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Abstract 
Decision-making capacity is an increasingly important medico-legal concept. The 
recent Mental Capacity Act employs a cognitive, process-based test of capacity, but in 
many psychiatric conditions pathological beliefs and values impair capacity even when 
the decision-making process is logically coherent. In such cases, capacity 
assessments implicitly rely on normative epistemic and evaluative standards. This 
raises a worry for the capacity test‘s reliability, objectivity and tolerance of differences 
in beliefs and values. 
 
There is currently little conceptual research on capacity and the normative standards 
underpinning its assessment. This thesis makes an original contribution to research by 
employing a number of philosophical approaches to map out a conceptual terrain within 
which questions about the substantive standards of capacity assessment can be 
framed. 
 
Focusing on the nature of epistemic standards and third-person judgements about 
decision-making, the thesis examines the normative constraints determining what 
counts as a recognisable reason for a decision. It employs the theoretical apparatus of 
Davidson‘s project of Radical Interpretation to explore the epistemology of 
interpretation, interrogating the conditions under which intentional attribution and the 
provision of reason explanations for behaviour are possible. It is contended that beliefs 
are intrinsically rational and intersubjective, and that judgements of irrationality are only 
possible against a background of shared belief between interpreter and observed 
agent. This view is defended against the objection that rationality is too stringent a 
constraint on belief. 
 
A misconception giving rise to this objection is then diagnosed. Drawing an analogy 
with Wittgenstein‘s rule-following considerations, it is submitted that the constitutive 
normativity of belief need not be codified in order to exert a genuine constraint on 
intentional behaviour. Rather, the norms of belief ought to be construed as emerging 
from shared practice. This indicates that normative judgements are disciplined through 
expertise and experience, rather than adherence to abstract principles. Finally, the 
implications of these insights for conceptualising and assessing capacity are 
considered. 
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The implementation of the Mental Capacity Act (2005) in England and Wales has 
heralded a surge of interest in the concept of mental capacity, its role in medical 
decision-making and its assessment in healthcare (Owen et al., 2009b). As mental 
capacity becomes an increasingly important concept in law, medical ethics and 
particularly psychiatry, further research will focus on the way it is assessed and the 
prevalence of incapacity judged according to the criteria of the Act. It is therefore 
important to establish whether the test for capacity employed in the legislation is able to 
successfully differentiate between vulnerable individuals who lack the capacity to make 
particular decisions about their welfare and treatment from those who retain this ability, 
even if their decisions go against prevailing medical opinions (Jones, 2005b).  
 
This thesis exploits a number of different literatures in law, clinical psychiatric research, 
bioethics, cognitive psychology, and themes in analytic philosophy of mind, language 
and psychiatry to consider how the criteria for capacity ought to be understood, and 
whether there are any universal normative standards underpinning judgements of 
capacity. The conceptual methodological approach taken situates this research within 
the field of philosophy of psychiatry, which is developing as a specialist domain of 
interest with the overarching aim of better understanding the field of psychiatry and its 
complex, diverse and contentious subject matter (Banner & Thornton, 2007). The 
methods and arguments employed here are largely derived from analytic philosophy, 
but the conclusions drawn are potentially compatible with conceptions of intentionality 
and interpersonal understanding drawn from a more Continental perspective. 
 
The first major claim of this thesis is that procedural criteria do not successfully 
distinguish capacity from incapacity, particularly in certain psychiatric cases. The 
presence of beliefs and values perceived to be pathological frequently lead to 
judgements that capacity is undermined even when the process of reasoning from the 
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provision of information to a decision outcome is logically intact. Arising primarily from 
bioethical literature on informed consent and the nature of autonomy, much 
philosophically-informed research into capacity has focused on the role of substantive 
values and whether particular kinds of desire or value ought to be held by a person 
deemed to possess the capacity to make decisions (Holroyd, 2010; Tan & Hope, 2008; 
Charland, 2001). However, no previous research has investigated the substantive 
epistemic conditions on capacity, namely whether there are constraints on what kinds 
of beliefs it would or would not be reasonable for a person to hold if he is to be judged 
to possess capacity.  
 
To address this question an original conceptual link is forged between judgements 
about a person‘s decision-making capacity and evaluations of the connection between 
one‘s actions and the reasons one has for those actions. Exploiting the wealth of 
literature in cognitive psychology on reasoning and decision-making, an informative 
parallel is drawn between the notions of procedural and epistemic rationality, and 
procedural and substantive criteria for capacity, which is of conceptual use in gaining 
traction on instances of irrationality in psychiatry that might undermine capacity. 
 
The theoretical project of Radical Interpretation (Davidson, 1973b), influential in the 
philosophy of mind and language, is uniquely employed in framing questions about 
third-person judgements of a person‘s reasons for a decision. The method is used to 
examine the conditions of possibility for the attribution of reasons and intentional states 
more broadly. This is in order to ascertain whether there are universal standards of 
rationality by which judgements about a person‘s reasons, and specifically his 
epistemic commitments, can be made. Emerging from this discussion is the claim that 
the intentional realm is intersubjectively constituted and structured by norms of 
rationality. In defending this view, which I term ―rational interpretationism‖, a novel 
argument in defence of the constitutive link between rationality and intentionality is 
developed based on the claim that opponents of this connection mistakenly conceive of 
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the demands of rationality in overly stringent, principled terms. It is argued that 
judgements about the rationality or irrationality of an agent‘s decision-making process 
can only occur against an assumed background of beliefs that are largely true and 
hang together in a broadly coherent whole. 
 
A therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein‘s remarks on rule-following forms the basis of two 
claims about the norms of intentional behaviour. Firstly, the idea of there being radically 
different forms of rationality is an empty one, as we are bounded in our interpretive 
capacities by our own mindedness and form of life. This renders unintelligible the 
possibility of utterly different ways of going on that are nonetheless perceived as 
intentional. Secondly, beliefs do have an intrinsically normative structure but the 
constitutive standards of normativity cannot be abstracted away from the context and 
practices in which they are manifest. Although well-established, the rule-following 
dialectic has not previously been applied to considerations about the normative 
standards underpinning third-person judgements of the rationality of beliefs and 
evaluations of decision-making processes.  
 
Two original conclusions about capacity judgements are drawn from these conceptual 
considerations. Whilst there may be variations in the details and emphasis of standards 
underpinning judgements about a person‘s reasons for a decision, the conceptual 
possibility of there being radically different forms of reason-giving between patient and 
clinician is closed off. Secondly, in seeking reliable standards for the assessment of 
capacity it is a mistake to focus judgements on the determination of context-free 
procedural or substantive criteria, as it is only by acknowledging the relational content, 
history and background of the decision-making context that judgements about a 
person‘s decision-making process can be reached. 
 
This thesis represents an initial step towards achieving a fuller grasp of what underpins 
judgements about a person‘s capacity with respect to a particular decision. The 
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philosophical exploration of the concept of capacity and judgements about a person‘s 
decision-making conducted here fill a niche that has previously been neglected in the 
empirical and conceptual literature on capacity. The conclusions presented thus form 
the basis of an enriched understanding of judgements of capacity that potentially could 
be applicable to the development of clinical guidance for training and policy in capacity 
assessment. It is my contention that notwithstanding the myriad ethical and legal 
complexities in determining capacity, it is imperative that the balance between 
protecting vulnerable individuals and preserving the right to individual autonomy is 
struck with as much conceptual sophistication as possible.  
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1. ASSESSING MENTAL CAPACITY 
1.1. THE LAW AND CAPACITY 
The Mental Capacity Act 
The Mental Capacity Act (2005) (MCA hereafter), fully implemented in England and 
Wales in October 2007, provides a statutory framework for dealing with individuals who 
may lack the ability to make decisions regarding their treatment, welfare or finances. It 
covers a wide range of protocols pertaining to, among other things, court powers, 
advance decisions, independent advocacy and powers of attorney. At its heart the 
legislation is concerned with preserving the autonomy of the individual as far as 
possible whilst allowing protection and care to be provided in the best interests of those 
who are unable to make their own decisions1 (Jones, 2005a). 
 
In this chapter I introduce the main provisions of the MCA, together with a brief 
examination of the clinical and legal background in which the legislation was 
developed. The principles underlying the legal framework will be explored and the 
commentary will focus on the conceptual basis of several key tenets of the MCA. 
Rather than provide a general overview (which can be found elsewhere, e.g., Ashton et 
al., 2006) particular attention will be paid to areas that, I will go on to argue, benefit 
from a close philosophical analysis to reveal the nature of the judgements involved in 
an assessment of the decision-making process. This discussion will raise a potential 
concern about the objectivity of clinical judgement that, if correct, raises an intractable 
problem for capacity assessment and the implementation of the Act, particularly in 
psychiatric practice.  
 
                                               
1
 Capacity and autonomy are intricately related concepts (Owen et al., 2009). Despite the 
prevalence of literature, particularly in bioethics, on the notion of autonomy and its role in law, I 
wish to focus solely on the conception of capacity as presented in the MCA free from the 
theoretical and conceptual apparatus of theories of autonomy. 
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The Act is accompanied by a detailed Code of Practice (CoP hereafter), designed to 
assist clinicians and health professionals in utilising the Act to ensure that capacity is 
properly assessed; decisions on behalf of those lacking capacity are made in their best 
interests; and to provide legal protection for those responsible for such decisions. The 
tenets of the MCA are based on common law principles established in key landmark 
legal rulings and several resultant consultation papers by the Law Commission (No. 
129, 1993; No. 128, 1993; No. 119, 1991). In the early 1990s a number of difficult 
cases arose that highlighted a gap in legislation for determining when an adult was 
incapacitated and how he or she should be treated if found to be incapable of making a 
decision. Against the background of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and an increasing focus on the rights of the individual, respect for personal 
autonomy has become the predominant governing principle in health care law (Gunn, 
1994, p.8). This is the case so long as the individual retains the capacity to make a 
decision about his or her treatment. Common law is clear that treating a competent 
patient involuntarily amounts to the clinician committing a battery (Grubb, 2004, p.161). 
In this respect the law has been heavily influenced by developments in bioethics 
regarding the notion of informed consent, which promotes the fundamental right of the 
individual to free choice and autonomy (Charland, 2008). 
 
Where a person is not capable of making a particular decision, a paternalistic decision 
on his behalf is legitimate and may even be ethically demanded to protect the 
individual‘s health and welfare. The common law principle of necessity dictates that 
there is a duty of care towards incompetent patients to save life, ensure the provision of 
beneficial medical treatment or prevent deterioration, or to act in the patient‘s best 
interests as determined by prevailing medical opinion (Raymont, 2002). The 
assessment of capacity is thus of crucial importance in medical decision-making and it 
is essential that the way it is tested sets a standard that strikes a balance between 




The MCA and its associated Code of Practice explicitly state that capacity is a 
functional notion, comprising two distinct but related aspects. Most importantly, the 
concept of capacity as functional means that its assessment should be based on 
evaluating the processes a patient uses to arrive at a decision rather than the content 
of the decision itself: “What matters is [the] ability to carry out the processes involved in 
making the decision – and not the outcome” (CoP, section 4.2). The concept of 
capacity employed here can be distinguished from two possible alternatives: the status 
and outcome approaches.  
 
A status approach to capacity would entail that if a person were deemed to lack 
capacity, this assessment would apply to all decisions that person could make. This 
kind of approach is typically taken with young children (Stauch et al., 2006, p.115) and 
is also implicitly employed in mental health legislation when a person is detained under 
a section for treatment of a mental disorder. In these cases decisions are 
paternalistically taken on the patient‘s behalf on the basis of a clinical judgement of 
best interests. The functional conception of capacity is thus distinct from the formal 
legal category of incompetence which implies a person is incapable of making any 
decisions at all for legal purposes (Nys et al., 2004). 
 
The outcome approach focuses on the result of the decision-making process. Any 
outcome deemed to be unreasonable, unwise, against conventionally held values or 
against medical opinion could be considered as evidence of incapacity2. This would 
undermine the very basis of requiring valid consent and vitiate the ideal of patient 
autonomy that health care law strives to protect (Stauch et al., ibid.). However, whilst 
indicating that assessing outcome is an inappropriate way to approach determining 
capacity, the Law Commission highlighted that it was in fact common in clinical practice 
                                               
2
 The distinction between process and outcome based judgements of decision-criterion has 
been explored more fully in bioethical literature on autonomy, where the dichotomy is set up as 
between procedural and substantive accounts of autonomy. 
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“…if the outcome is to reject a course which the doctor has advised then capacity is 
found to be absent” (Law Commission, Report No. 231, 1995, para. 3.4). This raises a 
conceptual and ethical issue regarding the way capacity assessments are conducted in 
practice and what assumptions clinicians might implicitly make about what it means to 
possess capacity when judging individual cases. 
 
The second aspect of the functional approach concerns the time and situation 
specificity of the assessment process. The CoP states that use of the term ―capacity‖ 
refers to “a person‟s…capacity to make a particular decision at the time it needs to be 
made” (CoP, p.19). This stipulation aims to ensure that a status approach is not taken 
to an individual whose capacity is in question. This is particularly important in contexts 
where an individual‘s capacity fluctuates depending on, for example, the time of day, 
cycle of mood or the effects of medication. Capacity is therefore not concerned with 
general cognitive or reasoning abilities abstracted away from the specific context in 
which it is being assessed. 
Capacity, Psychiatry and the Mental Health Act 
Mental health law and the MCA have in common the provision of statutory powers by 
which an individual‘s right to make decisions regarding his welfare and treatment can 
be revoked. However, there is a clear distinction between the two sets of legislation, 
reflecting their very different purposes. The purpose of capacity legislation is to protect 
the interests of people with mental impairments. Mental health law, by contrast, has a 
dual concern with public safety and operates on the basis of managing risks to the self 
or others (Fennell, 2007).  
 
In 2006 Richards and Mughal predicted that there would be significant interplay 
between mental health legislation and the MCA, particularly in cases concerning 
severe learning disabilities or dementia. The Mental Health Act (2007) supersedes the 
Mental Capacity Act for patients who qualify for a section under the former, so that if a 
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person is deemed to be seriously mentally ill and posing a danger to himself or others 
he may be detained irrespective of considerations about his capacity3. The MCA 
therefore applies to the large proportion of patients who need not be detained under a 
Mental Health Act section but who nonetheless may require others to make treatment 
decisions on their behalf4. 
 
Patients who do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Mental Health Act may be at a 
greater risk of being deemed to be lacking capacity than other clinical populations. 
Evidence for this phenomenon is rife (Raymont et al., 2004; Wong et al., 2000; Cairns 
et al., 2005ab) and it has been pointed out that “until recently it was commonly 
presumed that serious mental illness, by definition, rendered a patient incapable of 
consenting to treatment” (Cairns et al., 2005a, discussing a study by Grisso et al., 
1997). The functional concept of capacity used in the MCA is intended to avoid 
discriminating against patients merely on the basis of a diagnosis of mental disorder or 
learning disability (CoP, p.57). 
 
Van Staden and Kruger (2003) discuss the various concomitants of certain mental 
illnesses that may compromise a patient‘s capacity: indifference, ambivalence or 
indecisiveness during major depressive or manic episodes, problems with memory in 
dementia and disorganisation of thoughts in schizophrenia or other psychotic illnesses 
may clearly render an individual unable to make a decision regarding his treatment. 
However, Carpenter et al. (2000) demonstrate that impairments in decisional capacity 
were only modestly related to symptom prevalence in schizophrenia, with a much 
stronger correlation between poor performance on decisional tasks and cognitive 
                                               
3
 Efforts to bring mental health and mental capacity legislation together (Dawson & Szmukler, 
2006) aim at closing the gap between the conceptual and normative questions, arguing that if 
someone possesses capacity with respect to a decision, there are no circumstances under 
which this capacity should not be respected, but current mental health legislation in England 
and Wales contradicts this view. 
4 It will also apply to patients sectioned under the Mental Health Act who are in need of 
treatment for a physical disorder, which is not covered by the involuntary powers of the Mental 
Health Act. Only treatment for the mental disorder for which a patient is detained can be given 
compulsorily, and thus a test of capacity under the MCA will need to be conducted even for 
patients who are detained. 
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impairments that are not specific to psychiatric conditions. Presence of a severe mental 
illness does not therefore entail one‘s capacity is impaired. 
 
This assertion is reflected in the judgement of Justice Thorpe in a landmark case (Re C 
[1994]). An institutionalised patient suffering from schizophrenia, who believed that he 
was a world-famous doctor, refused to consent to his gangrenous leg being amputated. 
He did not believe the gangrene would kill him and he held a strong desire to die with 
his body intact. His doctors believed it was extremely likely that he would die if the 
amputation did not occur, and sought permission from the courts to carry out the 
operation in spite of the patient‘s refusal. The judge ruled that although the patient was 
suffering from delusions resulting from a severe mental illness, this did not compromise 
his ability to make a specific treatment decision about the amputation of his foot5 
(Stauch et al., 2006, p.117). 
 
Owen et al. (2009b) describe two categories of psychiatric patients to whom the MCA 
might apply. Patients with organic psychiatric diagnoses such as dementia or severe 
learning disabilities, which involve clear cognitive and memory impairments, form one 
group. For such patients capacity assessments may be reasonably straightforward and 
surrogate decision-making in their best interests is legitimised on the basis of their 
inability to engage with the process of decision-making at all. The other group 
comprises patients whose incapacity might not be thought of in cognitive terms: 
severely depressed patients who are ambivalent about treatment; paranoid 
schizophrenic individuals who do not trust or appreciate the significance of information 
given to them about their treatment; or patients with anorexia whose thought processes 
are dominated by fears and desires about their weight, for example. In such cases, 
surrogate decision-making is predominantly conducted on the basis of risk of harm, but 
if the risk does not qualify as sufficiently severe to warrant detention under section, an 
                                               
5
 Despite the refusal to permit amputation the patient survived and his leg responded to 
alternative treatment, reminding us that medical opinion about what constitutes the best form of 
treatment is indeed fallible (Gunn et al., 1999). 
 11 
assessment of capacity is required, and if capacity is intact the patient‘s decision must 
be respected. Capacity assessments for these patients are considerably more complex 
and represent the most challenging cases for clinical judgement, and are the most 
interesting for a philosophical exploration of the concept of capacity. 
The Presumption of Capacity 
The MCA contains five guiding principles, designed to emphasise the underlying ethos 
of the Act and make clear that the legislation is concerned with balancing autonomy 
and dignity with protection for those who lack capacity (Ashton et al., 2006). The first of 
these principles is the presumption that all adults have capacity unless it is established 
that they do not (MCA s 1(2)). The onus of proof is on the assessing clinician or health 
professional to show ‗on the balance of probabilities‘, (which is the usual legal standard 
in civil proceedings) that a patient lacks capacity to make a specific treatment decision 
(British Medical Association & The Law Society, 2004). A patient‘s incapacity with 
respect to a particular decision cannot be presumed or inferred on the basis of his 
appearance, age, behaviour or medical or psychiatric diagnosis (MCA, s 2 (3a,b)). 
Judgements influencing the development of the MCA have been explicit in their efforts 
to endorse this approach in standard clinical and legal practice.  
Unwise Decisions 
Another guiding principle of the Act stipulates that: “[a] person is not to be treated as 
unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision” (MCA, s 
1(4)). The competently made unwise decision should stand even if family members, 
friends or clinicians are unhappy with that decision. Such a right has been enshrined in 
English common law since 1850 (Ashton et al., 2006). Its purpose is to avoid as far as 
possible the threat of medical paternalism, which would lead to a patient‘s right to 
autonomy being overruled if a clinician does not agree that the patient has made the 
right or best decision. 
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Under normal circumstances where the ability of a person to make a decision is not in 
question, he has an inalienable right to decide whatever he wants, even if this is likely 
to result in his own death or disability. No reasons, justifications or rationalisations need 
to be provided to substantiate or explain his decision:  
―…the patient‘s right of choice exists whether the reasons for making that 
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent‖ (Lord Donaldson 
in Re T [1992] at 653).  
―A mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to 
medical treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, 
even where that decision may lead to his or her own death‖ (Re MB [1997] at 
426) 
The case Re MB established at law that decisions based on irrational beliefs do not 
indicate a lack of capacity unless the belief is caused by a mental impairment. The 
implication here was that even a decision that is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic 
or of accepted moral standards… [that]…no sensible person…could have arrived at it” 
(Re MB at 437) does not indicate the person should be found to lack capacity. It is only 
if a mental disturbance or impairment to mental functioning looks to be compromising 
this decision-making ability that capacity comes into question. 
 
Even where doctors and the majority of people might consider a particular decision to 
be unwise, the patient retains the right to make that decision if the process of decision-
making is intact. If the stipulation regarding the wisdom of decisions were revoked, 
patients would be restricted to making decisions in accord with medical opinion. The 
converse situation may also arise if this outcome approach to capacity is taken: 
agreement with medical opinion would lead clinicians to believe the patient does 
possess capacity, even if the patient is merely passively complying and not actively 
consenting to the proposed treatment (Gunn, 1994). A seemingly wise decision may 
also not necessarily be underpinned by a reasonable decision-making process. A 
patient could agree to risky surgery for the wrong reasons, such as a deluded belief in 
his own invincibility. Thus even a ‗wise‘ decision outcome would not be indicative of the 
patient possessing capacity. Placing the unwise decision principle on the face of the 
MCA amounts to an explicit rejection of the outcome approach to capacity, although as 
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the Law Commission noted we should recognise that such an approach “is almost 
certainly in daily use” 6 (Report No. 231, para 3.19). 
 
In spite of the assurances laid down in the MCA and its CoP, clinicians may well 
consider treatment refusal as grounds for suspecting the patient may lack capacity: 
“doctors faced with a refusal of consent have to give very careful and detailed 
consideration to the patient‟s capacity to decide…” (Re T at 662). This suggests that a 
decision clinicians consider to be unwise, such as refusing treatment, may give rise to 
suspicion that the patient lacks capacity even in the absence of prior evidence of 
mental impairment. The patient‘s capacity would then be formally assessed under the 
criteria of the capacity test and his decision-making process scrutinised: a stringent 
demand considering that ordinarily no reasons or justifications are required. Such 
reasoning hints at an implicit outcome approach to capacity, leading to the burden of 
proof being placed upon the patient to prove he does have capacity or to provide 
reasons for his refusal, rather than there being a presumption of capacity (Kennedy, 
1997, p.320-1). This illustrates the difficulties posed in practice of attempting to divorce 
decision outcome from the process of decision-making. 
 
The principles of the MCA point towards a conception of mental capacity that has 
important legal, ethical and political dimensions. Determining that a patient lacks 
capacity enables a clinician to make decisions on the patient‘s behalf in his best 
interests, thus investing the clinician with considerable power and responsibility over 
that individual‘s life, temporarily at least. To avoid an overly paternalistic approach 
much emphasis has been placed in the MCA on evaluating the process of decision-
making and not its content or outcome. 
 
                                               
6
 Nonetheless, the Code of Practice states that there may be concern if somebody repeatedly 
makes unwise decisions that put them at risk of harm or exploitation or makes a particular 
unwise decision that is obviously irrational or out of character (CoP, p.25). 
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1.2. ASSESSING CAPACITY 
Mental Impairment and Incapacity 
The test for capacity is intended to aid clinicians in determining whether a patient‘s 
decision is autonomous, and thus ought to be respected, or indicative of a lack of 
autonomy and can thus be overruled because it is made on the basis of a mental 
impairment: 
―...a person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if at the material time he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.‖ (MCA, 
s 2(1)) 
Sections 2 and 3 of the Act set out a two-stage process for testing capacity. The first 
stage checks the inclusion criterion that the person must be suffering from an 
impairment or disturbance to his mental functioning, whether this is temporary or 
permanent7 (CoP, section 4.11). Only if this criterion is fulfilled does assessment 
proceed to the second stage, which stipulates that for a person to come under the 
powers of the Act, the impairment of mental functioning must be causing an inability to 
make the relevant decision. Examples of such impairment include delirium, coma, 
severe brain damage, dementia and severe learning difficulties. A further category of 
inclusion is the deliberately worded “conditions associated with some forms of mental 
illness” (CoP, loc. cit.) although the Code is clear to emphasise that a psychiatric 
diagnosis alone does not constitute incapacity. Informed largely by empirical research, 
investigations into the relation between impairment and incapacity have focused mainly 
on the physiological and neuropsychological effects some mental disturbances have on 
cognitive functioning. Doubts about capacity commonly arise with respect to individuals 
suffering from psychotic disorders or severe cognitive impairment. In these cases it is 
often clear that there is a causal relation between mental impairment and disruption of 
at least one of the component abilities of capacity. Delirium, which is a common source 
of incapacity in hospitalised patients, conspicuously affects a person‘s decision-making 
                                               
7
 In earlier versions of the legislation, a mental disorder as defined under the Mental Health Act 
(1983) was a necessary precondition for capacity assessment, but this was dropped in part to 
avoid discrimination and in part to broaden the scope of legislative powers to include non-
psychiatric populations (Gunn, 1999, p.282). 
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ability by altering cognition and disrupting thought processes to render the actions and 
utterances of the person incomprehensible (Raymont, 2002). The severe cognitive 
impairment typical of advanced dementia is perhaps the classic example of a clear 
indication that a patient may lack capacity (Kim et al., 2002; Nygaard et al., 2000). 
Capacity may also be impaired by external factors that have only a temporary effect. 
Shock, confusion, sedation, fatigue, panic, pain and medication may all potentially 
undermine capacity by diminishing the person‘s ability to take in information or engage 
in a coherent process of decision-making (Grubb & Laing, 2004, para 3.91). 
 
The early Law Commission reports (Report No. 231, 1995; No. 129, 1993; No. 128, 
1993; No. 119, 1991) stated that the presence of mental impairment must be 
established as the sine qua non of capacity assessment and subsequently it must be 
determined that this impairment causes an inability to make the decision at hand. 
Mental impairment is thus a necessary but not sufficient condition of incapacity (Nys et 
al., 2004). The inclusion of this criterion was influenced by the judgement of LJ Butler-
Sloss in Re MB [1997]. In this case a heavily pregnant woman consented to delivering 
her baby by Caesarean section for medical reasons and because the baby was at risk. 
However she suffered from an extreme needle-phobia and panicked at the last 
moment, withdrawing her consent to the procedure. The judicial judgement was made 
that she was suffering from a temporary mental impairment in virtue of her phobia at 
the time of decision-making, and was thereby rendered incompetent to refuse. This 
case established at law that a judgement of incapacity can only be made if there is a 
causal relation between a mental impairment and the suspected incapacity.  
The Test for Capacity 
The second stage of assessment sets out a test of capacity, introduced to assist in the 
judgement as to whether a person is unable to make a decision: 
―…a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable- 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision; 
(b) to retain that information; 
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(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision; or 
(d) to communicate his decision‖ (MCA s 3(1)) 
If an individual cannot demonstrate any one of these four abilities in spite of sincere 
efforts being made to assist the decision-making process then he can be deemed to 
lack capacity8. Crucially, the assessment of these abilities is not supposed to inform the 
judgement about whether or not the patient is suffering from a mental disturbance or 
impairment, or the test would risk being circular. In order for the test to be non-question 
begging, a person‘s failure on any of the four criteria ought not to be used as evidence 
for mental impairment9 (Kennedy, 1997), p.322). I will consider these conditions for 
incapacity in turn. 
Understanding and Retaining Information 
A necessary requirement for capacity is that one understands and retains the 
information relevant to the decision. This includes having an awareness of the purpose 
of the treatment, an idea of what it will involve and the consequences of deciding to 
receive or refuse the treatment, or of not making a decision at all (Ashton et al., 2006, 
para 2.57). Every appropriate effort must be made to assist in communicating this 
information to the patient. These criteria aim to minimise the gap between potential and 
actual understanding so that the patient is able to participate in the decision-making 
process to the best of his abilities (Gunn, 1994, p.18). 
 
Whilst the requirement of imparting relevant information to the patient appears 
straightforward, Gunn et al. (1999) reported difficulty in ascertaining what the important 
relevant information should be in a research setting in which patients were assessed 
for capacity to consent to the simple procedure of a blood test. The authors indicate 
that somewhat to their surprise it was not easy to reach consensus about what patients 
needed to demonstrate to be assessed as understanding the relevant information. 
                                               
8
 Efforts to maximise the patient‘s ability to comprehend the information and decide for himself 
include using simple language, visual aids, conducting the assessment when the patient is most 
cognitively alert, and so on. 
9
 As of yet here is insufficient empirical evidence from the early implementation of the MCA to 
determine whether or not this potential circularity arises in practice. 
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Thus although these criteria looks as though they are tapping into cognitive capacities, 
namely memory and attention, there are ambiguities and subtleties in their application 
that will impact on how they are judged in practice10. For instance, there has been 
conflict in judgements as to whether it is necessary that a patient believes the 
information being presented to him about his condition in order to be deemed to 
possess capacity (Re C; Re MB). This may be because appreciation can be 
considered a necessary part of understanding: unless a patient appreciates and 
believes that the information about treatment being presented applies to him and his 
situation, he could not be said to understand that information. 
 
The presence of a mental illness may prevent a patient from being able to 
acknowledge the need for medical treatment. It may also be the case that a patient is 
capable of hypothetically understanding the proposed treatment and reasoning about it 
whilst denying that he needs any intervention. This could occur when patients simply 
do not accept their doctor‘s diagnosis or opinion about their illness (Stauch et al., 2006, 
p.121). It would be undesirable for legislation to require that in order to have capacity, a 
patient must believe everything a clinician tells him about his illness and treatment. 
However, “patients who refuse treatment in a psychiatric setting are particularly likely to 
be judged as lacking capacity” (Hotopf, 2005, p.582), indicating that in practice at least 
clinicians may consider treatment refusal to indicate a failure to understand and 
appreciate the facts of their condition and their need for treatment11. 
 
The issue of appreciation extends beyond the question of whether or not understanding 
incorporates an element of acknowledgement that the information presented applies to 
and is relevant to oneself and one‘s situation. Decision-making is not a purely abstract 
or intellectual exercise but contains an important affective element: the decisions made 
impact upon the person‘s life, health and relationships. Emotional value may be 
                                               
10
 See Manson & O‘Neill (2007) for an account of the implications a fine-grained understanding 
of these criteria have for the notion of informed consent in bioethics. 
11
 Appreciation is taken here to be similar to the concept of insight in psychiatry. 
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attached to various risks and benefits, the capacity for appreciation of which differs 
from a mere factual or abstract understanding of the situation (Gunn et al., 1999, p.19). 
For example, a person suffering from a severe episode of depression may be able to 
understand the facts relating to proposed courses of treatment, but he attaches no 
emotional significance and is ambivalent towards any proposal (Rudnick, 2002). It 
would be questionable whether such a patient unable to appreciate the significance of 
the decision-making situation and its potential impact on his life, health and welfare had 
the capacity to make this treatment decision. 
Using or Weighing Information 
The criterion of using or weighing information in the process of coming to a decision is 
perhaps the most conceptually difficult to understand and empirically difficult to test or 
measure. In employing this criterion the functional approach aims to direct capacity 
assessment towards an evaluation of the process of decision-making rather than its 
outcome. A person is able to use or weigh information in coming to a decision insofar 
as he can consider the risks, benefits, consequences of receiving or not receiving 
treatment and take into account his own beliefs and system of values in determining 
what to do (Ashton et al., 2006, para 2.61). Little further specification has been given 
for what constitutes a threshold for its fulfilment. 
 
It is natural to assume that in assessing whether someone is using or weighing 
information, one needs to be aware of what information is entering into that process. 
Whilst the relevant treatment information imparted by the clinician will be an important 
part of this, other factors such as a value system and personal beliefs will also be 
influential in determining the decision outcome (Stauch et al., 2006, p.126). A 
hypothetical clinical vignette drawn from the CoP illustrates some of the relevant 
considerations. A patient with learning disabilities needs to have regular blood tests to 
monitor his medication for a minor heart condition, but has a phobia of needles. His 
doctor explains the purpose of the blood test and demonstrates what the procedure will 
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involve. In the process of decision-making, the patient will need to handle a number of 
different factors that may influence that process and its outcome. Highly relevant will be 
the patient‘s beliefs about a variety of things including that: he has a heart problem; it 
needs treatment; the blood test is an important part of his treatment; his doctor is trying 
to help manage his condition; the test won‘t harm him; there are possible negative 
consequences for his health if he refuses the test; he is scared of needles. He may 
also hold a particular set of values and have certain desires: the desire to stay healthy; 
to avoid being hurt; to prove he is capable of independent living; to be a good patient; 
to avoid situations that make him anxious. Whilst not all of these factors will be evident 
to the assessing clinician, the patient must be able to display some kind of process 
leading from the acknowledgement and understanding of the given treatment 
information to the reaching of a decision. This superficial outline indicates that using or 
weighing information entails taking available evidence and testimony together with an 
appreciation of one‘s beliefs and values to produce some kind of decisional outcome. 
The terminology I am using to describe the process is deliberately vague at this point: it 
is by no means clear what counts as using or weighing information other than there is 
an as yet unspecified connection between all the ‗input‘ factors and the decision 
outcome. One prominent legal commentator queries why this standard is in place: “why 
does the law insist on evidence that information, once comprehended, retained and 
believed, must be weighed in the balance?” (Kennedy, 1997, p.321). The functional 
approach takes it that this very process, marking the transition from taking on board 
information to reaching a decision, is of central importance in the determination of 
capacity. Examining the nature of and evidence for this process will be a major focus of 
this thesis. 
Communicating a Decision 
A patient must be able to communicate his decision, whether verbally, in sign-
language, through the use of visual symbols or by some other means, if he is to be 
considered to have capacity. This criterion is particularly relevant for patients who have 
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suffered strokes or a paralysis-inducing neurological deficit. A person might be able to 
understand, retain, assess and reason with the information about his condition and 
treatment options but if he is unable to express his decision, he lacks capacity. The 
significance of this criterion will be brought to bear in later chapters when I consider the 
importance of the interface of communication for third-person judgements about a 
person‘s reasoning process. 
 
This discussion of the MCA has outlined the development of the ethical and legal 
principles central to the legislation. I now turn to examine how the challenges of 
assessing capacity have been met in clinical research and what conceptions of 
capacity and its measurement underlie the predominant approach. In doing so I 
question some fundamental presuppositions about the possibility of generating 
impartial, objective judgements of capacity and consider the implications this has for 
the assessment of patients‘ decision-making processes. 
 
1.3. EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CAPACITY 
The Concept of Mental Capacity 
Several questions need to be distinguished if we are to understand the concept of 
capacity and how it functions in clinical practice12. Firstly, there is a conceptual 
question: ―what is capacity?‖ What does it mean to say that someone possesses or 
lacks the capacity to make treatment choices? This question is primarily non-empirical, 
as it asks after the presuppositions underlying any theory of capacity or its assessment. 
Capacity is a legal, clinical, ethical and social construct (Hotopf, 2005) and as such 
cannot be understood by reference to one field of expertise alone. Secondly, there is a 
normative question: ―what rights does capacity confer on a person?‖ This concerns the 
                                               
12 The term competence is used more frequently in legal literature, often to confer a status upon 
a person, whereas capacity is more usual in clinical usage. Bielby (2005) warns against 
conflating these two concepts, and in the USA this separation between clinical and legal usage 
of the terms is maintained. However throughout this thesis I will use the terms ‗capacity‘ and 
‗competence‘ interchangeably, in line with common usage in the UK. 
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legal, moral and political normative obligations that influence how we, as a society, 
treat individuals with and without capacity. The third question is an epistemic one that 
has been addressed in the empirical clinical literature: ―how can we determine whether 
or not an individual has capacity?‖ There are many clinical tests and diagnostic tools 
designed to aid the assessment of mental capacity, all of which strive for increased 
reliability across raters and different contexts.  
 
Charland (2001) distinguishes two aspects of capacity, referred to as the “dual nature 
of competence” to illustrate the different concerns in play when an assessment of 
capacity needs to be made. It is first important to understand what capacity is and how 
it can be measured. Charland refers to this as the ―descriptive‖ dimension of 
competence, understanding of which aims to provide objective, valid definitions or 
descriptions of what it is to possess or to lack capacity, and to develop diagnostic tools 
to help clinicians make this determination13. Additionally however, an ethical question 
also comes into play concerning whether or not a person should retain his right to 
personal autonomy. This is determined by the legal and ethical framework within which 
one is working. Charland considers the ethical question to form the second and 
normative dimension of capacity. Normativity here concerns what it is appropriate, 
correct or right to do or think, construed in terms of moral obligations or imperatives14. I 
will say considerably more about the notion of normativity later, arguing that the sphere 
of normativity is not limited to the realm of ethics, but here the term serves as a 
placeholder to describe the specifically ethically oriented dimension of capacity. 
 
The overriding principle of respect for autonomy in health care law ensures that only 
the first dimension of capacity is usually relevant. If a person has capacity, it follows 
that he ought to have the right to make his own choices. For the vast majority of cases 
                                               
13
 At this point I am using the term ‗objective‘ in a lay scientific sense to signify something that 
exists independently of an observer. 
14
 This conception of the dual nature of capacity was originally noted by Freedman (1981, p.55), 
an influential writer on mental capacity, who queried whether competence is an empirical or 
moral form. 
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the ―descriptive‖ aspect of capacity is the sole determinant of whether a person should 
be permitted to make his own treatment choices. However, if a patient is deemed to 
pose a risk to himself or to others on the grounds of mental disorder he may be 
detained under the Mental Health Act and compulsorily treated irrespective of his 
capacity to make treatment decisions (MHA 2007, CoP, sections 4.9-4.10). Here, 
respect for autonomy is overridden by the ethically-motivated determination that the 
patient should not be permitted to make treatment choices. 
 
Taking both ethical and descriptive dimensions into account suggests that determining 
whether a person should be entitled to make his own decision requires a two-stage 
evaluation: firstly, a descriptive account of whether or not the patient does in fact 
possess capacity, and secondly a normative ethical judgement about whether the 
patient‘s capacity (if intact) should be respected. Carving up the dimensions of capacity 
assessment in this way provides an insight into the way in which research into mental 
capacity and its assessment has proceeded. If we are seeking to test mental capacity 
the factual, descriptive component appears to fulfil this role sufficiently, and 
independently of the ethically normative dimension. Separating out the ethically 
normative issues from the descriptive project ensures that research into what capacity 
is and how it can be measured, evaluated and assessed can continue independently of 
the ethical complexities of balancing autonomy with protection. However, I suggest that 
the distinction between descriptive and ethically normative components of capacity is 
misleading: it assumes that the only normative considerations relevant to capacity are 
ethical norms that impact after the fact of making a descriptive judgement about a 
person‘s capacity status. In the following discussion I avoid the considerable and 
complex ethical debate surrounding problems in the ethics of mental capacity (see for 
instance Buchanan & Brock, 1986), instead focusing on the descriptive dimension of 
capacity. The question I wish to consider is whether the definition and determination of 
capacity are indeed free of normative considerations. This will firstly require an 
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examination of the underpinnings of the predominant approach to capacity and its 
assessment in contemporary research. 
The Operational Approach 
An influential paper by Appelbaum and Roth (1982) developed what has become 
known as the ―cognitive conception‖ of capacity, claiming that capacity is comprised of 
a set of cognitive abilities or faculties15. This approach assumes that capacity can be 
operationalised through measuring what are presumed to be its constituent 
psychological processes. These processes are taken to be, in principle, amenable to 
observation and measurement by a third party observer, via the construction of scales 
or indices of observable behaviour or functions concerning memory, inferential 
reasoning and information processing (ibid). This is common in empirical psychology 
where it is often difficult to gauge abstract psychological constructs or processes 
through direct measurements, and “the fact that these abilities are characterised as 
cognitive is usually deemed essential to the objectivity of the proposed operationalised 
standards for assessing them”16 (Charland, 2001, p.136). On the basis of an 
assumption that capacity is constituted by certain kinds of psychological processes the 
epistemic project of determining a person‘s capacity can be pursued: using 
operationalised criteria for the fulfilment of capacity, the right kinds of tools can be 
devised to measure the constitutive processes. The cognitive view supposes that the 
relevant processes and mechanisms are the ability to store information, to identify its 
relevance and to process it in order to make a decision, broadly construed as the 
capacities of memory, understanding and reasoning. Established tests of 
neuropsychological functioning such as the mini mental state examination have 
demonstrated strong correlations with judgements of incapacity in studies involving 
organic psychiatric disorders, but only weak and inconsistent correlations where it is 
                                               
15
 Note that the term ‗cognitive‘ is here employed as it is used cognitive science and 
psychology: to refer to internal mental processes. It is not used in the philosophical sense of 
cognitive states as being truth evaluable.  
16
 For instance, fear is not necessarily directly observable to a third person observer but the 
concept may be operationalised by measuring galvanic skin response, on the assumption that 
increased perspiration rate is taken to be a reliable measure of a person‘s degree of fear. 
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not so clear that cognitive functioning is impaired (Okai et al., 2007). This suggests that 
incapacity cannot be modelled on standard tools for assessing neuropsychological 
deficits alone (Owen et al., 2009b). 
 
The shift towards operationalising criteria for testing and diagnosis of mental illness has 
been mirrored by progressive editions of the American Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) from DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980) onwards. Progress and improvement in the utility of assessment tools is 
achieved as they become increasingly reliable and less susceptible to the 
idiosyncrasies of individual clinical judgements, yielding similar results when used by 
different clinicians. Significant efforts have been made to minimise the role of the 
clinician in the diagnosis of mental disorders by a clear preference instead for scales of 
symptoms rated according to observed behaviour, self-report questionnaires and, if 
possible, biological markers. Indeed, papers written for the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) that aim to set out a research agenda for DSM-V and beyond 
explicitly argue for reducing the role of clinical judgement to “remove items that cannot 
be determined reliably through patient self-reporting or through objectively observable 
signs of behaviours” (Kupfer et al., 2002, p.21). Clearly, reliance on the clinician‘s 
judgement is considered to be inferior and undesirable compared to objective 
physiological markers and supposedly impartial psychological assessments based on 
rating scales. The intention here is to increase the reliability and validity of diagnosis. 
Reliability can be construed as the extent to which different clinicians agree on an 
assessment, whereas validity refers to the extent to which the tools measure what they 
purport to measure. This shift towards operationalising diagnostic criteria rests on the 
assumption that what such tests are measuring is in fact an objectively verifiable 
psychological construct or process. To this end the clinician is merely a trained 
impartial observer making descriptive judgements about what is or is not the case 
about a patient‘s mental states and cognitive functioning. 
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There are obvious advantages to such an approach to capacity assessment. Reliable, 
valid criteria and testing procedures create a transparent process, reducing the risk of 
abuse by clinicians and standardising assessments irrespective of patient background, 
or cultural or religious diversity. However, operational diagnostic criteria overlook the 
essential role of the clinician in determining what counts as fulfilling the capacity 
criteria. Furthermore, in what follows I argue that what is being assessed is an 
inherently normative process, and this normativity potentially generates difficulties for 
the idea that decision-making processes can be objectively assessed. I now turn to a 
brief survey of the diagnostic aids and tools that have been developed to assist in 
capacity assessments to support the first claim. 
 
Most research in the area of mental capacity is based on unified, underlying 
assumptions about the cognitive nature of capacity and takes a broadly similar 
approach to the generation and analysis of tools used for its assessment. Appelbaum 
and Roth (1982) established four operationalisable criteria which they deemed should 
be met if a person is to be considered to possess capacity: 
 Understanding of information; 
 Appreciation of relevance of treatment options to one‘s own situation; 
 Reasoning using the information provided; 
 Communicating a decision. 
The first three of these criteria are explicitly concerned with testing patients‘ memory, 
information processing and inferential reasoning capabilities, the assumption being that 
a good test of capacity would enable clinicians to provide a binary ‗yes or no‘ 
judgement about whether patients could demonstrate each of these abilities in relation 
to a particular decision. Based on these criteria the MacArthur treatment competence 
study (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Grisso et al., 1995; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995b; 
Grisso et al., 1997) was designed to develop standardised tools for assessing capacity, 
and from these initial studies the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment 
(MacCAT-T) was devised. It consists of a series of adaptable questions that can be 
tailored to the specific situation and administered by interview with a patient. The 
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MacCAT-T assists in determining capacity by rating each of the constitutive abilities on 
a 3-point scale (inadequate, partial, adequate). The virtue of this approach is that it is 
straightforwardly applicable in practice (Grisso et al., 1997) and generates a high level 
of concordance among clinicians when using the same tools. The MacCAT-T has been 
used frequently to determine the prevalence of incapacity in general medical (e.g., 
Raymont et al., 2004) and psychiatric settings (Cairns et al., 2005b; Vollman et al., 
2003) and it provides a high degree of inter-rater reliability (Okai et al., 2007). The 
developers do, however, stress that the diagnostic tool is intended to be used as an aid 
to assessment alongside clinical judgement and there are no absolute cut-off or 
threshold scores for distinguishing capacity from incapacity (Grisso & Appelbaum, 
1995a). 
 
The utility of such diagnostic tools has been investigated by comparing the 
assessments clinicians make when using these tools to the assessments of an expert 
psychiatric clinician. Here the judgement of the expert is used as the standard against 
which the tools are assessed. For instance, in a study by Janofksy et al. (1992) the 
authors explicitly judged the accuracy, reliability and validity of an assessment tool 
similar to the MacCAT-T on the basis of the goodness-of-fit it produced relative to 
expert psychiatric assessment. Similar methodologies have been employed to evaluate 
other diagnostic tools: their ability to discriminate patients found by an expert 
psychiatrist to lack capacity from competent individuals has been reported as evidence 
for their utility in clinical settings (Bean et al., 1994; Tomoda et al., 1997). Yet in none 
of these studies is any further detail provided about how or by what process these 
expert judgements are made, nor by what criteria a clinician was deemed to have such 
expertise. 
 
When comparing assessments made by different methods, either with diagnostic tools 
or based in expert clinical judgement, there is often a significant discrepancy between 
clinical and tool-based evaluations (Kitamura et al., 1998; Mukherjee & Shah, 2001; 
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Vellinga et al., 2004). Thus when using diagnostic tools to assist in assessment, 
clinicians often appear to reach different conclusions about the capacity of patients 
than when they make a judgement that is not guided or constrained by the concept of 
capacity upon which the tools are based. This finding strikes a prima facie blow to the 
assumed validity of assessment tools as it indicates their criteria do not match up to 
general clinical intuitions about what constitutes capacity. Indeed, some commentators 
have acknowledged that criterion validity, which concerns how closely different 
measures of the same hypothetical construct match up, is impossible to test for 
capacity assessments (Cairns et al., 2005a). 
Unpicking the Assumptions 
Two specific issues are raised by this brief examination of the development and 
underlying assumptions of capacity assessment tools. The first concerns the role of the 
expert clinician in determining capacity, which the operationalising of criteria seeks to 
minimise. The tools are based on the fundamental assumption that the determination of 
capacity is a matter of an impartial, passive observer ascertaining whether a patient 
has certain abilities in relation to decision-making. However, even the determination of 
capacity made using the diagnostic tools is calibrated during their development by the 
judgement of an expert clinician. Although there may be considerable agreement 
between clinicians, difficult cases appear to yield different assessments from experts 
(ibid). This is not an issue unique to capacity assessment, since all tools and 
instruments of measurement rely to some degree on a human perspective both to 
gather and interpret relevant data: there are many situations in which experts may fail 
to reach consensus, even where the judgement is about an objective matter of fact17. 
The essential role a clinician plays in making the assessment does not therefore 
necessarily undermine the objectivity of what the judgement is about, if that judgement 
is merely a matter of making a potentially difficult binary decision about the fulfilment of 
a set of operational criteria by the patient. 
                                               
17
 Concordance rates between radiographers in reading x-rays are a case in point (Sackett et 
al., 1991, p.30). 
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However, the second issue raised by this survey of diagnostic tools impacts on this 
assumption and queries the foundations of the cognitive approach to capacity. 
Acknowledging the difficulty in establishing a ―gold standard‖ for capacity assessment 
instruments Kim (2001; 2006) highlights that the cognitive conception relies on the 
assumption that what is being investigated and assessed is an objectively measurable 
phenomenon. Yet assessment tools are ultimately calibrated by the judgement of an 
expert clinician, not a perspective-neutral measure of cognitive functioning. Low 
concordance rates recorded when clinicians are not guided by diagnostic tools (e.g., 
Kitamura et al., 1998) suggest that clinicians may be intuitively employing different 
concepts of capacity or its constituent abilities, further undermining the idea that 
capacity assessment is a matter of the impartial, theory-neutral measurement of 
observable behaviours and functions. Some authors have criticised the cognitive bias 
in research, and the MacCAT-T in particular, for underplaying the complexity of 
decision-making and overstating the operationalised elements of capacity (Breden & 
Vollmann, 2004; Higgs, 2004; Silberfeld, 1994). Such criticisms do not merely attack 
the level of refinement of the tools but seek to undermine the assumption that capacity 
can be determined by ascertaining scores or indices of the patient‘s mental functioning.  
Capacity Judgements on Cognitive Criteria 
One strategy for dealing with this potential problem for the objectivity of capacity 
assessments is to modify the criteria for capacity to measure only those elements of 
capacity that can be descriptively ascertained. This approach is outlined by Culver and 
Gert (2004). They moot the possibility of characterising competence (taken here to be 
synonymous with capacity) solely in terms of understanding and appreciating relevant 
treatment information. This strategy is based on the standard in bioethics that 
understanding information and appreciating its relevance to oneself are prerequisites 
for providing valid informed consent to treatment. Both criteria can in theory be 
determined independently of the outcome of the decision, satisfying one of the key 
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desiderata of capacity assessment. Furthermore, establishing if a patient fulfils the 
criteria does not require a difficult judgement on the part of the clinician: briefly quizzing 
the patient about the content and relevance of the given information is thought to be 
sufficient to determine whether or not he does, as a matter of fact, understand and 
appreciate it. The authors cite the ease of use and objectivity of these criteria (ibid. 
p.261) for their popularity in determining capacity in practice. 
 
A brief examination of typical psychiatric scenarios reveals that the pure understanding 
and appreciation conception of capacity generates some highly counterintuitive results. 
The following examples are similar to those in Culver and Gert‘s commentary, and 
illustrate the inadequacy of a concept of capacity restricted to these criteria:  
1. A severely anorexic patient refuses naso-gastric feeding owing to an 
extreme fear of gaining weight. He understands what the treatment 
involves, and that it could in fact save his life. He appreciates that it is 
his decision to make and despite agreeing that without the procedure 
he risks death, he will not consent. 
2. A patient with chronic depression needs surgery to remove an ovarian 
tumour. Doctors tell her that without surgery she is likely to die. The 
patient is able to grasp this information and is capable of discussing 
the options with her clinical team, but she is entirely ambivalent about 
whether she lives or dies and thus will not consent to the operation. 
These cases would not necessarily fall under the jurisdiction of mental health 
legislation and therefore the assessment of capacity would be the determining factor in 
deciding what treatment the patient is subject to. In both cases, the understanding and 
appreciation criteria are satisfied. Culver and Gert suggest, however, that as clinicians 
they would be reluctant to allow that either patient possessed the capacity to make the 
treatment choice at hand (ibid. p.264). They speculate that in such cases these criteria 
are not sufficient to determine capacity, and they resort to appealing to the ―rationality‖ 
of the decision outcome to assess whether or not the patient should be deemed 
competent. But requiring that a patient reach a ―rational‖ decision in order to be 
deemed to possess capacity undermines the attempt to provide purely understanding 
and appreciation-based criteria. On the basis of the understanding and appreciation 
criteria alone, Culver and Gert acknowledge that patients with capacity cannot be 
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reliably and consistently distinguished from those lacking capacity. What then of the 
assessment of using or weighing information in the decision-making process: can this 
provide an objective criterion to justify the denial of capacity without appealing to the 
rationality of the decision outcome? 
Evaluating the Process 
―A person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable…to use or 
weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision…‖ (MCA, 
s 3(1)c). 
This criterion is consistent with an element in many tests of capacity that the MacCAT-
T refers to as the ability to ―reason‖. The way this requirement is characterised varies 
with different tools, but the implication is broadly similar. Assessors need to determine 
if the decision has been reached through a process that indicates the patient has taken 
account of the relevant information and options, and weighed this information in the 
balance. There is surprisingly little discussion in the theoretical and empirical literature 
on capacity detailing either what is meant by using or weighing information, or what 
constitutes fulfilment of this criterion. In some of the legal precedents underpinning the 
MCA reference is made to ―balancing‖ information (e.g., Re MB; Re C ‗Eastman‘ test of 
capacity) but there have been no direct efforts in research of mental capacity to explore 
this concept further. Nonetheless, I suggest that such analysis is crucial if we are to 
understand how this criterion is judged and unpack the implicit standards that guide or 
constrain this judgement in practice.  
 
One suggestion as to how best to evaluate the decision-making process has been 
made in the capacity literature, but has not been followed up with any degree of 
conceptual sophistication. In an early paper on the notion of decisional competence to 
consent to treatment, Freedman (1981) argues that what it means for a person to be 
using and weighing information is that he is capable of providing “recognisable 
reasons” for his decision. Therefore, in order to be deemed competent a person must 
have reasons that are relevant to the decision he makes. He argues that such reasons 
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must provide a strong justification for the decision, but does not, as Charland (2001) 
points out, elaborate any further on what is means for reasons to be recognisable, nor 
what constitutes justification in this context.  
 
In spite of Freedman‘s vagueness we can speculate as to what a recognisable reason 
might look like on his account. The requirement of justification suggests that a reason 
ought to take the form of an argument or inference, whereby a conclusion is drawn or 
decision reached on the basis of a starting set of premises. If the premises are capable 
of supporting the conclusion, one‘s reasons count as recognisable (Charland, 2001 
citing Freedman, p.137). Thus despite the rhetoric of the Re MB ruling, if a mental 
impairment is suspected the reasons a patient has for refusing treatment may be 
subject to scrutiny in an assessment of capacity (Stauch et al., 2006, p.128). In order to 
establish how the requirement of recognisable reasons impacts on capacity 
assessments, it will first be necessary to understand the implications that an appeal to 
reasons has for the concept of capacity and the nature of the judgements upon which 
its assessment is based. 
 
1.4. CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AS A NORMATIVE JUDGEMENT 
Reasons and Normative Judgements 
The very idea of appealing to recognisable reasons for a decision introduces an 
inherent normativity to the notion of capacity. Normativity concerns what ought to be 
the case, or in the case of decision-making, how one ought to think and reason. 
Although there is little consensus over the nature of normativity and the role it plays in 
judgements of another person‘s beliefs and actions, following Wedgwood (2007, p.22) I 
suggest that we do not need a definition of normativity in order to provide a theoretical 
account of our everyday understanding of normative terms. When we invoke normative 
statements about what one ought to do or think, either in the course of decision-making 
or in judgement about another‘s reasoning process, they make claims on us: they 
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oblige, justify, constrain or guide intentions and actions and do not merely describe 
what we do (Korsgaard, 1996, p.8). To say that there is a recognisable reason for a 
person‘s decision is to say that in light of the information given to him, the decision 
made is appropriate; it is to say that the decision is one that ought to have been made. 
The question we need to ask is: is the outcome recognisable as a response that follows 
in light of the information feeding into the process (including the relevant information, 
along with one‘s beliefs, desires, hopes, fears and so forth)? As Owen et al. (2009b, 
p.101) point out, understanding what the normative elements of capacity assessment 
are and how they are structured is an increasingly important area of philosophical, legal 
and psychiatric research. 
 
The Law Commission reports that preceded the MCA were keen to allow that even with 
evidence of intact cognitive functioning some individuals may lack capacity, through 
adopting a ―true choice‖ approach to assessment (Consultation Paper No. 129, 1993). 
This is the stipulation that whatever decision a patient makes, it ought to reflect his 
desires and choices free from coercion, compulsion or external influence. The process 
of using or weighing information can be construed as a matter of how the patient is 
appropriating that information, along with his beliefs and values, in a way that is 
recognisable as supporting the decision outcome. Determining fulfilment of this 
criterion therefore involves the normative dimensions of reasoning well or badly, 
correctly or incorrectly, appropriately or inappropriately or as one ought or ought not to: 
only if the process is normatively appropriate will it supply a recognisable reason for the 
outcome18. 
 
Does the inherent normativity of capacity judgement undermine the possibility of 
providing reliable, accurate and objective assessments? If the operational approach 
                                               
18
 A stronger constraint on the normativity of rational processes requires that the individual be 
capable of reflecting on his own reasons for belief and action (Hurley & Nudds, 2006, p.12) and 
this is necessary for the assessment of capacity as a patient needs to be able to provide his 
reasons for coming to a certain decision. This is quite a stringent requirement since in normal 
cases of decision-making, one‘s reasons or justifications for choosing a certain option are not 
under scrutiny. 
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depends on being able to make impartial observations about a person‘s mental 
functioning, it appears that capacity cannot be tested in this way once we acknowledge 
that judgements are dependent on what counts as recognisable reasoning. This 
potentially undermines the descriptive cognitive approach to capacity testing and 
measurement. If determinations of capacity are contingent on an assessor making a 
normative judgement about the patient‘s decision-making process, a fundamental 
difficulty to the assessment of capacity is introduced, because what constitutes 
evidence for the using or weighing information criterion is only evidence in virtue of its 
normative import. That is to say, we can only say a person is using and weighing 
information if he is using and weighing this information as he should: if there are 
appropriate or reasonable relations between what he values, believes and decides. If 
such relations are not in evidence or they seem unwarranted or inappropriate, then the 
person cannot be said to be using and weighing the relevant information in the process 
of making a decision.  
 
Clinical judgement is an inextricable part of the assessment process in spite of the 
drive towards operationalising criteria of cognitive functioning. This is not to deny that 
one can make a descriptive judgement about a normative process: the question of 
whether or not a person does have recognisable reasons for his decision can be 
answered with a binary ‗yes or no‘ response. But although the judgement made takes 
the form of a statement that the patient either possesses or lacks capacity, it will be 
based on the clinician‘s understanding of what counts as (among other things) using or 
weighing information in the decision-making process. The distinction Charland (2001) 
draws between normative and descriptive dimensions of capacity implies that the 
normative dimension is an ethical one that can be decided after the fact of determining 
whether or not a person possesses capacity. However, ascertaining if a patient fulfils 
the ―using or weighing information‖ criterion is a matter of making a normative 
judgement about the patient‘s process of reasoning with the relevant information he‘s 
been given, together with his epistemic and evaluative commitments. Thus a normative 
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element is implicit even in the descriptive dimension of capacity, distinct from the 
ethically oriented normative dimension suggested by Charland‘s analysis. 
Substantive Requirements for Capacity? 
If the standards by which a decision-making process are judged are content-neutral 
and universally applicable, the normative nature of capacity assessments need not 
undermine their reliability and objectivity. To use terminology borrowed from bioethical 
literature on autonomy, we can question whether capacity can be judged through 
procedural criteria alone, irrespective of the content of the decision-making process, or 
whether there is a substantive element to the assessment that cannot be discarded. 
We can thus distinguish two important questions in determining what counts as a 
recognisable reason for a decision: 
1. Are there normative constraints on the process of reasoning from the 
relevant information and one‘s beliefs and values to the decision 
outcome? If so, do capacity judgements rely on standards governing 
what ought to follow from the premises of one‘s decision-making 
process to its conclusion? 
2. Are there normative constraints on the contents of the beliefs and 
values that enter into the decision-making process? Again, does this 
impact on our notion of capacity by implying that it requires one to 
have particular epistemic and evaluative commitments? 
The process-based approach assumes that capacity can be distinguished from 
incapacity solely on the basis of the standards gestured towards in the first question. 
Conceiving of the decision-making process in terms of what Charland refers to as its 
“internal rationality” (2001, p.136) entails evaluating the form of the process rather than 
its content. Although the content of the information and the decision is relevant insofar 
as it specifies what the decision is about, it is not epistemically or evaluatively judged: 
the patient‘s beliefs and values are taken as premises for the decision-making process 
and are not themselves scrutinised. This requirement suggests that in order to have 
capacity one must be capable of making epistemic and evaluative commitments and 
acting upon those commitments. It does not, however, dictate what such commitments 
ought to be. An assessor need not share the specific beliefs and values of the patient 
in order to recognise how they enter into the decision-making process, providing 
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reasons for the patient‘s decision. On this procedural construal of capacity, what is 
important is that the structure of the process from premises to conclusion is intact. 
Understanding assessment as an evaluation of the integrity of the form of the decision-
making process clarifies how this demand it supposed to be met: it turns on the idea 
that the outcome is consistent with the person‘s beliefs and values, which enter the 
process like premises in an inference or argument. Kennedy (1997) suggests that a 
decision can be identified as having been made due to a pathology of belief or 
reasoning insofar as it is inconsistent with the patient‘s own previously expressed 
beliefs and values, irrespective of what the contents of those beliefs and values 
actually are. Evaluating the integrity of the reasoning process in this way might be a 
successful strategy in cases where capacity is temporarily impaired or fluctuating: here, 
expressing a choice that is out of kilter with one‘s own beliefs and values indicates that 
the decision might not have been made on the basis of a process of using or weighing 
the relevant information. 
 
This approach is consistent with the principle that patients should not be deemed to 
lack capacity because they make a seemingly unwise decision. The principle implies 
that assessment is purely procedural and ought not to be substantive: no judgement is 
made about the particular epistemic and evaluative commitments a patient has. The 
intention here is to ensure that a paternalistic view of what is reasonable does not 
become an inextricable part of the assessment (ibid. p.322). If, on the other hand, 
epistemic and evaluative standards do partially determine what counts as a 
recognisable reason for a decision, then the judgement is contingent on what beliefs 
and values the assessing clinician deems it is reasonable to hold. If a patient holds 
seemingly bizarre beliefs or values that influence in the decision-making process, this 
could potentially discount the reason for the decision from being ‗recognisable‘ by the 
clinician, thus introducing an element of medical paternalism to the assessment 
process, regarding what the patient ought to believe, want or decide. 
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The question I am interested in here is whether what counts as a recognisable reason 
can be determined independently of substantive evaluative and epistemic 
commitments about what one ought to believe and desire. My contention is that 
evaluating the process of decision-making without regard to its content does not, 
contrary to the rhetoric of the MCA, successfully capture all and only those cases for 
which a judgement of incapacity would be appropriate. Although capacity legislation 
attempts to minimise such paternalism, the process approach alone does not 
successfully track the notion of capacity. If we examine typical cases in psychiatry in 
which capacity is brought into question it is clear that part of what drives the instigation 
of an assessment of capacity in the first place is the suspicion that the patient holds 
particular beliefs or values that are in some way pathological, and it is to such cases 
that I now turn in order to argue that capacity judgements do depend on substantive 
and not merely procedural criteria. Here we must acknowledge that epistemic 
standards governing what one ought to believe and evaluative standards governing 
what one ought to assign value to are intrinsic to the assessment of one‘s decision-
making capacity.  
Beliefs 
The presence of a mental disorder or impairment may cause a person to hold beliefs 
that are delusional or simply untrue. The case of Norfolk and Norwich NHS Trust v W 
(1996) is a pertinent example: a female patient was admitted for an emergency 
Caesarean section, but refused treatment because she denied that she was pregnant. 
Here, a misperception of reality provided strong evidence that the patient lacked the 
capacity to make a decision about her treatment, as she was either incapable or 
unwilling to acknowledge an uncontroversial fact that endangered her life. Similarly, a 
patient suffering from anorexia nervosa who was in imminent danger of death was 
deemed to be incapable of acknowledging facts about her weight, insisting that she 
was still fat and refusing naso-gastric feeding on that basis (SW Hertfordshire Health 
Authority v KB [1994b]). In these cases, the patients denied empirical truths that are 
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irrefutable to the outside observer, and were deemed to lack capacity on grounds that 
their mental disorders were impairing their ability to comprehend obvious facts about 
the world. In clinical practice, delusions are also strongly associated with assessments 
of incapacity (Owen et al., 2009a). In a judgement granting a hospital the right to 
override a patient‘s refusal for a medically necessary hysterectomy, the court stated: “a 
compulsive disorder or phobia may prevent the patient's decision from being a true 
one, particularly if conditioned by some obsessional belief or feeling which so distorts 
the judgment as to render the decision invalid” (Trust A and Trust B v H [2006] at 965). 
Here the falsity of the patient‘s belief that she was childless (she had two grown up 
children) meant that her refusal to consent on the grounds that she wanted children 
undermined her capacity.  
 
There is a clear substantive condition at work here in judgements about the particular 
epistemic commitments of patients: in order to possess capacity, one ought to believe 
facts relevant to one‘s treatment decision that are manifestly true, or in any case 
reasonable and understandable in light of the evidence and information available. If 
one breaches this standard, it is questionable whether one is understanding, using or 
weighing the relevant information in the process of decision-making. This 
characterisation of epistemic requirements for capacity is deliberately vague at this 
point and serves as a placeholder for a further analysis of the constraints on belief to 
be developed in the following chapters. 
 
The substantive epistemic conception of capacity is not without problems, not least 
because it threatens the commitment to pluralism in and freedom of beliefs, taken to be 
a central liberal ideal of our legislature. It also leads to the question of whether having 
capacity requires that a patient ought to believe the information given to him about his 
condition and the available treatment options. For many instances of mental disorder in 
particular, a denial by the patient that they are ill does not necessarily constitute a 
rejection of obvious truths. Psychiatric diagnoses are highly controversial and in the 
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absence of clear physical evidence of illness (in the way that a gangrenous foot is 
objectively verifiable), rejection of a medical opinion or proposed course of treatment 
does not imply the patient is failing to acknowledge incontrovertible facts. In these 
cases, a mental illness diagnosis combined with rejection of or disbelief in medical 
opinion might lead clinicians to presume there is a causal link between the two. The 
process of decision-making, in principle, can be influenced by unusual or eccentric 
beliefs without detriment to the presumption of capacity. There is an intuitive difference 
between disbelieving a doctor‘s opinion because one is detached from reality and 
impervious to reason owing to a mental impairment and the natural tendency to 
critically reflect upon and assess the medical expertise one is offered (Grubb, 2004, 
para 3.85). But where impairments to capacity may be more subtle, there is no line of 
demarcation between a rejection of medical advice made with capacity from one made 
lacking capacity. Hence, it is not clear whether merely unusual beliefs can be 
distinguished from those that potentially undermine capacity: a conceptual problem 
mirrored throughout the domain of psychiatric diagnosis and practice19. 
Values 
Decision-making ability can be impaired subtly by disorders such as depression, where 
a person may be perfectly capable of fulfilling the capacity criteria as an abstract 
exercise in cognitive functioning whilst attaching no emotional significance to the 
process or outcome (Charland, 2006). The ability to understand, use and weigh the 
relevant information is intact but the patient is indifferent about the outcome and lacks 
the motivational ability to express a personal choice. In such a case it is questionable 
whether the patient possesses the requisite evaluative capacities to make the decision 
at hand, because he is ambivalent about the status of his own health or life. It is not, 
however, merely a capacity for making evaluative commitments that is in question in a 
judgement of capacity. The issue here is whether capacity requires that patients 
actually hold any particular values. 
                                               
19
 Differentiating between legitimate religious beliefs and pathological ones is recognised as a 
particularly problematic area of judgement (Waldfogel & Meadows, 1996). 
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A series of qualitative studies examining the decision-making competence of patients 
suffering from anorexia nervosa provide a useful insight into the role played by the 
particular values a patient holds in the process of reasoning and weighing up 
information about a treatment decision (Tan & Hope, 2008; Tan et al., 2003; Tan et al., 
2006). These studies document that patients suffering from anorexia are often 
insightful, coherent and able to understand the hypothetical reasoning for the necessity 
of forcing a dangerously underweight, malnourished person to ingest food in order to 
save his life or prevent serious disability. The patients involved in Tan‘s research were 
frequently able to weigh up all the relevant considerations and communicate this 
process of reasoning: “all the participants were already highly conversant with the facts 
of their disorder, the exercise of going through information about anorexia nervosa and 
its treatment” (Tan et al., 2003, p.704). On measures of understanding, reasoning and 
expressing a choice all patients performed comparably with normal subjects, although 
appreciation was unclear for two of them (ibid). Despite the imminent danger to their 
lives, health and physical mobility, the patients refused to consent to naso-gastric 
feeding. On the process-based view of capacity employed by the MCA criteria, such 
patients appear to fulfil the formal requirements for capacity and therefore ought to be 
entitled to make treatment decisions. Nonetheless, it was evident to the researchers 
that for decisions regarding treatment (usually related to feeding and weight-gain) 
many of these patients should not be deemed competent to refuse treatment. 
 
Whilst many psychological and biological factors may contribute to this continued 
refusal to eat, Tan et al. (2006) established that the evaluative commitments of these 
patients underpin their reasoning and motivations to continue to lose weight. The 
authors present the myriad complexities of the reasoning behind treatment refusal in a 
sample of patients, pertaining to a wide range of values that are only revealed and 
pieced together through detailed interviews. Positive evaluations associated with 
anorexia include feelings of control, safety, distraction from other problems, a sense of 
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identity and community with others with anorexia, and feeling special or different, all of 
which are associated with a positively valued and valuable identity. Additionally, the 
significance of positive evaluative commitments to life, health and well-being are 
downplayed and considered less important. Thus, “treatment refusal may occur, not 
because the patient wishes to die, but because of the relative unimportance of death 
and disability as compared to anorexia nervosa” (Tan et al., 2003, p.704). As a 
consequence, patients‘ decision-making processes are based on assigning significant 
weight to the positive values associated with anorexia, which has the effect of 
outweighing the negative connotations associated with disability and death. It is not 
that these patients do not acknowledge or believe the risks involved in continued 
treatment refusal, but when weighed against their strong evaluative commitments to 
thinness, control and so forth, these concerns are insignificant:  “these… are not 
products of a lack of understanding, but instead influence the use of understood 
information and the weight placed on it in coming to a decision” (Tan et al., 2006, 
p.277). Patterns of evaluation serve as highly significant weights in the decision-making 
process, providing reasons or justifications in themselves for making a choice to refuse 
treatment. 
 
What is perplexing and perhaps indicative of incapacity in these cases is that the 
overriding evaluative commitments clash with or undermine some of our most deeply 
held values: it is difficult to comprehend how the value of thinness could be accorded 
greater weight than the value one places on one‘s own life, for instance. We cannot 
avoid concluding from this that patients expressing such commitments are not merely 
deviating from values that are usually held, but rather that they are in error: they are not 
making the particular valuations that they ought to. Tan and Hope (2008) conclude that 
capacity does in fact require certain evaluative commitments to be made by the patient. 
Thus the values a person attaches to relevant information such as risks and benefits of 
a treatment play a significant role in determining how that information is used and 
weighed in the process of decision-making. The implication is that there are evaluative 
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standards impinging on the judgement of whether a patient fulfils capacity criteria: it 
requires that one‘s values ought to be reasonable, good, or otherwise normatively 
appropriate. 
 
It is a hallmark of a liberal, broadly inclusive democratic society that wide variations in 
religious and cultural values are not only tolerated but embraced as expressions of 
diversity. However, whilst many values are deemed acceptable or reasonable even if 
they are not shared, others are not and may be perceived as being indicative of 
psychopathology, thus potentially undermining the capacity of the individual who holds 
them. A comprehensive account of the nature and role of substantive evaluative 
commitments in capacity judgements can be found elsewhere (e.g., Holroyd, 2010), 
and it is interesting to note the convergence among authors (Tan & Hope, 2008; Martin, 
2007) that an understanding of patients‘ values is critical to the determination of their 
capacity. 
Compulsion 
Some mental disorders or impairments may disrupt decision-making ability owing to a 
compulsion or inescapable drive to behave in a particular way. In the case of Re MB 
the patient consented to a procedure only then to refuse repeatedly once the operation 
was imminent, on account of her extreme and overwhelming fear of needles. The judge 
ruled that her phobia temporarily impaired her capacity to make a decision:  “…a panic 
fear of needles dominated everything and at the critical point she was not capable of 
making a decision at all” (Re MB at 427). 
 
Tan et al. (2003; 2006) found that even in patients who were determined to recover 
from their illness, a strong compulsion to reject food was overriding their sincere 
desires for recovery. The notion of compulsion is familiar in Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder, which is characterised by repetitive compulsively driven behaviour that is 
beyond the control of the individual to cease or alter. Thus certain mental disorders 
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may deprive a person of the ability to make a genuine choice, independent of 
compulsion or coercion. In these instances the patient is not expressing a decision 
arrived at competently and although free from external influence he will not be making 
an autonomous decision. In terms of the MCA criteria the disorder diminishes the ability 
to weigh information relevant to the decision, as the compulsion may obviate any other 
considerations from entering into the reasoning process and generate an impediment 
to the patient‘s will. A refusal of treatment under these circumstances is not a 
competent refusal, and may thus be overruled (Grubb, 2004, para 3.87). Only if the 
compulsion or phobia acts to “paralyse the will and thus destroy the capacity to make a 
decision” will a judgement of incapacity be justified (Re MB at 437). The compulsion 
may not necessarily be acknowledged by the patient in order to be considered an 
impediment to the will, as evidenced in the case of a depressive woman refusing to eat 
(B v Croydon Health Authority [1994a]). The patient‘s acute self-awareness, insightful 
self-analysis and rigorous articulation of her reasons for refusing to eat actually 
assisted the judge in deciding that her desire to refuse treatment was the result of a 
compulsion induced by her mental illness. Again, whilst I will not be focusing on the 
way in which disorders of volition may compromise capacity, this brief analysis of 
compulsive behaviour supports the claim that judgements about using or weighing 
information intrinsically involve an appeal to the reasonableness or appropriateness of 
the factors influencing the decision-making process.  
Norms of Judgement in Capacity Assessments 
For some mental disorders then, serious doubts about the capacity of patients are 
legitimate even when their cognitive functions appear to be intact, or they display 
consistency and coherence in their beliefs, desires and decisions. This is particularly 
the case when patients make bizarre or dangerous choices about their treatment. This 
could be the result of the decision being made on the basis of abnormal or patently 
false beliefs, or strong evaluative commitments that potentially indicate the presence of 
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a mental impairment. Epistemic and evaluative standards do come into play when 
assessing whether a person is using or weighing information.  
 
To take the example of the patient suffering from anorexia: her continued refusal to eat 
or to permit naso-gastric feeding does logically follow from her deeply held beliefs and 
values. In a sense, she has a reason for her decision. It makes sense that she refuses 
treatment if she sincerely believes she is, for example, overweight; or she places such 
a high value on thinness that this overrides concern for her physical health or even her 
own life. However, it is questionable whether these reasons, whilst recognisable as 
having the form of reasons (i.e., she makes this decision because of them), are 
indicative of a competent decision-making process. Indeed, the very fixation and 
conviction she exhibits suggests some mental impairment or pathology might be at 
work that would undermine her capacity to make autonomous decisions.  
 
This insight demonstrates that in attempting to assess the decision-making process, an 
implicit normative standard is operating that disciplines judgements about what 
reasonably ought to follow from the information provided about a treatment decision. In 
this case, despite the logicality of the decisional process, we might consider the fact 
that the patient does not seem to place due weight on the severity of her disability or 
risk of death to indicate she is not using or weighing the relevant information. Crucially, 
this is a judgement that is based in part on a conception of what one ought to believe 
and want: in this case, that she ought to believe that she is dangerously underweight 
and place a high value on her own life. Procedural criteria alone are thus insufficient for 
distinguishing capacity from incapacity. 
 
There are substantial political, ethical and legal issues associated with the claim that 
capacity requires substantive evaluative commitments but these are beyond the scope 
of this thesis (see e.g., Martin, 2007). I will focus instead on the procedural and 
epistemic requirements for capacity, examining the structure of the decision-making 
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process and the constraints on what one ought to believe in order to possess capacity. 
Expanding upon the idea that capacity concerns one‘s reasons for a decision, l turn in 
the next chapter to discuss the large body of empirical and philosophical literature on 
the topic of rationality. I examine the normative structure of reasons and seek to 
ascertain whether there are objective, universal standards underpinning normative 
judgements about the process of decision-making. 
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2. RATIONALITY AND REASONS 
2.1. RATIONAL PROCESSES 
Reasons and Decision-Making 
The possibility of defining capacity according to purely procedural criteria has been 
undermined by recognition of the fact that ascertaining whether an individual has 
recognisable reasons for his decision requires some evaluation of the beliefs, values 
and desires that enter into the decision-making process. In this chapter I unpack this 
claim further by discussing some influential empirical and philosophical views on what it 
means to engage in a process of decision-making and how we form reasons for our 
decisions and actions. The aim is to shed light on how we are to understand what 
counts as using or weighing information in a deliberative process of decision-making, 
or conversely, what circumstances would undermine the claim that a person was using 
or weighing information in coming to a decision. Part of my concern is to ascertain if 
our decision-making processes are subject to any universal normative standards, and 
to query the implications for the reliability and objectivity of capacity assessment if not. 
 
There are strong parallels between the procedural conception of capacity and a 
prominent view in research on reasoning and decision-making referred to as the 
―standard picture‖ (Stein, 1996). I utilise this established literature firstly to examine 
why the procedural conception of human reasoning is inadequate and secondly to 
determine whether any content can be given to the idea that there are substantive 
epistemic standards governing normative evaluations of the decision-making process. 
Procedural norms do possess an advantage over substantive norms, in that they are 
amenable to codification in principles. This means they can be applied in any relevant 
situation to prescribe appropriate moves or proscribe inappropriate ones. The universal 
nature of logical standards renders them ideally suited to the task of providing clear, 
objective standards by which to judge a person‘s reasoning. By contrast, epistemic 
standards do not appear to be codifiable in this way. Towards the end of the chapter I 
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advance a relativist worry that if epistemic standards are intrinsic to judgements about 
a person‘s reasons and decision-making as I have suggested, without codification 
there is scope for such standards to differ across individuals or groups: a problem that 
raises a prima facie obstacle to attempts to provide objective standards for 
assessments of decision-making capacity. 
Rational Relations 
In everyday interpersonal encounters we unreflectively and spontaneously see 
meaning, intention and motivation in the movements and utterances of others. This 
interpersonal understanding rarely takes the form of an explicit deliberation as to what 
people mean by their words or why they decide or act as they do. However, evaluating 
a person‘s decision-making process for the purposes of determining whether or not he 
has capacity requires a more critical consideration of his decisions, which necessitates 
an attempt to grasp his reasons for that decision. This is a matter of seeking an 
explanation as to why the patient decides as he does, and when we seek to identify a 
person‘s reasons we may make reference to the beliefs and desires we take him to 
have20. Whilst many different psychological, affective and motivational factors will affect 
a person‘s decision-making processes, here I wish to focus on those elements that 
enter into explanations for a decision in terms of that person‘s reasons.  
 
Appealing to an agent‘s beliefs and desires may serve to generate a reason 
explanation for a particular instance of behaviour. A reason explanation is one that 
makes the patient‘s behaviour intelligible to the clinician, but this kind of explanation 
differs from explanations of phenomena found in the natural sciences. To use 
Dennett‘s (1987) terminology, we can adopt the ―Intentional Stance‖ towards agents to 
explain at least some of their behaviour. Why a person behaves as he does is not 
                                               
20
 The approach I am adopting does not imply that understanding the behaviour of another 
involves a perception of physical movements devoid of psychological intention, followed by an 
inferential attribution of meaning and significance. Rather, behavioural phenomena are 
expressive and visible to others (Zahavi, 2005, p.151). Much writing in the phenomenological 
tradition takes this view of intersubjectivity and although this discussion is not directly informed 
by such approaches, nothing in what I suggest is incompatible with this view. 
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explained using the vocabulary of physical-causal concepts but by employing the folk 
psychological concepts of belief, desire, intention and so forth. This folk psychological 
approach has dominated philosophical theorising about interpersonal understanding 
and explanation, and although I consider the framework to represent an impoverished 
view of ordinary, everyday understanding of intentional action, the concepts it employs 
are nonetheless a useful starting point from which to begin the project of establishing 
whether there are epistemic constraints on what counts as a recognisable reason for a 
decision21. In this chapter I start from the assumption that judgements about capacity 
require the clinician to grasp an explanation of the patient‘s decision in terms of his 
reasons. The evidence upon which the clinician must make this judgement comes from 
the patient‘s linguistic utterances and his behaviour, together with whatever knowledge 
the clinician has about such relevant contextual information as his background, history 
of previous choices and value system. 
 
Constructing reason explanations from attributions of beliefs and desires serves an 
explanatory purpose that will help clarify what having a reason for a particular decision 
or action might entail. A few caveats are in order here. I am concerned with the 
question of whether there are normative epistemic standards constraining the 
attribution of beliefs, and I will therefore not consider the role of evaluative judgements 
in intentional attributions of desires and values. Furthermore, I will not touch upon the 
considerable philosophical and psychological literature concerning self-knowledge and 
first person reason-giving (see e.g., Bortolotti & Broome, 2008; Moran, 2001) as I wish 
to examine the attribution of reasons from the position of the third-person making 
judgements about another‘s intentional behaviour. Although for the purposes of 
exposition and tractability we need to focus on simple chains of inference and 
belief/desire pairings, seeking to grasp an agent‘s reasons is a project best construed 
more broadly. This is especially true for judgements of capacity: an observer needs to 
                                               
21
 See Bermúdez (2005) for a detailed account of the influence of folk psychological concepts in 
both philosophical and empirical models of the mind. 
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be aware of a great number of relevant factors entering into the decision-making 
process if he is to make a well-informed judgement as to whether this process is 
sufficiently reasonable to allow the decision to stand.  
 
Reason explanations function by enabling us “to see the events or attitudes as 
reasonable from the point of view of the agent” 22 (Davidson, 1982, p.169). Conversely, 
in the absence of recognisable reasons we might think of an action or utterance as 
being irrational. Reasons are in principle recognisable to the person himself: a 
requirement that reflects the need for an agent to be able to articulate and weigh up his 
own reasons in order to be deemed to possess the capacity to make a decision. In the 
first person case, if one wishes to act in one‘s own best interests there is an intrinsic 
connection between comprehending what one ought to do in order to fulfil that wish 
and making the decision23. In normal circumstances intentions are formed on the basis 
of what one thinks one ought to do: the normative judgement (for example, that one 
ought to φ) supplies the motivation for intending to φ (Wedgwood, 2007, p.33; Broome, 
1997, p.141-2). There is thus an essential connection between the judgements one 
makes about what one ought to do and one‘s reasons and motivations for action. 
Whilst this is a claim that is open to debate, I shall presume that it suffices to outline the 
sense in which one‘s own reflective judgement might normally play a role in motivating 
intentions and deliberatively making decisions. The purpose of seeking reason 
explanations is thus to attempt to grasp the first-person point of view to make sense of 
the reasons a person has for his decisions and actions from a third-person 
perspective24. 
 
                                               
22
 I shall leave it an open question as to whether such reasons provide the cause of the action, 
although see especially Davidson (2001a) for some considerations about the relation between 
reasons and causes. 
23
 Contemplating what one ought to do is a deliberative question and Wedgwood (2007, p.25) 
suggests that if one is rational it is a question that arises when considering a decision about 
what to do (footnote 10). 
24
 Frankfurt (1977)  outlines a similar requirement of second-order self-reflection in his ethically 
oriented philosophical account of autonomy. 
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Gerrans (2004) and Bayne and Pacherie (2004) criticise the reason approach to 
explanation, particularly in psychiatry, arguing that focusing solely on person-level 
concepts such as beliefs and desires excludes cognitive and neurobiological facts 
about a person‘s psychological functioning from entering into explanations of his 
behaviour. This is because they presume that non-propositional content (which they 
take to include perceptual experiences) cannot be accommodated within a reason-
based account of behaviour. However, the central importance I am placing on the role 
of reason explanations in the understanding of decision-making behaviour is not 
incompatible with the idea that there are sub-personal causal factors involved in the 
formation of intentions and the performance of intentional action, nor that ordinary 
behaviour is not disciplined by careful reflection on one‘s own reasons. The reason 
approach to explanation does not preclude the causal relevance of sub-personal 
processes, cognitive biases, non-propositional content or even postulated Freudian 
unconscious drives. Rather, this emphasis on reason explanation is based upon the 
claim that an explicit and deliberative understanding of the processes by which an 
agent comes to a decision is necessarily pitched at the intentional level, and that this 
understanding is normatively structured. Indeed, the prime focus of this thesis is on 
distinguishing situations in which a person‘s decisions and behaviour are explained by 
reasons from those that might instead be explained or accounted for by some mental 
disturbance, cognitive deficit or neuropathology that impairs the normative structure of 
the reasoning process. Accepting that reasons provide explanations of intentional 
behaviour does not commit one to any particular position regarding the metaphysics of 
mental content. Whatever one‘s view regarding the constitution of the psychological 
realm folk psychological vocabulary has a clear practical utility if we are seeking to 
understand a person‘s deliberative process: we can explain reasons for behaviour, and 
indeed decisions, by reference to what agents think and want (Bortolotti, 2004a, p.360). 
 
What lies at the heart of the utility of reason explanations is the idea that propositional 
attitudes are capable of bearing semantic and logical relations to one another (Millar, 
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2004). Beliefs can serve to justify, support or undermine other beliefs; they may lead to 
the creation or cessation of desires; doubts about the truth-value of a particular 
proposition may make one reluctant to form a belief about it; a fear may undermine a 
desire and thus thwart action, and so forth. Understanding the nature of these inter-
relations between propositional attitudes is necessary to the project of exploring what 
constitutes a recognisable reason for an action or decision. Let us take a few 
hypothetical examples to clarify what I mean by the relatedness of propositional 
attitudes. 
1. A patient is convinced his wife is being unfaithful to him. When asked why he 
thinks this, he says ―I know because the number 23 bus just went past the 
window.‖ 
2. A patient with a minor scalp wound believes the FBI has sewn a radio into his 
skull and repeatedly attempts to sue the government (described by Gold & 
Howhy, 2000). 
3. An artistic patient with bipolar disorder refuses anti-psychotic medication 
because it diminishes his creativity. 
In example 1 a belief is resolutely maintained, but the basis upon which the agent 
asserts his reason for holding that belief is irrelevant to the belief itself. There is no 
rational relation between the supposed marital infidelity and the timing and route of a 
bus, nor any intelligible significance of the bus number to the agent‘s relationship with 
his wife. In short, the agent‘s avowed reasons cannot in fact be reasons for his belief: 
there is no conceivable logical or semantic internal connection between the belief and 
the reason the agent gives for it. This example demonstrates how a lack of obvious 
rational relations between intentional states precludes the provision of intelligible 
reason explanations for actions and utterances. 
 
Example 2 is of a type that occurs in individuals with delusions of persecution, often 
diagnosed with schizophrenia. The belief that is formed is fantastical, delusional in its 
intensity and immune to counterevidence or argument. Nonetheless, if we take the 
delusional belief as a given, perhaps evidentially supported in part by the scar on the 
patient‘s scalp, then his persistent efforts to sue the government are at least intelligible 
to the observer: if I had such a belief then such a course of action would, even if ill-
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advised, be a recognisable response to my predicament. Thus, although the belief is 
bizarre and the resultant action potentially detrimental to the individual, from the 
outside we can at least formulate a reason explanation for the person‘s actions: he is 
attempting to sue the government because he believes that the wound in his head is 
evidence that the FBI is persecuting him. In this instance whist the process of 
reasoning is at least intelligible, it is based on poor epistemic commitments. 
 
In the final example not only can a reason explanation be provided for the action or 
decision, but also it seems a reasonable and appropriate outcome. This is so even if it 
goes against prevailing medical opinion. In addition to being recognisable the reasons 
given for the action are understandable, particularly in light of the high value the patient 
places on his creative flair. Thus while perhaps deviating from medical norms in his 
evaluative commitments, the patient is not considered to have made a normative 
mistake in his valuations and beliefs. It is unlikely in this kind of scenario that the 
patient‘s capacity would be undermined. 
 
This brief anatomy of reason explanations suggests that there is a normatively rich 
structure to the reasons that explain or account for one‘s actions and decisions. I turn 
now to discuss the myriad theoretical positions relating to human reasoning and the 
notion of rationality, to ascertain what normative commitments underpin judgements 
about a person‘s reasoning and decision-making process. 
The Concept of Rationality 
Thus far I have avoided use of the term ‗rationality‘ in discussing the idea that 
normative standards underpin judgements of capacity. This is because the polysemous 
concept of rationality has a wide range of applications and no concise definition even 
within the literature of a single academic domain. Here, I use the term ‗rationality‘ with 
the caveat that it is intended loosely to denote a pre-philosophical sense of picking out 
processes that provide reasons for beliefs and actions, from an observer‘s point of 
 52 
view. I suggest then that what counts as a recognisable reason is determined by the 
standards of rationality imposed on the process of decision making. These standards 
concern whether or not there is a rational relation between all the input factors such as 
information, beliefs and values, and the decision outcome. 
 
In day-to-day life our thinking, actions and decision-making rarely follow a clear serial 
structure. Much of what we do is not the result of a well-reasoned argument or process 
that takes into account all or even most of the relevant information, and actions may be 
performed and decisions made unconsciously or reflexively, particularly when in 
familiar situations. Many of the factors involved in making a decision may not be known 
to us unless we are interrogated about our reasons. It is only at this point that these 
factors, or our self-conscious perceptions of them, may be linguistically described in the 
form of a reason explanation using the concepts of folk psychology. Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986) refer to this folk model of thought and reasoning as the ―Hamlet model‖ 
(p.28), reflecting the idea that in decision-making a person analyses, weighs up and 
self-consciously considers the available options in a deliberative fashion. They point 
out that this model does not necessarily mirror the structure of thought and reasoning, 
arguing that much of what we know and how we go about making decisions does not 
take the form of explicit propositional knowledge that would be a candidate for being a 
reason. Furthermore, we may construct post-hoc rationalisations of our behaviour that 
do not accurately reflect our motivating reasons for a particular decision. However, a 
determination of capacity does require evidence of a deliberative reasoning process 
leading to the decision, and so my concern here will be with the beliefs, values and 
intentions that the patient himself is capable of acknowledging and that are observable 
from a third-person perspective, even if there are additional implicit influences on his 
decision-making. 
 
In exploring the notion of rationality I am not seeking to claim that decisions that are not 
made on the basis of a clear-cut process of reasoning are thereby irrational or 
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indicative of incapacity. For a start, there are significant differences between the 
concepts of capacity and rationality. Rationality is a global concept which, in the 
philosophical and psychological literature at least, reflects the broad underlying 
reasoning competence of an individual across different contexts and that need not be 
manifested consistently in all situations. A judgement about capacity is, on the other 
hand, a judgement about a patient‘s ability to make a decision in a particular instance 
on the basis of an information-weighing process. For the purposes of framing the 
present discussion it will suffice to say that rationality requires an abstract, domain-
general and flexible ability to act for reasons; and the term refers to the active exercise 
of this ability to act for reasons, rather than as a latent capacity. I will also not be 
making use of the well-established distinction between theoretical and practical reason, 
which distinguishes what it is rational to think or believe from what it rational to do or 
intend (see e.g., Mele & Rawling, 2004). This is owing to the fact that decision-making 
capacity encompasses both of these types of reason and I will not be pitching any 
claims at a level that distinguishes theoretical from practical rationality. 
The Rationality of Reasoning Processes 
The tasks of understanding and assessing the processes of decision-making have 
spawned a vast research literature throughout several disparate academic disciplines. 
The project predominant in psychology and biology has focused on exploring how 
humans do in fact make decisions and form beliefs, whereas the project more common 
to logic and economics aims at setting out ideal standards and models of inferential 
reasoning. Philosophical discussions of the nature of rationality have tended to 
conceptualise it as an ability to draw inferences from premises to conclusions and to 
recognise the validity of such inferences (Raz, 1999, p.357). Whilst rationality is 
conceived as an ability or capacity, it is manifested through the process of reasoning; 
hence the concepts of rationality and reasoning are closely related. Reasoning can be 
thought of as a process that generates behaviour (Hurley & Nudds, 2006, p.5), and 
which might require conceptual and linguistic abilities. It can be explicit and capable of 
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being articulated or it may take the form of a tacit process the mechanism of which is 
opaque to the subject. Kacelnik (2006) considers the focus on process to belong 
primarily the domain of philosophical and psychological discussion on the topic of 
rationality. He terms this ―PP-rationality‖ and distinguishes it from two other 
conceptions of rationality. Firstly, ―E-rationality‖, most frequently used in economics, 
takes rationality to consist in behaviours that ensure the maximisation of expected 
utility for an individual. E-rationality deals with observable actions and outcomes and it 
is these that determine whether an individual is rational or not. Secondly, rationality as 
construed by biology is referred to as ―B-rationality‖ and this is concerned more with 
whether the behaviour is evolutionarily adaptive or beneficial to the individual (ibid. 
p.17). Like E-rationality, this conception of rationality focuses on behavioural outcomes. 
The possibility of scrutinising someone‘s ends presupposes the existence of objective 
standards or values regarding what it would be rational to do or think. This is precisely 
what judgements of capacity are supposed to avoid, although as I have suggested the 
possession of capacity does in fact depend in part on one‘s epistemic and evaluative 
commitments. By contrast, the PP-rationality of a behaviour or action is evaluated in 
terms of the process that led to it being performed, irrespective of the appropriateness 
of the ends or the outcome. As Kacelnik puts it, in the language of cognitive psychology 
PP-rationality is about the rationality of information processing rather than the 
rationality of actions themselves. This approach mirrors the process-based conception 
of capacity, in which it is the structure of the inference from premises to conclusion that 
is subject to being normatively judged irrespective of the decision content. Additionally, 
whilst PP-rationality is concerned with the formal relations between the thoughts and 
values that enter into a process of reasoning, it is contrasted with decisions arrived at 
through emotion, religious or spiritual faith, conformity to authority or arbitrary choice 
(Hurley & Nudds, p.5). 
 
It is important to distinguish those kinds of psychological process that might be subject 
to judgement by normative standards of reasoning from those that are involved in 
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causing behaviour and action, but that nonetheless are not evaluated in an assessment 
of the rationality of an agent‘s decision-making process. Some processes leading to the 
generation of behaviour are ‗arational‘, by which I mean that it is not possible for the 
individual himself to evaluate rationally such processes as being appropriate, 
reasonable or otherwise. Behaviour may be generated by physiological or 
neurochemical processes that do not fall within the domain of rationality, or there may 
be tacit, unconscious psychological processes governing action that are not subject to 
any degree of conscious control, intervention or analysis. Heuristics and cognitive 
biases are two such examples that have been heavily researched in the empirical 
psychology literature (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer et al., 1999) revealing 
implicit shortcuts and resource-saving strategies we normally use when engaged in 
reasoning tasks (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1972). 
 
On the conception of rationality I am employing, which requires the agent to act for 
reasons that are recognisable as such, heuristics and cognitive biases do not fall within 
the range of processes that could in principle supply an agent with reasons for his 
action. The unconscious employment of such strategies may well explain an agent‘s 
behaviour but the heuristic is not a reason for the behaviour: its use is not a reason the 
agent himself has for making a particular judgement or choice25. Thus I do not consider 
such heuristics to be part of the reasoning process that is open to evaluation by a 
capacity assessment, although their use may in fact cause behaviours or outcomes 
that can be interpreted as rational or irrational. 
 
Alternatively, processes that are in principle rationally describable may fail to be 
rational, in the sense that they produce mistakes or errors, effecting the wrong or 
inappropriate kind of behaviour or action. Such processes may be termed ‗irrational,‘ 
denoting that they remain rationally evaluable in principle and that something appears 
                                               
25
 Whilst there are arguments that identify the normativity of such heuristics in evolutionary and 
adaptive functions (e.g., Danielson, 2004), it is beyond the scope of this discussion to argue that 
these constitute rationally evaluable reasoning strategies. 
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to have gone wrong in the process of reasoning. These kinds of rational process are of 
interest to clinicians assessing capacity, particularly where cognitive functioning 
appears intact. The relationship between arational and rational processes is a complex 
issue that has concerned philosophers of mind and psychologists alike and I do not 
intend to impinge upon debate about the interface between reasons for and causes of 
action (see e.g., Bolton & Hill, 2004; Thornton, 1997; Davidson, 1982). Here I merely 
wish to draw attention to the relationship between reasoning and rationality, and 
highlight that the pertinent focus for understanding what underpins judgements of 
capacity is on the kinds of psychological processes that are amenable to rational 
evaluation. 
 
The PP-rationality of processes of reasoning has been termed ―instrumental rationality‖ 
in philosophy and psychology, although the term has different connotations in 
economics (Hurley & Nudds, p.7). Instrumental rationality concerns the way in which 
agents select the means necessary to achieve a given end or outcome. An agent 
would be instrumentally rational to the extent that he takes the means necessary to 
achieve his ends, irrespective of what those ends are (Wallace, 2008). There is a 
benefit to thinking of capacity assessment in terms of instrumental rationality, in that 
focusing on process ensures that an ‗appropriate‘, ‗correct‘ or ‗good‘ outcome is not 
automatically accepted as being indicative that the patient possesses capacity, or 
indeed the converse. Instrumental rationality requires that the outcome is reliably 
arrived at by a rational reasoning process: it is not sufficient that the patient complies 
with a doctor‘s recommendation as this may be accidental or resulting from a warped 
reasoning process. We are getting closer to being able to frame the question as to 
what standards determine whether a decision-making process provides recognisable 
reasons. This instrumental approach to rationality is entirely compatible with the 
intention behind capacity assessment, in which the perceived wisdom or rationality of 
the actual decision is not supposed to influence the capacity judgement. 
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2.2. PROCEDURAL RATIONALITY 
The Standard Picture of Rationality 
Empirical research into reasoning, particularly in the cognitive sciences, has for the 
most part been guided by a framework whereby the degree to which participants are 
rational is determined according to whether their reasoning, judgements and decision-
making accord with the dictates of a normative ideal. The experimental methodologies, 
analyses and theorems developed from reasoning task experiments are framed around 
the idea that there are normative standards of rationality that one ought to obey and 
that failure to do so results in one committing an error, often in the form of a logical 
fallacy (see Stein, 1996 for an overview of the field). For instance, cognitive psychology 
in this area has tended to focus on conditional and syllogistic reasoning, with 
participants‘ judgements in the tasks being taken to denote success or failure in 
reasoning correctly: clearly a normative analysis on the part of the researchers 
(Eysenck & Keane, 2005). Gigerenzer (2006) refers to the ideal of rationality upon 
which this idea is based as the ―LaPlacean demon‖ of unlimited time, cognitive 
resources and omniscience, and it is a model based on the laws of probability and logic 
that has pervaded thought on human reasoning and inference at least since the 
Enlightenment (ibid. p.117). 
 
Two camps have emerged from this empirical literature, based on opposing 
assumptions about whether or not humans can be considered rational. The rationality 
thesis asserts that humans in general are rational and that errors in reasoning can be 
attributed to performance problems such as accidental mistakes or limitations in 
computational capacity. By contrast, the irrationality thesis asserts that humans are 
fundamentally irrational, and that errors made in reasoning tasks are due to poor 
competence in adhering to the principles of reasoning rather than merely resulting from 
performance errors. The pioneer of the Wason selection task, which is used in 
countless reasoning experiments, argues that “irrationality…is the norm. People all too 
readily succumb to logical fallacies” (Wason, 1983, p.59). Stein points out that for all 
 58 
their differences, both of these theses are based upon the same assumption: that what 
it is to be rational is to reason in accordance with the rules of logic and probability 
theory. This is referred to as the ―standard picture of rationality” (Stein, 1996, p.4) and it 
is generated from the conjunction of two ideas. Firstly, that reasoning is based on 
principles that dictate how we ought to draw inferences, and secondly that these 
principles are derived from formal logical rules and axioms of probability theory.  
 
This conception of rationality is not, however, a modern phenomenon resulting from 
advancements in logical theory. Hume noted the isomorphism between deductive 
reasoning from propositional premises to a conclusion and the transition from one 
psychological state to another, and this led him to believe that the rationality of 
reasoning processes was explained by the validity of deductive arguments (Smith, 
2004). Research based on the standard picture has largely concerned inferential 
relations: drawing conclusions from given sets of premises, recognising the validity of 
stated inferences and enabling an observer to make judgements of correctness or to 
make choice preferences on the basis of those principles. This view of rationality has 
an historical precedent quite independent of empirical research, in the writings of 
Aristotle on the practical syllogism and more recently by Davidson, who discusses the 
reasons an agent has for his actions as being akin to an inferential argument: 
“If we can characterise the reasoning that would serve, we will, in effect, have 
described the logical relations between descriptions of beliefs and desires, 
and the description of the action, when the former gives the reasons with 
which the latter was performed. We are to imagine, then, that the agent‘s 
beliefs and desires provide him with the premises of an argument‖ (Davidson, 
1978, pp.85-86). 
The conception of rationality implicit in the standard picture is referred to by Bermúdez 
as ―procedural rationality‖: “subjects are procedurally rational to the extent that they 
reason in accordance with familiar deductive principles as modus ponens, modus 
tollens, contraposition…together with…basic principles of probability theory…” 
(Bermúdez, 2001, p.496). What logic and probability theory have in common with 
regard to rationality is their basis in considerations of the truth-functions of propositions: 
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they are concerned with what would be logically entailed by the truth of a proposition, 
irrespective of its actual truth-value. Principles of procedural rationality deal in relations 
of implication and entailment, providing a formal structure for setting out what follows 
from a given premise or set or premises. For example, if we take the proposition ‗that-p‘ 
to be true, it follows that ‗not-p‘ cannot also be true: this would contravene the law of 
non-contradiction. Similar rules are derived from probability theory. For example, the 
conjunction rule states that the probability of the conjunction of two events occurring is 
always less than the probability of a single one of those events occurring. These logical 
and probabilistic principles provide a formalised framework for studying inferential 
reasoning and the relations that obtain between propositions. 
 
On this view, the extent to which agents are deemed rational is determined by their 
behavioural conformity to what this normative ideal dictates. A classic example from 
the empirical literature on human reasoning demonstrating this presupposition can be 
seen in the way the conjunction experiment devised by Tversky and Kahnemann 
(1983) is formulated and discussed by the researchers themselves. The hypothetical 
scenario drawn up for this experiment concerned a woman, Linda, and gave some 
details of her history such as a passion for left-wing politics in her youth. The reasoning 
task required the participants to rate the probability of Linda being a feminist, a bank 
teller, or both. Many participants committed a conjunction fallacy, believing the 
probability of the conjunction of the two conditions (bank teller and feminist) to be 
greater than the probability of a single condition (bank teller): a mistaken inference. The 
principle being violated is the conjunction rule, part of probability calculus, which states 
that the probability of a conjunction being true cannot be greater than the probability of 
its individual conjuncts. To suggest that participants commit an error when they violate 
the conjunction rule is to derive a specific normative prescription on what one ought or 
ought not to believe from the rules of statistics and extensional laws of probability (ibid. 
p.294). The fact that the probability of a proposition being true cannot be greater than 
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the probability of its constituents being true translates into a normative constraint on 
what beliefs one ought or ought not to hold.  
 
On a procedural conception of rationality, logical axioms dictate what it is correct to 
infer from a given set of premises, and conforming to the principles derived from these 
rules in drawing inferences is just what reasoning correctly is26. Correctness here is 
determined by logical relations between the premises rather than in facts about the 
world: it is derived purely from the internal relations between the propositions that 
comprise the premises for the reasoning process. The correct option or choice 
preference in the experimental scenarios devised is identified algorithmically by the 
application of procedural principles to the starting premises27: 
―...often rationality is taken as equivalent to logicality. That is, you are rational 
just in case you systematically instantiate the rules and principles of inductive 
logic, statistics, and probability theory on the one hand, and deductive logic 
and all the mathematical sciences, on the other‖ (Flanagan, 1984, p.206).  
If a given set of beliefs and desires is taken as the starting premises, the application of 
a system of logic and a theory of decision-making can define functions from these to 
other beliefs and intentions that are entailed by the original premises (Heal, 2008, 
p.49). The implication is that logical validity from premises to conclusion is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the normative correctness of the reasoning process, such 
that making a valid inference guarantees that the inference is rational, irrespective of 
the truth-values of its propositions.  
 
There are significant epistemic and cognitive resource limitations on our reasoning 
capacities, and we seldom follow through all the logical entailments of our beliefs or 
                                               
26 Principles of reasoning are based on the rules of logic but are not identical to them: reasoning 
is based on relations between beliefs whereas logical rules apply to statements and 
propositions. This distinction is perhaps best maintained by referring the relations dictated by 
logic as rules and those of reasoning as principles (Stein, 1996, p.5).  
27 Several theories of reasoning have been developed on the basis of procedural principles and 
these epitomise the claim that a logical ideal of rationality forms a normative standard by which 
actual reasoning competence can be judged. Abstract-rule theory (Braine et al., 1984) suggests 
that people implicitly possess 16 mental rules, which account for performance on syllogistic 
reasoning tasks. Oakesford and Chater (2001) consider that a probabilistic approach provides 
for a more realistic normative theory or reasoning. In both cases rationality is conceived of as a 
matter of the inferential structure of the reasoning process. 
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exhaustively weigh up the expected utilities of different choice preferences before 
coming to a decision. Yet whilst it is clear that we do not have the information 
processing capacity to adhere to the principles of logical reasoning and probability 
theory, the standard picture takes the dictates of procedural rationality to be a 
normative ideal28. In practical terms, we may still be procedurally rational to the extent 
that our beliefs are consistent with one another, or at least, not obviously inconsistent, 
and that we seek to correct our decisions or choice preferences if a breach of 
procedural principles becomes salient. There are empirical precedents for this 
approach to rationality, for example, a decision-theoretic approach takes rationality to 
be a matter of maintaining internal consistency within one‘s mental economy (Mele & 
Rawling, 2004, p.4). Bermúdez (2001) cites this “norm of consistency” as retaining the 
standards of procedural rationality, as it generally ensures we do not hold openly 
contradictory beliefs or commit obvious logical fallacies in our reasoning.  
 
According to the procedural conception of rationality one‘s ability to reason, conceived 
of as an ability to conform largely to logical principles, has two clear characteristics. 
Firstly, it has what Hurley and Nudds refer to as “flexible generality” (2006, p.11): the 
reasoning process can be applied in different contexts and environments, used in 
counterfactual thinking and in the formation of beliefs and actions. The content of the 
inference, what the agent is reasoning about, is therefore irrelevant to any 
determination as to whether or not the agent is reasoning correctly, as it is only the 
logical relations between premises and conclusion that matter. Secondly, the standard 
of correctness for the inference is supplied by its logical validity, derived from the 
instantiation of abstract, universally generalisable rules that stand irrespective of the 
specific content of the inference (Searle, 2001, p.21). Being instrumentally or ‗PP‘ 
rational requires that the processes one uses in decision-making adhere to these rules. 
                                               
28
 Stich (1999) argues that Dennett subscribes to a view of rationality as an ideal, to the extent 
that the ideal is so far removed from what we are actually capable of that one is forced to adopt 
an instrumental view of mental entities such as beliefs and desires: the applicability of such 
concepts to human minds and behaviour cannot possibly be true if they are subject to such 
stringent constraints of rationality. 
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At first glance this procedural conception of rationality looks to be aligned with the 
intention of the MCA to focus on evaluating the process of decision-making as opposed 
to the judging whether or not the outcome is objectively good or wise29. Because 
procedural rationality is silent on the matter of the truth-values of propositions it cannot 
determine either the B- or E- rationality of an individual, as it makes no reference to the 
appropriateness of an outcome in relation to the broader situation or environment in 
which the process is occurring30. What is more, appealing to generalised, context-free 
principles appears to ensure that the normative standards of rationality by which an 
individual‘s reasoning is evaluated are objective and universally applicable. Codified 
principles of logic are as well established and as secure as mathematical truths, 
possessing the same fixed and universal status (Stein, 1996, p.4). If human reasoning 
is governed by the normative standards dictated by procedural rationality, there is 
prima facie plausibility in the idea of codifying these principles as benchmark standards 
that would enable us reliably to distinguish between those who are successfully 
engaged in a reasoning process and those who are not. It follows that if the way we 
ought to reason is determined by adherence to the principles of procedural rationality, 
we have a strong basis for an algorithmic and content-neutral normative standard for 
judging the decision-making process. 
Limitations of Procedural Rationality 
Ascertaining whether or not we do actually reason in accordance with, and only with 
logical principles has spawned a significant philosophical and empirical research 
literature. One of the most famous and empirically robust reasoning experiments 
demonstrates that we consistently commit the fallacy of affirming the consequent. The 
                                               
29
 Gunn (1994) comments that despite the Law Commission report discussing approaches to 
capacity choosing not to make rationality a component of capacity, the identification of logical 
fallacies in the decision-making process may well serve as evidence that a person‘s capacity is 
impaired (p.25), indicating that the formal standards of procedural rationality may play an 
implicit role at least in capacity judgements. 
30
 Reasoning could be procedurally rational but nonetheless fail to result in a behaviour that 
fulfils substantive criteria such as the maximizing of inclusive fitness (Biological rationality) or 
expected utility (Economic rationality). 
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Wason selection task (Wason, 1983) was designed to test participants‘ ability to reason 
according to the principle of modus tollens, requiring them to make selections that 
would disprove a rule of the form ‗if p then q‘. A high percentage of people commit the 
logical error of thinking ‗q, therefore p‘. When the task is set up with realistic content 
rather than abstract premises, participants are less likely to commit the fallacy (e.g., 
Johnson-Laird et al., 1972), suggesting that reasoning competence may not be 
grounded in adherence to abstract principles but rather be attuned to the actual 
situations and contexts in which decisions are made and intentions formed. 
 
Evans and Over (1996) discuss specific criticisms levelled at research on reasoning 
that is based on a procedural conception of rationality. The ―normative system 
problem‖, first brought to light by Cohen (1981, cited in Evans and Over, 1996, p.4) is 
that the standards and styles of reasoning used by the experiment participant may 
differ from those expected or explicitly stipulated by the investigators. Typically 
researchers intend for participants to use only reasoning based on (for instance) 
extensional propositional logic to guide their decision making processes, assuming that 
the information given in the task will be taken to provide factually isolated premises and 
that contextual factors and information extrinsic to the logical structure of the inference 
or formation of a choice preference will not impinge upon the reasoning process from 
premises to conclusion. Any deviation from outcomes dictated by this use of standard 
logic would therefore appear to the researcher to indicate a failure of rationality on the 
part of the participant, or provide evidence for a reasoning bias infiltrating the inferential 
process. Aside from practical computational difficulties, Evans and Over argue that 
reasoning researchers have assumed the tasks they investigate tap into participants‘ 
abilities to reason according to abstract context-free principles of logic and probability. 
The ―interpretation problem‖ further indicates a potential divergence in understanding 
between the investigator and participant, who may interpret the premises or 
requirements of the reasoning task differently. Although appearing to contravene the 
dictates of formal logic, an individual may in fact reason perfectly logically from his own 
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perspective or representation of the problem at hand. He may have interpreted the 
premises in an unforeseen way or have perceptual experiences that influence his 
reasoning process in a way that is invisible to those evaluating his performance on the 
task. 
 
Both of these criticisms highlight the fact that the reasoning process being tested is 
supposed to be devoid of content. Of interest for the experimental task is the structure 
of the process and its conformity with procedural principles: the specific premises used 
in the task are merely hypothetical examples that are intended to permit this process to 
be manifested in a familiar way. Rather than presenting participants with a series of 
logical schema involving propositions of „p‟ and „q‟, the tasks are given content to make 
them more understandable. Nonetheless it is the abstract formal structure of the 
inferential process that is under scrutiny. The reasoning process being investigated is 
therefore a highly intellectualised one that is abstracted away from real-life contexts. 
 
The ―external validity‖ problem (ibid.) queries whether the controlled laboratory 
scenarios set up and evaluated by such research actually tap into anything that could 
be termed a psychological construct of rationality. It incorporates the concerns of both 
the normative system and interpretation problems by suggesting that the concept of 
rationality imposed by researchers is artificial and should not form a normative 
standard against which human reasoning ought to be judged. Traditional interpretations 
of the notoriously low proportion of adults passing the Wason selection task testing 
conditional logic have generally focused on the notion that we are imperfectly rational 
because of our tendency to fail to apply the principle of modus tollens correctly (Stein, 
1996). The predominance of ‗errors‘ has been attributed to failures to adhere to the 
logical normative standards to which we should aspire. Yet the ‗irrationality‘ exhibited 
by many adults on failing the Wason task may in fact be explained not as a failure of 




It would be irrational for a person to calculate every eventuality and probability before 
making simple everyday decisions. At times it may be rational to ignore the 
inconsistency of one‘s beliefs, for example, if it would be unwise to devote the cognitive 
resources demanded to such a task. Some authors (such as Foley, 1993; Nozick, 
1993) have argued that being rational may be perfectly compatible with holding 
inconsistent beliefs (Bermúdez, 2001). Rationality needs to be tempered by practical 
and epistemic considerations such as the level of interest one has in resolving fallacies 
in one‘s reasoning process (Harman, 2004, p.50). It is not therefore merely dictated by 
the logical relations obtaining between propositions held true, and the principles of 
procedural rationality are not indefeasible constraints.  
 
There are evident problems with setting adherence to logical rules as a normative 
standard by which to judge the correctness of a process of reasoning and one 
argument for this, advocated by Gilbert Harman, is that reasoning has very little to do 
with relations of logical consistency and implication (ibid. p.46-7). Harman argues that 
deduction, the epitome of logical reasoning, is not an instance of reasoning at all: 
“Logic, the theory of deduction, is not...itself a theory about what to believe (or intend); 
it is not a theory concerning how to change your view” (Harman, 1999, p.28). Logic and 
probability theory are concerned only with what is entailed by the acceptance of given 
premises, not with how those premises are established in the first place or with whether 
or not they are in fact true: “Logical powers, in the absence of suitably grounded beliefs 
to provide rationally held premises, are like an engine without fuel” (Audi, 2004, p.41). 
This remark brings us to the crux of the limitations of procedural principles as 
grounding a process-based conception of rationality. What counts as a rational process 
depends in large part on content of the propositions entering into that process. 
Rationality is essentially world-involving: in deciding what reasonably follows from a set 
of premises some attention must be given to the question of whether or not those 
premises actually obtain. More precisely, it concerns the truth-values of those 
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propositions comprising the premises. It might not be rational to make a procedurally 
correct decision or choice preference if one‘s starting premises were false or unreliable. 
The point of decision-making is to enable one to act in the world; hence any conception 
of rationality that overlooks what is actually going on in the world must be inadequate. 
Ascertaining the truth (or otherwise) of beliefs brings us to the heart of epistemology 
and a concern with the normative standards that constrain what our epistemic 
commitments ought to look like. 
 
Reasoning is concerned with the process by which we justify, change and revise our 
beliefs, desires and values (Harman, 2004, p.47). This point is emphasised by the fact 
that while the dictates of propositional logic govern relations between propositions they 
do not, Bermúdez points out “have anything to say about how one should revise one‟s 
beliefs” (2001, p.466). The principles of procedural rationality say nothing about the 
world or how we ought to form beliefs and make decisions that are reasonable in light 
of the way the world is. Recognising the limitations of conceiving of the reasoning 
process in purely procedural terms brings us back to the issue I began to draw out in 
the previous chapter, namely that normative judgements about a person‘s capacity to 
make a decision incorporate an evaluation of his epistemic commitments as well as the 
formal structure of his process of reasoning. 
 
2.3. EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY 
Reasons and Context 
Being engaged in deliberative decision-making requires us to draw on available 
sources of information and pragmatically utilise vast amounts of background data. To 
be able to reason one must have the capacity to accept particular premises, reject 
others, consider the testimony of others, appeal to one‘s knowledge of the way the 
world is and call one‘s prior beliefs into question in light of counterevidence. In this 
regard we face the classic problem of epistemology, concerning the justification of 
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beliefs and what we have grounds to hold true. Non-inferential beliefs may form the 
premises for logical inferences that lead to the acquisition of other beliefs, desires and 
so forth, but whether I am justified or reasonable in holding them is not a matter of my 
adherence to logical principles. Other beliefs may be acquired via inference from prior 
beliefs, desires and values, or from the testimony of others, but the relationship 
between these is not akin to that between premises and conclusion: reasoning does 
not necessarily take the form of an argument or proof31 (Harman, 2004, p.47). 
 
Bermúdez (2001) suggests that reasoning about evidence requires ―epistemic 
rationality‖, a term he uses in contrast with procedural rationality to refer to the norms 
of good reasoning that dictate how we ought to treat the information we have available 
when forming intentions and making decisions: 
―The norms of good reasoning are principles that govern the processes of 
drawing conclusions; weighing up the balance of evidence for and against a 
particular proposition; deciding upon a particular course of action; judging the 
likelihood of a particular event and so forth. These are all psychological 
processes that result in either changes of belief or alterations in one's plans‖ 
(Bermúdez, 2001, p.465). 
Epistemic rationality concerns the capacity one has to test hypotheses, revise beliefs in 
light of available information, decide upon one action rather than another on the basis 
of evidence, favour certain beliefs and values over others and make judgements about 
how best to achieve one‘s ends, whatever they may be. It is about how one revises and 
alters one‘s beliefs, generates intentions and makes plans in light of the information 
that is available, and the way one uses and weighs the evidence from perception, 
knowledge and the testimony of others in forming beliefs and intentions. This kind of 
rationality and its converse, irrationality, appears to be much closer to a lay usage of 
the term than the dictates of procedural principles: 
―We use the words ‗irrational‘ and ‗unreasonable‘…for those who refuse to 
accept ‗obvious‘ inductions, or for those who jump to conclusions on 
insufficient evidence…or for those who are uncooperative‖ (Harman, 1999, 
p.45). 
                                               
31
 The roles of testimony, persuasion and counter-argument by other people and figures of 
authority will not be considered separately here, although they undoubtedly play a role in 
influencing a person‘s decision-making. 
 68 
We would consider someone irrational if he did not ground his beliefs on sufficient 
evidence, typified by the jumping-to-conclusions bias that has been identified as a 
robust trait in individuals with schizophrenia (Garety et al., 1991). Also, and of particular 
interest to those concerned with the role of psychiatry as an agent of social control, an 
uncooperative agent might be considered irrational: here it is the agent‘s ends and 
actions that are being evaluated against society‘s view of how one ought to behave. 
These examples of irrationality reflect the idea that there is a failure in the reasoning 
process, but not because of a normative error of failing to conform to principles of 
procedural rationality. Rather, they suggest failures of epistemic rationality, namely 
through having mistaken or poor epistemic and evaluative commitments. 
Epistemic Rationality in Psychiatry 
Some psychiatric phenomena may be thought of as involving impairments to epistemic 
rationality. Langdon and Coltheart (2000) argue that deluded individuals suffer from an 
impairment in the way the evidence for different explanations of an anomalous 
perception is evaluated and weighed up. Spitzer  similarly argues that the distinction 
between a delusional belief and one that is rationally held is that the person 
entertaining the former is unable or unwilling to reason about, justify and be open to the 
possibility of revising that belief in the face of counterevidence or argument32 (1990, 
p.391). Again we see the appeal of understanding standards of epistemic rationality in 
terms of the relationship between the beliefs and experience, as the truth or plausibility 
of beliefs play a role in determining whether they are being rationally held. 
 
Often delusions take the form of a highly elaborate set of beliefs and desires, each 
mutually consistent with one another and entirely inferentially valid, and patients may 
deliver procedurally intact reasoning in defence of their claims (Bermúdez, 2001, p.471; 
Kemp et al., 1997). Indeed, individuals with schizophrenia frequently perform better 
                                               
32
 A significant philosophical and cognitive psychological literature has evolved around the 
question of whether delusions possess the status of beliefs (see e.g., Campbell, 2001). Insofar 
as their attribution serves a useful function in the explanation of action, I will assume that they 
can be considered to be beliefs. 
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than healthy controls on tasks of formal reasoning and logic (Owen et al., 2007). 
Nonetheless, ordinarily we expect beliefs impacting on one‘s decisions to have at least 
a partial grounding or basis in experience, whether this is sensory experience of the 
external world or reflective, introspective experience. A decision made on the basis of a 
belief, where an outside observer can grasp no justification for acquiring that belief, 
either from experience or through inference, may be considered irrational33. It is not 
only that the belief content is bizarre, but that often when faced with an epistemic 
inconsistency between the delusional belief and sources of counterevidence or the 
testimony of others, the delusional individual constructs elaborate and implausible 
reasons to immunise the delusion against all contrary evidence:  
―… the individual with the irrational or delusional belief will most likely 
postulate a very complicated and unfalsifiable explanation to resolve the 
inconsistency. Consequently, he makes the entire belief set less intelligible, 
less testable, more unwieldy, and thus even more immune to falsification. 
What seems to make this mode of thinking irrational is, in part…making it 
more impervious to counterargument and refutation‖ (Leeser & O'Donohue, 
1999, p.691).  
What strikes us as unusual in such cases is a failure to afford due weight and 
significance to the available evidence that runs counter to the delusional conviction. 
This is not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with the truth values of the beliefs an 
individual holds, but rather a perceived deficit in the processes by which normatively 
significant facts about the world are grasped, accommodated and used in the 
formation, maintenance and revision of beliefs, and in the forming of intentions to act. 
Even if the delusional beliefs are the result of anomalous perceptual experience, as 
proposed by Maher (1999), they could not be considered to be ‗rational‘ responses to 
these experiences, as the resultant beliefs do not cohere with any (or in some 
instances, many) other beliefs the individual holds. There therefore appears to be a 
breakdown between the individual‘s normal, general beliefs and those that appear to 
                                               
33
 This characterisation excludes those beliefs that may be culturally sanctioned, such as 
minority religious beliefs, though I make no claim as to how such beliefs may be distinguished 
from pathological convictions. Such culturally sanctioned beliefs might include instances of what 
Wittgenstein calls ―framework propositions‖ (Wittgenstein, 1969). 
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be guiding decision-making. Somewhere in the reasoning process relations between 
beliefs have gone awry34.  
 
Other authors propose that a deficit in the processes of belief evaluation does indeed 
account for the transition from anomalous experience to delusional belief (e.g., Davies 
et al., 2001). Specifically, deluded individuals often lack the ability to reject candidates 
for belief derived from first-person perceptions, despite the implausibility of their 
content and inconsistency with all other beliefs and knowledge they possess (ibid.). 
The supposition that there is an abnormality in evidence evaluation is supported by the 
startling lack of insight frequently shown by patients suffering from delusions. For 
instance, individuals suffering from the Capgras delusion insist that their spouses, 
family members or significant others have been replaced by an impostor, in the form of 
a clone or sophisticated robot. The delusion is impervious to counterargument, the 
testimony of others or even recollections of shared memories or prior knowledge. 
These Capgras patients do not complain that it is ―as if‖ their relatives have been 
replaced by impostors: they persistently claim that they actually have been replaced 
(Stone & Young, 1997). Perceptual abnormality and cognitive biases cannot account 
for this striking lack of the reality-testing of such beliefs (Langdon & Coltheart, 2000), 
and this indicates that a problem in appropriating and weighing evidence from 
experience and other beliefs is what typifies such monothematic delusional beliefs35. 
 
Delusions are perhaps a special class of psychiatric phenomena that are not 
particularly frequently observed in normal clinical practice with such clarity and 
persistence as the example of Capgras delusion. However, more common conditions 
such as depression and anorexia could also involve similar impairments of epistemic 
                                               
34
 It must, however, be noted that delusions may serve useful psychological functions, such as 
bolstering self-esteem and preventing the comprehension of perceived personal failings, 
particularly through an exaggeration of the self-serving bias (Bentall et al., 2001). 
35
 It is less clear that we can gain a rational handle on florid, polythematic delusions. Since I am 
interested here in the kinds of cases that could help identify a distinction between rationality and 
irrationality, I will focus on the pathologies of reasoning at the borderline rather than extremes of 
apparent irrationality. 
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rationality where procedural rationality appears to be intact. Tan et al.‘s (2006; 2003) 
in-depth interviews with anorexic patients revealed a complex picture of coherent, 
intact logical reasoning from premises to conclusions, but which frequently involved 
distorted evaluative commitments and false beliefs about weight (Viglione et al., 2006). 
In such cases the inference from premises to conclusion is procedurally valid but the 
starting premises are in breach of what I have described as epistemic rationality. There 
is of course much more to the problem of understanding the pathologies involved in the 
types of case I have mentioned, but it is plausible to suggest at this level of generality 
that something is going awry with patients‘ ability to form, maintain and act upon 
epistemically and evaluatively appropriate commitments. There are problems in the 
way that beliefs are weighed against evidence, experience and each other, with the 
way values are prioritised and desires are related to intentions to act. 
 
A significant difficulty for providing any substantive account of rationality is that the 
norms governing good reasoning do not appear to be amenable to codification in a 
formal theory or even hierarchical ordering36. Bermúdez comments that there is a prima 
facie difficulty in comprehending how the processes of acquiring and weighing up 
evidence and dynamically revising one‘s beliefs could be subsumed under formal 
principles (2001, p.467). How could we derive a formal principle from the general 
injunction to take one‘s prior beliefs into account when evaluating the weight and 
significance accorded to new evidence, for example? The most plausible candidate for 
such a role in normatively constraining what one ought to believe would be the 
Carnapian ―principle of total evidence‖. This principle is that one ought to take into 
account the totality of the available evidence when forming a judgement of probability, 
taken to be analogous to the conviction with which one holds a belief. Yet as a context-
free principle, this axiom provides nothing in terms of normative guidance: it cannot say 
what counts as evidence, how one ought to weigh up the contributions of different 
                                               
36
 Bermúdez (2001) suggests that proponents of Bayesian epistemology would seek to underpin 
all norms of reasoning with formal principles but this approach presumes that the probabilities or 
degrees of conviction attached to beliefs can be taken as a given. 
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forms of evidence, how one ought to apportion degrees of belief, and so on. Thus, it 
cannot dictate what one ought to do or believe, in light of the nexus of beliefs and 
desires one possesses. Whereas the formal demands of procedural rationality are 
amenable to codification in terms of principles subsumed within a formal theory of 
rationality, once we incorporate norms of good reasoning that constitute epistemic 
rationality into our conception of rationality, its normative requirements do not appear to 
be so easily defined and axiomatised. Codification permits an algorithmic application of 
standards to evaluate a particular piece of reasoning or decision-making; but if the 
norms of epistemic rationality are uncodifiable, it is not clear if judgements about 
reasoning are disciplined across the board by the same standards. The question I wish 
to address now is whether this lack of codification via abstract principles entails that 
standards of epistemic rationality might not be universal and shared across groups. 
 
2.4. JUDGING BY A DIFFERENT STANDARD? 
The Possibility of Divergent Norms 
Consider two hypothetical cases of decision-making that are similar in form and 
process, differentiated only by the particulars of the patient‘s beliefs: 
1. A Jehovah‘s witness with a life-threatening condition refuses to have 
an urgent blood transfusion because she believes that she will be 
condemned to eternal damnation if she receives blood37. 
2. A patient with a schizophrenic delusion refuses to have an urgent 
blood transfusion because she believes that the secret services will 
poison the blood. 
What is it that motivates the intuition that only in the case of the schizophrenic there 
has been a normative mistake in the epistemic commitments the patient has, as 
opposed to a different but valid way of understanding the world, which is how we ought 
to think of the first case?38 A fine-grained understanding of rationality must be capable 
of discriminating between processes considered irrational and those that signify 
                                               
37
 I shall not discuss specifically the problematic issue of judgements about capacity where a 
religious belief is influential in decision-making, though it has been raised as a difficult area of 
clinical judgement (Waldfogel & Meadows, 1996). 
38
 I will return to this example in chapter six, to consider how the nuanced understanding of 
capacity assessment I advance might better accommodate these two cases. 
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conformity to different but intelligible forms of reasoning, particularly if it is to shed light 
on the complex notion of capacity. We could appeal to the idea that the religious belief 
is one that is culturally sanctioned, thus providing the individual with reasonable and 
secure grounds for her belief, whereas the delusional belief has no external support 
from a community. This alone does not, however, provide a criterion for distinguishing 
acceptable variations in epistemic standards from unreasonable or inappropriate ones. 
So-called ‗pro-ana‘ websites are home to online communities that encourage the kinds 
of beliefs about anorexia and evaluations of body image and health that would be 
considered wrong and unhealthy by the majority of the population and by psychiatrists, 
suggesting that the communal nature of particular epistemic or evaluative commitments 
alone ought not to ensure their acceptance as indicating divergent but acceptable 
standards in reasoning and decision-making. 
 
The notion that different groups or individuals exhibit differing degrees of rationality 
dates back in Western thought at least as far as Aristotle, whose politically motivated 
conception of rationality supplied the criteria for full citizenship of the Greek state 
(Lloyd, 2007, p.152), notably criteria that women and slaves failed to meet. At the time, 
Aristotle‘s conception of rationality was not in a position to be challenged: it was 
assumed to be superior and provided a clear, fixed normative standard for reasoning 
ability, whether or not it was universally agreed upon. Early anthropologists conducting 
ethnographic studies of alien tribes made sweeping generalisations about the 
rationality exhibited by members of different cultures, exemplified by Lévy-Bruhl‘s 
(1923) attribution of ―pre-logical‖ mentalities to seemingly primitive peoples. Such 
arguments were of course heavily criticised for invalidly imposing post-Enlightenment 
Western standards of reason and logic upon the behaviour and practices of a culture in 
which they might not necessarily apply. Furthermore, there seemed no reason to 
suggest that the understanding and interpretation of behaviour ought to rest on such 
standards applying across the board to all human cultures (Lloyd, ibid). Put simply, why 
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should we think it is the case that all humans conform to the same standards of 
reasoning? 
 
Liberal Western democracies are at pains to avoid attributions of inferior rationality or 
reasoning competencies to other groups, mindful of the consequences that may follow 
from such perceptions of inequality. Yet it is clear that there are differences in the way 
people assimilate information, weigh this up with their own beliefs and values and 
reach decisions. It appears that what count as the norms of good reasoning may vary 
significantly between different populations and cultures. For example, the idea that we 
should place value on empirically established scientific evidence and statistics may be 
entirely disregarded in a society where beliefs are weighted according to the dictates of 
one‘s spiritual faith rather than medical opinion. The priority accorded to the evidence 
of one‘s own perceptual experience may be subordinate to the authority of a religious 
leader. In a society that values the welfare and health of a community over and above 
that of the individual, the value placed on one‘s own life may be overridden by a 
concern for the success and stability of the community or family. In short, the norms of 
epistemic rationality that I have thus far taken largely for granted do not look as though 
they necessarily converge in different communities. Divergences in evaluative 
commitments, what is taken to be evidence and the priority accorded to different forms 
of evidence in the decision-making process may arise across different populations. Yet 
whether or not they have similar institutions in place to our own, every society at least 
in some way distinguishes between behaviour that is deemed irrational from that which 
is normal and acceptable, wherever it is that these normative boundaries are drawn.  
  
Returning to focus on psychiatry within English law and culture, the significance of the 
potential for such divergence becomes clear. In the 1960s R.D. Laing attacked the 
presumption that in the absence of a coherent, sense-making explanation from a third-
person perspective, a person‘s actions and utterances are nonsensical or meaningless, 
in his critique of psychiatry and the conceptualisation of psychiatric conditions as 
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medical disorders. For Laing, behaviour that is considered to be symptomatic of 
disorder when there is no physiological evidence (such as a lesion), is "without 
exception ... a special strategy that a person invents in order to live in an unliveable 
situation” (Laing, 1967, p.114). In other words, behaviour that is unintelligible to an 
outsider has structure, purpose and meaning for the individual concerned, and it is his 
way of surviving or coping with his experiences. The fact that this strategy may not be 
discernable to others does not undermine the possibility that to the individual himself 
there are logical, rational connections between his beliefs and actions: from his own 
point of view there are reason explanations for what he thinks and does (Hunt, 1990). It 
is not clear whether Laing would have considered the problem to be one of a lack of 
epistemic access by clinicians to the beliefs and thoughts that would make the 
behaviour coherent, or of individuals reasoning in fundamentally different ways, but 
either way the implications for the judgements about agents‘ reasons are the same: we 
are not in an epistemic (or indeed moral) position to form judgements about the 
intelligibility of the reasons, experiences and beliefs of others whose behaviour might 
appear baffling to us. 
 
The way we accommodate and weigh up information depends at least in part on the 
evaluative commitments and attitudes we hold, and these are largely influenced by our 
cultural, social and psychological context. There is therefore much diversity and 
variability in the way we reason. Such differences pose a problem if we are seeking to 
formulate general normative standards of rationality. We might freely accept that we 
may be unqualified to judge the reasoning process of an individual whose entire 
worldview, language and belief and value system is dissimilar to our own, since there 
would undoubtedly be a host of implicit factors to which we would be culturally 
insensitive. In light of this, the question arises as to whether what counts as a 
recognisable reason for one‘s decision relies on a contingent set of standards that 
happen to guide one‘s own reasoning but that need not impose any constraint on 
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interpretations and judgements of the behaviour of another. Davidson puts this worry 
succinctly: 
―If you deviate from my norms of rationality, and you do not share my sense of 
what is reasonable, then are you really irrational? After all, fully rational agents 
can differ over values. If rationality is just one more value or complex set of 
values, then calling someone irrational would seem to be no more than a 
matter of expressing disagreement with his values or norms‖ (1985a, p.189). 
If the norms of good reasoning are contingent only on conventions or epistemic and 
evaluative commitments that are particular to a community, the search for a reliable, 
objective set of criteria for evaluating reasoning processes inevitably will be futile. On 
the other hand if certain epistemic standards are necessary for judgements about 
decision-making processes, how are they to be characterised if not in terms of 
universally applicable procedural principles?  
Relativism About Rational Norms 
I have argued that judgements about capacity cannot be disciplined by a procedurally 
defined set of rules operating independently of the epistemic content of the decision 
being made. Establishing whether a person has a recognisable reason for his decision 
in light (in part) of the beliefs he has necessarily involves making a judgement about 
whether those beliefs themselves are reasonably held. But incorporating this 
substantive epistemic element to judgement ostensibly generates problems for the 
objectivity of its standards. This lends support to a philosophically motivated concern, 
that whatever we happen to consider the standards of reasoning to be, we have no 
justification for believing that what counts as good reasoning in our own case ought to 
be the same for others. It may of course turn out that such agreement is necessary for 
one‘s belonging to a certain community, but the point is that it could have been 
otherwise, that there is a possibility of doing things differently.  
 
I take this view to represent a relativist conception of rational norms: “relativism is the 
view that cognitive goals and virtues, especially rationality, are relative to persons, 
situations and purposes” (Mišcevic N., 2000, p.47). This means that the normative 
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standards governing the way one individual or group reasons about the world, weighs 
up evidence and so forth, may be indexed only to that particular group. A similar idea is 
found in Davidson‘s notion of a ―conceptual scheme‖ (1974b), which is taken to be a 
system of concepts that enables one to organise or make sense of one‘s experience of 
the world. It is a point of view that may be specific to a culture or time, and the essence 
of the idea of such a scheme is that there is potential for other, rival schemes to exist. 
This possibility forms the basis of the doctrine of conceptual relativism, which I consider 
to be informatively analogous to relativism about rational norms39. 
 
Various sociological theories of knowledge (e.g., Bloor, 1983) have sought to embrace 
relativism about rational norms, rejecting all reference to the supposed truth or falsity of 
beliefs, or any objective standard of rationality regarding their formation and 
maintenance. Instead, by citing sociological and psychological causal conditions that 
lead individuals to embrace certain beliefs and forms of reasoning, knowledge is 
construed as consisting in whatever that particular community takes to be knowledge, 
and good reasoning as whatever community consensus dictates is an acceptable or 
correct process of inference or decision-making. 
 
One implication of this view is that the behaviour and actions of agents could not 
accurately be judged by those who are not part of the same community, as the 
standards governing what count as acceptable reasoning and decision-making 
processes for the observer may differ from those by which the observed agents form 
their intentions. Within his own community, an agent‘s reasoning process may conform 
adequately to the norms of good reasoning that have achieved consensus in that 
community, but judged from the perspective and standards of an outside the process is 
poor, inappropriate or even unintelligible. Such a judgement would be an illegitimate 
imposition of standards onto the behaviour of an agent who is not bound by those 
                                               
39
 Conceptual and rational relativism are not synonymous, but the close connection between 
one‘s concepts and one‘s reasons for action ensures parallel insights about their epistemic 
claims can be drawn for them both. 
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same norms. This kind of imposition appears to have occurred when early 
anthropologists studied new found tribes: their behaviour seemed strange, ―pre-logical‖ 
and irrational as it was judged by the researcher‘s own conception of rationality (Lloyd, 
2007, p.154).  
 
This is not merely an epistemological problem regarding how we know and can judge 
the rationality of others. It is an ontological concern about whether or not there are any 
universal standards governing the decision-making process. If there are not, the 
conceptual possibility is open that there may be fundamentally different ways of going 
on in the world. By this I mean that there may be such different ways of understanding 
facts, of considering evidence, and of reasoning to form decisions, that there is no 
possibility that an observer could form a judgement that other intentional agents 
outside of his own linguistic community have in some sense erred in their beliefs about 
the world. On this view, there are no universal normative constraints on the formation 
of beliefs or concepts; there is no objectively right or wrong way of doing things; people 
may simply be said to see the world differently and we are in no position to judge them 
as being in error. Indeed, we are in no position to subject their decision-making to a 
normative evaluation at all. This is the position most forcefully advocated by Laing in 
his discussions of mental illness. For him, the behaviours and delusional beliefs typical 
of some types of mental illness carry with them no normative consequences above and 
beyond the fact that we as observers or clinicians deem behaviour characteristic of 
mental illness to be, for instance, socially inappropriate. Normativity here goes no 
deeper than contingent social or cultural convention. 
 
At this stage it is worth considering how the prima facie plausible relativism of rational 
epistemic standards I have sketched may impact on judgements of capacity, in order to 
understand why a lack of universally shared standards would be epistemically 
problematic. 
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Standards Governing Capacity Judgements 
In light of the preference in psychiatry for minimising the idiosyncrasies of clinical 
judgement and increasing reliability of assessment across raters, whatever the 
standards by which clinician judges capacity are they ought to be universally 
applicable, used reliably and consistently by clinicians across the board. Codification of 
standards in terms of explicitly statable general principles would be one way of 
ensuring this kind of transparent regimentation of clinical assessment, but as I have 
argued what counts as fulfilling the essential criterion of using or weighing information 
cannot be fixed by a set of principles. Alternatively, standardisation of clinical 
assessment would be assured if the norms governing capacity judgements were 
universally shared. If standards are the same across humanity the norms of the 
assessor and those of the patient would coincide. Consequently these normative 
requirements need not necessarily be set out and articulated but instead could be 
implicitly relied upon to guide capacity judgements and delimit the boundaries of 
reason-guided decision-making processes. However, in mooting the idea that different 
cultural groups may possess fundamentally different norms of reasoning a doubt has 
been generated about the universality of rational standards. 
 
The operational approach to capacity treats assessment as a matter of ascertaining 
fulfilment or failure on a number of cognitively-based descriptive criteria of mental 
functioning. These checklists will be perfunctory and misleading at best if what 
clinicians deem to count as fulfilling the criteria has the potential to differ either from 
other professional opinion or from the standards of reasoning by which the patient 
himself reaches his decision. The veneer of objectivity and neutrality afforded by the 
checklist approach to ascertaining capacity belies the complex normative judgement 
underpinning these criteria and if there is scope for the standards governing this 
judgement to differ, significant implications for the possibility of reliably and fairly 
assessing a patient‘s decision-making process follow. Naturally there is always scope 
for disagreement among clinicians but the concern here is an ontological one with 
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epistemological ramifications. The ontological concern is that there may simply be 
radically different standards of epistemic rationality governing how individuals 
accommodate, assimilate and utilise information, their own beliefs and values and so 
forth, in making a decision. Consistently convergent inter-rater judgements about 
particular cases will support the claim that standards among clinicians might be shared, 
but the concern is more pressing if we consider the potential for discrepancy in 
standards between a clinician and patient. A clinician will judge a patient‘s decision-
making process according to his own implicit conception of what counts as a 
recognisable reason based on the available information relevant to the decision at 
hand. However, if the standards governing the actual process for the patient are 
different, the clinician may perceive a failure or pathology of reasoning when by the 
patient‘s own lights the decision is reached via a perfectly legitimate, normatively 
appropriate process.  
 
Although I will go on to argue that this concern about the possible relativism of rational 
standards is misplaced, it is interesting to consider how the notion of judging the 
behaviour and actions of one group by imposing the standards of another has a 
particularly troublesome resonance for psychiatry. The demands of rationality could be 
interpreted as tools of social control to justify taking the decisions and deliberations of 
one authoritative group seriously whilst ignoring or undermining the voices of others on 
account of their apparently inferior rationality. If virtue is an invention of politicians to 
keep human cattle in line (Korsgaard, 1996, p.8, citing Mandeville), then so too could 
rationality be thought of as a paternalistic invention to quell the eccentric and bizarre, 
preventing decisions made on the basis of seemingly irrational reasoning from being 
implemented. Such hyperbole is not beyond the criticisms levelled at psychiatry 
particularly since the anti-psychiatry movement of the 1960s onwards. If judgements 
about rationality determine whose autonomy should be respected and whose is 
undermined, then even the hypothetical possibility of fundamentally different ways of 
reasoning generates a worrying asymmetry in which the authoritative standards of 
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rationality are those that belong to the psychiatric profession: predominantly white, 
middle-class males, in the UK at least. The spectre of relativism about rational 
standards therefore raises serious questions for the possibility of impartially judging the 
reasoning and decision-making process of others. 
 
In the following chapter I seek to assuage this concern by examining the normative 
constraints on third-person judgements about a person‘s reasons and decisions. I use 
Davidson‘s arguments for the conditions of possibility on ascribing intentional states to 
others in order to undermine the notion that there could be radically different standards 
of rationality, and will go on to consider whether there are any broad necessary norms 




3.1. REASONS AND THIRD-PERSON INTERPRETATION 
Reconstructing Interpretation 
I have argued that judgements about reasons are underpinned by standards of both 
procedural and epistemic rationality, and suggested that the two are not independent of 
one another. Despite the limitations of procedural rationality it does at least appear to 
supply a universal and codifiable normative standard by which to judge the rationality of 
a decision-making process that is abstracted from and irrespective of the content of the 
beliefs and desires entering into that process. By contrast, epistemic rationality is 
concerned with the way information and evidence is used and content of the decision 
within the context in which it is made. Epistemic standards are not obviously amenable 
to codification and I mooted the possibility that there might in principle be radical 
cultural differences between communities, thus generating a prima facie worry for the 
reliability and objectivity of third-person judgements about a person‘s reasons.  
 
In this chapter I begin to neutralise this concern by broadening the scope of enquiry, 
shifting from considerations of rationality in particular instances of reasoning and 
decision-making to an examination of the conditions that render intentional attribution 
possible in the first place. To do this I draw on a theoretical reconstruction of 
interpretive judgement and the normative constraints underpinning the possibility of 
interpretation that emerge from Donald Davidson‘s project of Radical Interpretation 
(1973b). Having first sought to justify this technical approach to interpretation, I attempt 
to provide a robust philosophical account of the grounds of interpretive judgements to 
support two claims. Firstly, that the rational constraints on normative judgements about 
a person‘s reasons for a decision reflect a deep fact about our nature as intentional 
agents. This argument will form the basis for the second claim, to be developed in 
chapter five, which diagnoses the idea that judgements about the process of decision 
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making could be informed by radically different standards of rationality as an 
unintelligible notion. 
The Davidsonian Project 
I use the term ‗interpretation‘ as a shorthand for the process of seeking to make sense 
of people‘s utterances and intentional actions from a third-person perspective using the 
language and concepts of reason explanations, that does not depend on a prior grasp 
of substantial theory. Interpretation can be understood as part of the process of forming 
judgements about a person‘s reasons for an action, enabling an interpreter to ascertain 
whether there is a rational process occurring that renders the action intelligible. Here I 
intend to consider how the project of interpretation can proceed on the basis of the 
behavioural evidence available, without any prior assumptions regarding shared 
language or social conventions. To do this I employ Davidson‘s project of Radical 
Interpretation (1973b), which provides a theoretical account of the inferences made by 
an interpreter from observing the behaviour of an agent to rendering it intelligible, by 
assigning meaning and intention that enable the behaviour to be amenable to reason 
explanation40. It sets out a view that an interpreter can only attribute propositional 
attitudes and thereby seek to explain behaviour if an assumption is made that the 
agent is rational, indicating a close connection between rationality and what it is to be 
an intentional agent. Davidson argues that the practice of interpretation is governed by 
constraints of Coherence and Correspondence, revealed through the methodology of 
Radical Interpretation (hereafter, RI), which he terms collectively ‗The Principle of 
Charity‘. The interpretive constraints imposed by Charity derive from the interpreter‘s 
own logical and epistemic resources. 
 
The claim that Charity imposes a normative structure on the process of interpretation is 
contentious not least of all because in practice rationality and intentionality appear to 
be capable of coming apart, for example when a person‘s behaviour is best explained 
                                               
40 This usage is wider in scope that Davidson‘s own concept of interpretation, which he took to 
refer only to the understanding of linguistic utterances (1973b). 
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by attributing to him a false belief, or that his actions are self-defeating. In this regard 
Charity might at best be thought of as a tool that can assist interpretation on occasion 
but that may be abandoned if reason explanations can be better supplied by ignoring 
the constraints of Charity when attributing propositional attitudes: a view characterised 
by Richard Grandy‘s pragmatic ‗Principle of Humanity‘ (1973). However, taking Charity 
to be a dispensable heuristic for interpretation is precisely the move that permits the 
threat of relativism about norms of rationality to take hold. 
 
To mitigate against this possibility, in the latter half of the chapter I advance what Child 
(1996b) terms an ―interpretationist‖ view of the relation between the methods of 
interpretation and the structure of the intentional realm. I argue that the applicability of 
the concepts of belief, reasons, and intentional action depends on their being 
attributable as such in interpretation for the purposes of reason explanation. This view 
is developed using Davidson‘s argument that in virtue of being an intentional agent 
one‘s behaviour is, in principle, intelligible to an interpreter. I then suggest that 
interpretation and intentionality are normatively structured by the demands of 
rationality. These conditions on intelligibility are exposed by the constraints of Radical 
Interpretation: the rational standards of Charity. Intelligibility and rationality cannot 
come apart as Grandy suggests because the applicability of the concept of belief 
requires the attributed attitude to bear rational relations to other intentional states. 
Intentional concepts therefore cannot be applied to, and behaviour therefore cannot be 
intelligible for, a creature whose behaviour does not conform broadly to the normative 
demands of Coherence and Correspondence. In the next chapter I will address the 
most pressing objections to this constitutively normative view of intentionality. 
 
The locus of interest in this thesis is in instances where ordinary understanding and 
interpretation may fail, where it is by no means clear if a person is acting for good 
reasons or in some cases at all intelligibly. In exploring the process of interpretation the 
aim is thus to scrutinise the boundaries of intelligibility and sense-making that are 
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breached when communication and understanding break down. One strategy for 
theorising about where these boundaries might lie is to attempt to abstract away from 
the potential variability and norms of social and pragmatic convention that constitute 
our ordinary interpersonal encounters, in order to ascertain whether or not there are 
necessary conditions underpinning the possibility of interpreting another intentional 
agent. If such conditions exist, they would delineate the boundaries beyond which 
another‘s behaviour could not be understood as intentional. The Davidsonian approach 
to interpretation seeks to do precisely this: his radical project attempts to strip away the 
assumptions of shared language, social and cultural norms and conventions that 
ordinarily pervade our interpretive practices, to examine the kernel of intelligibility that 
distinguishes an organism as an intentional being capable of acting for reasons from a 
non-intentional system. The project of Radical Interpretation is a thought experiment 
designed to uncover the necessary conditions of possibility for the attribution of 
intentional concepts.  
 
It is not, therefore, immediately clear that the conditions of intelligibility Davidson 
uncovers have any direct bearing on our ordinary understanding of reasons and 
decision-making. In specifying the assumptions that would enable an interpretive 
theory to be generated from method of Radical Interpretation, Davidson is engaged in 
an explicitly theoretical as opposed to empirical enterprise (Evnine, 1991, p.76). RI is 
not therefore a direct claim about what evidence could suffice for interpretation in 
practice: “My argument that RI is possible therefore does not depend…on pretending 
that the evidence and methods I describe represent the actual epistemic condition…of 
linguists and translators in the field‖ 41 (Davidson, 1994, p.124). In themselves the 
constraints of Charity, emerging from a rational reconstruction of interpretation in a 
radicalised scenario of total epistemic ignorance, do not directly generate interpretive 
constraints for ordinary, everyday instances of interpretation and the provision of 
                                               
41
 In contrast with the likes of Chomsky (1986, p.28-9) for his theory of Universal Grammar, he 
is not seeking to determine the actual implicit structures underlying our linguistic competence or 
ability to acquire language. 
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reason explanations. In utilising the resources of RI I am intending to provide a 
philosophical account of the deep normative structure of the grounds of interpretive 
judgement rather than supplementing psychological theories of human reasoning or 
providing specific standards of judgement in ordinary practice. However, towards the 
end of the chapter I will consider how the insights into this structure exposed by RI can 
be brought to bear on the narrower project of attributing reasons in particular instances 
of action and decision-making. 
 
3.2. INTERPRETATION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY 
Radical Interpretation 
Radical Interpretation takes the observable behaviour of an agent to provide all 
evidence there can be for an interpreter to base his intentional attributions upon. It aims 
to generate an idealised method for understanding the linguistic utterances of a 
radically unfamiliar speaker without any prior knowledge of the speaker‘s language or 
his mental states. RI was originally devised to shed light on the nature of meaning and 
to ascertain the most abstract and general conditions on possessing a language, based 
on a priori knowledge about what must be the case for a creature to be considered a 
linguistic being together with publicly observable linguistic behaviour (Ludwig, 2004, 
p.350). Davidson‘s strategy here is based upon Quine‘s notion of ―Radical Translation‖ 
(Davidson, 1970b, p.62), developed for the philosophical study of language to expose 
the minimal necessary conditions for languagehood without the usual contingent 
vagaries of culture, language or psychology42 43 (Quine, 1960, ch.2). The primary 
application of RI was thus as a tool in the philosophy of language, concerned with the 
understanding of linguistic utterances on the basis of extensional, behavioural criteria 
                                               
42
 There are significant differences between Quinean Radical Translation and Davidson‘s 
project of RI. Whereas translation implies a mapping from one language to another, 
interpretation is more akin to a transition that clarifies the meanings of utterances and behaviour 
for the interpreter himself, by giving them expression in another way that is understandable or 
intelligible to him (Mulhall, 1987, p.320). 
43
 For Quine, the evidence for such a theory could only take the form of behavioural dispositions 
to physical stimuli if the theory was to indeed be purely extensional, purged of intensional 
concepts and remaining ‗scientific‘ in its approach. Davidson, by contrast, embraces the fact 
that the evidence for interpretation is intensional (Davidson, 2001b, Reply to Foster, p.175). 
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and stripped of the contingencies of social convention, heuristics and assumptions 
about language we take for granted in seeking to understand other people‘s behaviour 
(Davidson, 1995a). Here, however, I will look beyond this original function, instead 
focusing on the application of the methodology for understanding the nature of third-
person attributions of intentional states based on the minimal epistemic resources 
available to a Radical interpreter.  
 
With the method of Radical Interpretation, the interpreter is starting from a position of 
total epistemic ignorance and cannot make any assumptions about the meanings of an 
agent‘s utterances in order to facilitate intentional attributions. Neither is it possible to 
ground an interpretation of the agent‘s utterances on the intentions he has in using 
words the way he does, for example, by pointing and making a vocal utterance, since 
the interpreter has no prior knowledge of what he believes:44 
―beliefs and meanings conspire to account for utterances. A speaker who 
holds a sentence to be true on an occasion does so in part because of what 
he means, or would mean, by an utterance of that sentence, and in part 
because of what he believes. If all we have to go on is the fact of honest 
utterance, we cannot infer the belief without knowing the meaning, and have 
no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief" (Davidson, 1974a, 
p.142).  
In the same way that Decision Theory seeks to delineate subjective probability and 
utility from the thin evidence of choice preferences, the challenge for an interpreter 
engaged in the project of RI can be expressed as the problem of ascertaining a 
speaker‘s beliefs and meanings simultaneously on the basis of the evidence of his 
utterances and actions. The dispositional facts that determine a speaker‘s hold-true 
attitudes, which for Davidson form the behavioural evidence for interpretation, are 
vectors of meaning and belief (ibid. p.142; 148). Using uninterpreted utterances as 
evidence alone the interpretive project cannot get off the ground, since neither can be 
determined prior to the other: “interpreting an agent‟s intentions, his beliefs and his 
words are parts of a single project, no part of which can be assumed to be complete 
                                               
44
 This precludes the possibility of generating a theory of interpretation on the basis of non-
linguistic intentions: an approach most thoroughly worked through by Paul Grice (e.g., 1957). 
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before the rest is” (Davidson, 1973b, p.127). In this idealised scenario, initiating the 
process of interpretation looks to be an impossible task unless some starting 
assumptions can be made about what the agent means by his utterances or what he 
believes. 
 
Here the resources of the Radical Interpreter himself come to light. For it is on account 
of his status as an intentional being capable of holding beliefs, having reasons for his 
actions and speaking a language, that the interpreter can use his own standards of 
belief formation and reason-giving to enable him to make initial intentional state 
attributions. In spite of the relative paucity of the evidence before him, the interpreter 
can launch the process of interpretation by making fundamental assumptions about 
what the agent believes. Such assumptions are based on the fact of the shared 
perceptual environment in which the interpretive encounter occurs and particular 
presuppositions about the relationship between the meanings of the agent‘s 
utterances, the beliefs that he holds and the actions that he performs. In short, 
interpretation can only proceed in virtue of the assumption that the normative standards 
constraining the interpreter‘s beliefs and actions are relevantly similar to those 
constraining the behaviour of the agent: “interpretation depends on reading some of the 
norms of the interpreter into the actions and speech of those he interprets” (Davidson, 
1994, p.123). Davidson‘s construal of what these norms consist of is known as the 
Principle of Charity. 
The Principle of Charity 
The term ―Principle of Charity‖ is attributed to Wilson (1959) who developed the notion 
as part of a philosophical account of the determination of the semantic values of 
linguistic terms (Jackman, 2003), though it first came to prominence through Quine's 
pragmatic use of it as an arbiter between conflicting translation manuals (1960). The 
Principle can be formulated in several ways, each carrying different implications for 
understanding the theoretical reconstruction of interpretation pursued by Davidson. 
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Lepore and Ludwig for instance provide three different formulations derived from 
textual evidence in Davidson‘s own writings alone (Lepore & Ludwig, 2005). 
Nonetheless, in all its guises Charity can be thought of as a methodological 
presupposition for Radical Interpretation, which allows interpretation to proceed by 
dictating that an interpreter uses his own logical and epistemic resources to render the 
beliefs and utterances attributable to an agent intelligible as far as possible: “[t]he 
clarity and cogency of our attributions of attitude, motive and belief are proportionate, 
then, to the extent to which we find others consistent and correct” (Davidson, 1982, 
p.184). Its use therefore licenses assumptions about the beliefs of agents being 
interpreted, based on the normative structure of the interpreter‘s own beliefs. For its 
purposes in the philosophy of language this enables an interpreter to assign putative 
beliefs to the agent in order to establish what his utterances mean, to “hold one factor 
steady while the other is studied” (Davidson, 1975, p.167). In appealing to Charity 
Davidson thereby seeks to state conditions that would yield an interpretive theory for 
understanding an agent‘s language (Davidson, 1994, p.127). For my purposes here, 
however, I am concerned with the nature of the assumptions being made by the 
interpreter rather than their role in the development of a theory of meaning.  
 
Davidson considers Charity to consist of two distinguishable constraints on 
interpretation: ―we must assume that a speaker is by and large consistent and correct 
in his beliefs” (Davidson, 1973a, p.238). Broadly, these conditions of consistency and 
correctness are termed ―Coherence‖ and ―Correspondence‖ respectively (e.g., 1983; 
1991, p.211; 1970a, p.221; 1967, p.21; 1969, p.48). The former consists in the claim 
that there are holistic constraints on the structure of the patterns of that speaker‘s 
thoughts and language; and the latter that a speaker‘s utterances indicate generally 
true beliefs. Although these components are interdependent, for clarity they will be 
considered separately here. 
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Coherence 
In order to begin the process of attributing intentional states, an interpreter must 
assume that the agent‘s beliefs, desires, values and intentions are broadly consistent 
with one another and hang together as a more or less coherent whole. Hookway gives 
a succinct delineation of what this admittedly vague requirement amounts to for 
interpretation: “We are constrained to look for…rationally coherent bodies of belief, to 
avoid ascribing inexplicable ignorance, to look for reasonable desires…” (cited in Miller, 
1998, p.273). It is difficult to specify how the requirement of Coherence provides a 
methodological injunction for the interpreter in practice, but the motivation underpinning 
this normative assumption is perhaps clearest in Quine‘s pragmatic demand for logical 
consistency as a constraint for the translation of truth functional operators45. He uses 
this notion extensively in Radical Translation. Although Coherence on Davidson‘s 
construal of Charity has a far broader scope and forms an essential rather than 
pragmatic constraint on interpretation, it is nonetheless instructive to take Quine‘s view 
as a starting point for considering the nature of Coherence, as I shall later argue that 
the non-semantic rule-based conception advocated by Quine is in fact the source of 
many of the problems Charity faces46 47. 
 
For Quine, the evidence available to the field linguist takes the form of sentences 
assented to by a speaker, and he considers the law of non-contradiction to be a prime 
candidate for a rule of the translation of truth-functions. To take an example, for a field 
linguist the terms ‗blip‘ and ‗bloop‘ appear to be translatable to the English conjunction 
                                               
45
 Quine does not elaborate on his reasons for restricting his use of Charity to truth-functions, 
although it would be consistent with his behaviourist intentions to suppose he considered them 
to be directly translatable through tests of behavioural assent without any semantic assumptions 
being necessary. 
46
 Davidson insists that we need a much richer conception of Charity that applies “across the 
board” (1974a; 1974c). His formulation of Charity is therefore considerably thicker than Quine‘s, 
in that it explicitly emphasies the semanticity of interpretation rather than its non-semantic form. 
For the behaviourist Quine, the relation between belief and truth was ensured by the fact that 
the only evidence available for the translation was from stimulus meaning, which was created 
from a causal chain emanating from occurrent environmental events or conditions. In contrast, 
the behavioural evidence Davidson relies on as a platform from which to generate his account 
of RI is already explicitly semantic.  
47
 It should be noted that Quine himself does not distinguish the elements of Charity as I have 
done here. 
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‗and‘ and the negation ‗not‘ respectively, and the speaker assents to certain sentences 
that are compatible with this translation. However, when querying ‗p blip bloop-p‘ (p 
and not-p) the speaker also assents, thus apparently violating the law of non-
contradiction. The linguist could either argue that the speaker adheres to standards of 
logic that are bizarre, or alternatively could assume that he has mistranslated the terms 
‗blip‘ and ‗bloop‘. On the basis of the behavioural evidence alone, the interpreter cannot 
arbitrate between these two alternatives. The notion of logical consistency is thus 
invoked by Quine to constrain possible translations: it cannot be the case that a 
speaker defies such logical standards, and we must select a translation manual that 
does not entail this logical defect. This prevents translations from permitting, in Quine‘s 
words, “silliness” in the translations of utterances (Quine, 1960, p.59; Evnine, 1991, 
p.104). In every case, a translation will be preferred that, when abstracted to the form 
of an inductive or deductive argument leading from premises to a conclusion, adheres 
to the dictates of formal logical reasoning. We should err on the side of assuming we 
have mistranslated if a situation arises whereby a translation involves the attribution of 
illogical or inconsistent beliefs in order to cohere with the available behavioural 
evidence. Beyond this usage in the translation of truth-functional operators and logical 
constants (Miller, 1998, p.272) it is not clear precisely what Quine takes Charity to 
consist in or whether it extends beyond the requirement for translations to imply 
adherence to other logical truths. Irrespective, Quinean Charity can be thought of as a 
wholly non-semantic practical tool for translation.  
 
Davidson‘s conception of Coherence differs in two ways that are important for my 
purposes. He acknowledges from the outset of the project of RI that the evidence for 
interpretation is explicitly semantic (Glock, 2003, p.174) and also applies the 
requirement of coherence far more broadly and applies it to the use of folk 
psychological concepts such as beliefs and desires48. This wider scope entails that the 
                                               
48
 Davidson argues against the idea that perception provides us with non-propositional content 
(sense-data, percepts etc) that constitutes the rational basis of our beliefs about the world, in 
 92 
meanings of utterances and the contents of thoughts are subject to the interpretive 
requirement of Coherence. That is to say, there is a normative constraint on the 
interpreter to attribute beliefs, desires, intentions and meanings that are coherent with 
one another. Coherence forms a holistic constraint on the totality of intentional 
attributions made by an interpreter to a particular agent. Rather than demanding 
deductive closure and complete logical consistency it counsels the interpreter to make 
attributions that ensure the beliefs, desires and intentions of the agent hang together in 
a broadly consistent whole. Such coherence is, for Davidson, a matter of adherence to 
logical and probabilistic principles derived from Decision and Probability Theory. This 
notion of Coherence has ostensible benefits when it comes to attempting to interpret 
the utterances and behaviour of others with whom we may not share certain beliefs: it 
looks as though it is only the logical structure of the reasoning process that Coherence 
concerns. However, I shall argue presently that the coherence aspect of Charity cannot 
be thought of as independent of the second aspect, Correspondence. 
“Correspondence” 
The Principle of Correspondence is derived from an assumption about the relation 
between a speaker‘s hold-true attitudes, his beliefs and his meanings, namely that he 
knows what he means by his sentences and that he infers the sentences expressing 
his beliefs are, by and large, true (Glock, ibid. p.188-9). Correspondence entails that 
truth conditions are assigned to a speaker‘s utterances that make the speaker “right 
when plausibly possible”49 (Davidson, 1973b, p.137). I use the term ―Correspondence‖ 
                                                                                                                                         
line with Sellars and Austin (Davidson, 2003, p.695). This is because nothing non-propositional 
can have a logical relation with (and so provide a rational justification for) something 
propositional such as a belief. Davidson proposed that perceptions cause us to have true 
beliefs, therefore yielding knowledge directly and not via an epistemic intermediary: ―I look and I 
believe‖. This contrasts with Quine‘s appeal to stimulus meaning serving an epistemological 
function. By contrast McDowell (1994) argues perceptual experience itself is conceptually 
structured and thus propositional, enabling it to serve as an epistemic basis for belief. 
49
 Davidson does at times suggest (e.g., 1973a, p.239; 1973b, p.136; 1968, p.101) that Charity 
constrains interpretation by requiring that the interpreter and speaker merely agree about 
events or conditions in the environment. Lepore and Ludwig refer to this principle as 
―Agreement‖ (2005, p.190), which differs from Correspondence in not judging the truth of beliefs 
relative to the environment itself. Thus an interpreter and speaker could be equally deluded or 
deceived: they would hold the same beliefs about the environment but these beliefs could be 
false. This reading appears to contradict Davidson‘s overriding commitment to a constitutive 
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cautiously as it is not intended to indicate anything like the relation between thought 
and world implicated in traditional correspondence theories of truth (Lepore & Ludwig, 
2005). 
 
On Davidson‘s methodology of interpretation, Correspondence provides an injunction 
that the interpreter assumes a speaker‘s verbal dispositions to assert particular held-
true attitudes in the same or similar environment largely match the interpreter‘s own 
(1991, p.211). Evnine describes Correspondence as requiring the assumption that 
other speakers “find obvious what we (the interpreters) find obvious” (Evnine, 1991, 
p.103). This is not an authoritarian empirical assumption about the possibilities of two 
agents happening to converge in their judgements and attitudes towards events and 
objects in a shared environment (Joseph, 2004, p.67). Rather, it points to the causal 
connection between the sentences a speaker holds true and events and objects in the 
external world: a subject‘s verbal dispositions are related to his environment (Davidson, 
1983, p.150). The causal relation enables a radical interpreter to proceed by assuming 
that the attitudes a speaker holds about the world, exemplified by his utterances, are 
largely correct: “if we understand a speaker, we know how her words are connected to 
the world”50 (Davidson, 1994, p.125).  
 
Truth, on this view, is not a neutral, observer-independent arbiter of belief. Statements 
about the truth-conditions of sentences are always expressed in the language of the 
interpreter and it is thus always the interpreter‘s own perspective that determines the 
standard by which sentences uttered by the agent are judged. Davidson acknowledges 
that in RI we interpret a speaker “…according, of course, to our own view of what is 
right” (1973b, p.137). If we consider the project of interpretation to be akin to 
constructing a scientific theory, a parallel emerges between this conception of the 
                                                                                                                                         
constraint on beliefs being largely true about the environment and I do not consider Agreement 
to constitute what Davidson needs the notion of Correspondence to consist in. 
50
 For Davidson this requirement extends to the need for the interpretation generated to satisfy 
the holistic constraints of a Tarski-style Convention T, enabling T-sentences comprising 
expressions in the object and metalanguage to be generated that identify the extension of the 
truth predicate for a language (Davidson, 1967). 
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relationship between the observer of the data of the theory, and an influential argument 
in the philosophy of science put forward by Kuhn (1970b), among others. This is the 
view that there can be no theory-neutral vocabulary of sense-data to describe 
accurately the entities of and events occurring in nature, free from the perspective 
imposed by a human agent: “Feyerabend and I have argued at length that no such 
vocabulary is available” (Kuhn, 1970b, p.262, cited in ; Davidson, 1974b, p.191). In the 
process of RI the injunction for an interpreter to ascribe true beliefs to the agent is not a 
task that can be achieved without recourse to the interpreter‘s own language and 
perspective regarding what is true. Nevertheless, this idea will recur in chapter five as 
an important component of the argument against the possibility of relativism about 
rational standards.  
 
Correspondence allows that the relation between an agent‘s utterances and the extra-
linguistic reality of the world is tracked using the interpreter‘s epistemic vantage point 
and beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences in his language (Joseph, 2004, 
p.63). This assumption allows the interpreter to go beyond the actual verbal behaviour 
of the agent in attempting to develop a theory of interpretation. The observed agent is 
not behaving in a vacuum: his movements and the sounds he utters occur within a 
social and environmental context part of which the interpreter himself will have 
epistemic access to. Whilst the interpreter may be unaware of the social dimension of 
the speaker‘s behaviour, in observing his actions during the interpretive encounter the 
two will share at least in part a perceptual environment. Thus the interpreter will form 
beliefs about the environment in which he is in that he can employ in making intentional 
attributions to others.  
The Relation Between Coherence and Correspondence 
The interpreter‘s beliefs about the shared environment necessarily inform his 
interpretation of a speaker‘s utterances and beliefs. But the attribution of true beliefs is 
not particularly informative for the interpreter unless he can extrapolate beyond the 
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directly available evidence and formulate hypotheses about what other beliefs the 
agent might hold, and thereby begin to enrich his understanding of the agent‘s 
language and intentional behaviour. An assumption is required that certain things 
follow from the attribution of a belief, and this is what Coherence warrants. Thus, if an 
interpreter attributes to an agent the belief ‗that-p‘, this belief is not isolated from other 
beliefs that the agent might have: the interpreter is justified in assuming that the agent 
will not also believe ‗not-p‘. In this way, the interpreter can extend his interpretations 
beyond the available behavioural evidence, formulate hypotheses about the agent‘s 
actions and utterances, and initiate the process of seeking reason explanations for his 
behaviour. Both Correspondence and Coherence are necessary in order for this step to 
be taken. 
 
A formative influence on Davidson‘s thinking about the two-factor essence of Charity 
was the development of Ramsey‘s strategy in Decision Theory for disentangling the 
elements of subjective utility and perceived probability that, he argued, sufficiently 
explained choice preference behaviour (Bermúdez, 2009). In order to extract rich 
information about propositional attitudes from the thin evidence of expressions of 
choice, Ramsey made the crucial move of assuming that the agent would act 
consistently to maximise the likelihood of achieving his goals and aims. An agent who 
made choices that aimed to maximise his expected utility was, on these terms, 
behaving rationally. This conception of rationality comprises two distinguishable 
components. Firstly, to maximise one‘s expected utility requires that one‘s actions 
appropriately follow from one‘s beliefs and desires, and secondly, if the expectation of 
utility is going to be fulfilled, the intended consequences must follow or be likely to 
follow from one‘s actions. The assumption that agents are broadly rational therefore 
formed a descriptive constraint on the interpretation of his actions (Joseph, 2004, p.51), 
acting as a presupposition that there would be a coherent pattern to his beliefs, desires 
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and actions such that he would seek to bring about a maximisation of his expected 
utility through his actions51. 
 
The idea that rational agents seek to maximise their expected utility does, at first 
glance, appear to align with the process-focused conception of rationality characterised 
as PP-rationality by Kacelnik described previously. PP-rationality is a matter of the 
internal coherence of a process of reasoning and the appropriateness of the action is 
considered solely in light of the agent‘s beliefs and desires. This is irrespective of the 
truth of the beliefs, the appropriateness of the ends given the environment in which the 
agent is acting and so forth. On this process-conception all that matters to the 
rationality of a decision-making process is the subjective weighting of beliefs and 
desires in the formation of an intention to act. However, it is only if one‘s intentions are 
appropriate to the environment that one would successfully maximise the likelihood of 
achieving one‘s goals. Thus the rationality of this process of decision-making cannot be 
considered purely as a matter of internal coherence: if they are to successfully guide 
action and satisfy his goals, the agent‘s beliefs must reflect the way the world is, that is, 
they must be true. The two components of Charity mirror this two-fold conception of the 
assumptions required for understanding the decisions of others based on their choice 
behaviour (Davidson, 1974a). 
 
3.3. AN ARGUMENT FOR CHARITY 
Charity or Humanity? 
Several commentators (Lepore & Ludwig, 2005; Bortolotti, 2004b; Goldman, 1989; 
Mulhall, 1987; Grandy, 1973) have argued that the imposition of Charity rules out the 
possibility of explaining behaviour that we would perceive as intentional. Furthermore, 
                                               
51
 Furthermore, Ramsey cited the need to take into account expressions of choice evinced by 
different experimental set ups, so that values and expected probabilities are scaled relative to 
one another: particular choices can be explained by examining other interestingly relevant 
choices (Bermúdez, 2009). Thus individual choices or actions cannot be considered in isolation 
from other beliefs, values and desires and agent holds: a holistic approach to understanding 
choice behaviour is necessary, constrained by the assumption that the agent will act to 
maximise the achievement of his goals. 
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they claim that if Charity is taken seriously, we would be forced to deny intentional 
status to agents whose behaviour, while odd, we can nonetheless apply the concepts 
of meaning and intentional thought to and generate reason explanations for. On this 
view, the requirements of Charity ought to be rejected as a constraint on interpretation. 
There are two strands to this rejection of Charity, both of which are discernible in 
Taylor‘s (2002) critique of Davidson‘s strategy for RI. Firstly, Taylor construes 
Davidson‘s Charity as epistemological, arguing that its employment in interpretation 
requires justification as a constraint on interpreters‘ attributions. Such justification could 
be obtained only if the application of Charity rendered fruitful explanations and 
predictions of intentional behaviour in every instance. He takes it that the adoption of 
Charity is contingent on the practical utility of the attributions it produces and could be 
construed as a pragmatic aid to interpretation, rather than essential to it. It will be the 
aim of the following section to reject this view of Charity and to argue that such 
criticisms misconstrue the nature of Davidson‘s project.  
 
Secondly, if a Davidsonian requirement of Charity is accepted as a normative 
interpretive constraint, Taylor argues that it licenses ethnocentrism about interpretation 
and is thus inapplicable in intercultural contexts. He claims that there is nothing to 
suggest that epistemic virtues are universal (ibid. p.116-8), for example, the high value 
placed on ascribing true belief could be considered a direct consequence of the 
influence of Enlightenment and positivist thought in modern secular Western societies. 
Although Taylor is light on anthropological detail, as previously suggested it is plausible 
to conceive that in other cultures high epistemic value is placed on beliefs that ensure 
social cohesion or adherence to the dictates of religious authority, rather than on truth. 
It is therefore by no means a given that we are justified in thinking that the demands of 
Charity are universally valid, and this undermines their status as theoretical 
reconstructions of the grounds we have for interpretive judgement. However, I will set 
the groundwork here for the argument to be developed in chapter five that total 
unintelligibility of another culture is not an option if we want to continue regarding its 
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members as intentional agents (Davidson, 1974b). Whilst there may be differences in 
epistemic values and standards between different cultures, I will go on to claim that the 
normative demands of Charity are not ethnocentric but rather capture an important 
insight about the universal constraints and limits of intentionality. 
 
There are numerous routes into arguing that Charity ought to be treated as a 
contingent epistemological strategy, all based on the overarching claim that generating 
reason explanations for behaviour is not beholden to Charity‘s restrictive demands. 
Indeed, behaviour is often most intelligible when attributions are made that explicitly 
violate the constraints of coherence and true belief. I will address the most compelling 
stance against Charity, involving the citation of clear-cut empirical instances of 
irrationality, in the following chapter, but here I consider the prima facie plausible view 
that the constraints of Charity are pragmatic and thus potentially dispensable for the 
project of interpretation. 
 
The most well-known characterisation of this idea comes from Grandy (1973). Primarily 
attacking Quine‘s notion of Charity, he argues that if the purpose of translation is to 
produce the best possible predictions and explanations of an agent‘s behaviour (ibid. 
p.442), then Charity is neither necessary nor even particularly well-suited to the task. 
His alternative Principle of Humanity provides a pragmatic injunction that when 
translating another‘s utterances “the imputed pattern of relations among beliefs, desires 
and the world be as similar to our own as possible” (ibid. p.443). Grandy does not 
reject the dependence of intentional attributions on the epistemic and logical resources 
of the interpreter, but rather suggests that these permit of more flexibility than the 
requirement to attribute true and coherent beliefs entailed by Charity. Breaking the 
connection to truth that is so central to Davidson‘s account, Humanity straightforwardly 
allows scope for the attribution of false beliefs if in doing so an agent‘s behaviour is 
thereby rendered more intelligible. This permits, for example, an interpreter to attribute 
a belief to an agent that he (the interpreter) knows is false, but that which from the 
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perspective of the agent is either understandable (perhaps, for instance, he cannot see 
what is obvious to the interpreter on account of his spatial location) or indicative of the 
agent making an error in that instance. Preserving empathy with the agent‘s point of 
view is more important to interpretation than preserving truth in the beliefs attributed 
(Stein, 1996, p.120). Humanity counsels that when an interpreter is engaged in 
interpretation, he ought to recognise that the agent has basic perceptual and epistemic 
similarities to himself (Grandy, p.445), and this includes all the flaws of human 
reasoning, propensities to evidential bias and proneness to committing logical fallacies 
that typify our decision-making and intentional behaviour52. 
 
In arguing that constraints on intentional attributions are those of ensuring agreement, 
Humanity places a significant emphasis on the capability of the interpreter to empathise 
successfully with the interpreted agent. With the link to truth broken, the normative 
constraints on the interpreter are, Grandy claims, far looser than those of Charity, and 
the only resource the interpreter has to frame his interpretation is an extrapolation of 
his own consideration as to what he would believe or do in the situation of the agent. 
The Principle of Humanity therefore ties the intelligibility of behaviour solely to a third-
person perspective that floats free of considerations of rationality. 
 
Humanity looks to be most plausible when considering cases of understandable error. 
It is of course true that in the ordinary practice of interpretation, generating a reason 
explanation that makes sense of an agent‘s intentional behaviour might involve the 
attribution of false beliefs, particularly if the behaviour does not come about as the 
result of a carefully deliberated process of reasoning and evidence-checking by the 
agent. But the attack on Charity‘s concern with true belief as too stringent a constraint 
on interpretation neglects the balancing role played by Coherence in the attribution of 
intentional states. Charity does not dictate that an interpreter ought to attribute only true 
                                               
52
 There are strong parallels between the Principle of Humanity and simulation theory, although 
Grandy takes Humanity to be an option for interpretation rather than a psychological theory of 
interpersonal understanding. 
 100 
beliefs if doing so would do violence to the coherence of the agent‘s beliefs. For 
example, suppose I am in a bar and order a gin and tonic. The barman nods, turns to 
face the row of bottles behind him, picks up a bottle of vodka and begins to pour out a 
measure. According to Grandy, Charity demands that I ought to attribute to the barman 
the belief that he is pouring a measure of vodka, as this would be a true belief. 
However, to do so would be to ignore the inconsistency in his beliefs that would arise 
from such an attribution. Presumably, being a competent barman he knows that a gin 
and tonic requires gin, not vodka, and if he heard my order correctly he will believe I 
wanted gin and tonic and that he is fulfilling my request. To attribute to him the true 
belief that he is pouring vodka would undermine the coherence of his other beliefs. In 
this situation it is straightforward to attribute to him a false belief, that he is pouring gin, 
and thus to maintain the coherence of his beliefs and actions.  
 
This move is a legitimate one to make within the constraints of Charity. If a false belief 
is consistent with what an agent would know given his evidence and the rest of his 
beliefs, Charity has no difficulty with permitting such falsity to be attributed. 
Correspondence does not trump Coherence: both are necessary for successful 
interpretation. In this respect, Grandy‘s argument for Humanity misconstrues what 
Charity requires, and his alternative principle does not provide any further resources for 
interpretation that Charity does not already utilise. 
 
The rejection of truth as a constraint on interpretation does, however, differentiate 
Humanity from Charity. Humanity trades on agreements in judgements between the 
interpreter and interpretee, that is, the interpreter makes attributions according to what 
he himself would believe in a similar epistemic situation. Explicitly in contrast to Charity, 
Humanity does not take truth to provide a standard of interpersonal agreement. As an 
interpreter one could assume that if an agent points and utters the word 'cat' he 
believes there is a cat in the direction he is pointing, and if he utters 'dog' he believes 
there is a dog, just as the interpreter himself would do. But without reference to what 
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the interpreter takes to be true, given the epistemic surround in which the interpreter 
and agent are operating, how could these intentional attributions be made? 
Agreements in judgements depend upon a degree of co-ordination between interpreter 
and agent about what is true: 
―it is only when an observer consciously correlates the responses of another 
creature with objects and events of the observer's world that there is any basis 
for saying the creature is responding to those objects or events rather than 
any other objects or events‖ (Davidson, 1991, p.212). 
In other words, agreement between interpreter and agent needs to be triangulated with 
the world if it is to tell the interpreter what the agent does in fact believe (Davidson, 
1991, p.213). The assumption of truth is required to tie beliefs to specific events and 
objects in the world and without it, the notion of sameness in judgements and 
agreement between interpreter and agent is an empty one. I suggest then that 
Humanity‘s appeal to agreement in judgements implicitly relies upon the very constraint 
of Charity that it is seeking to reject, namely the requirement of truth. Although it 
assumes that the application of intentional concepts is independent of the interpretive 
constraints of Charity, the idea that interpreters ought to attribute agreement in beliefs 
is only given substance if it is co-ordinated by a connection to truth. 
 
The argument from Humanity is pitched solely at an epistemological level, in that it 
focuses on the application of interpretive constraints by an interpreter without 
consideration of the metaphysical suppositions underpinning the use of these 
concepts. Humanity looks plausible if the concepts of belief, reasons and intentional 
action employed by the account do not themselves implicitly rely on the norms of 
rationality captured by Charity. However, it is my contention that the concepts of 
intentionality are intrinsically structured by these norms, and that therefore the 
pragmatic use of Humanity does not in fact succeed in eliminating the reliance of 
interpretation on the demands of Charity. 
 
This kernel of an argument at first appears to conflate two distinct philosophical 
projects. On the one hand, we are concerned with the question of whether there are 
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essential normative constraints that are imposed on the interpreter, which is an 
epistemological issue regarding the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of 
intentional behaviour. On the other hand, I have speculated that Humanity, the 
pragmatic alternative to Charity, implicitly relies on a concept of belief that is bound up 
with the requirement of truth: an insight that concerns the metaphysics of intentional 
states. Indeed, the argument for Humanity, perhaps reasonably, takes it as given that 
the epistemological project of generating a theory of interpretation is divorced from an 
ontological thesis about the nature of intentional states and meaning. However, on 
Davidson‘s view of the relation between language, thought and the world, this 
distinction is not warranted. The epistemological projects of seeking reason 
explanations and justifying the constraints of Charity on interpretation are intrinsically 
bound up with the nature of intentional thought, action and meaning: a view termed 
‗Interpretationism‘ by one of its key proponents, Child (1996a). 
Interpretationism and the Nature of the Intentional Realm 
Interpretationism is a methodological approach to both the metaphysics of intentionality 
and the epistemology of interpretation that is based on the claim that the interpretive 
structure of intentional state attributions and reason explanations is constitutively 
bound up with the nature of the intentional realm. Its central claim is that the conditions 
on interpretation are not merely contingent features of the interpretive project that are 
intended to aid the process of intentional attribution, but rather that the structure of 
interpretation mirrors the structure of the domain of intentionality: “When we attribute a 
belief, a desire, a goal, an intention or a meaning to an agent, we necessarily operate 
within a system of concepts in part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires” 
(Davidson, 1973a, p.230). Its advocates (primarily Davidson, passim; Child, 1996a; 
1996b; 1993) assert that we can seek to understand the nature of beliefs, desires, 
intentions and so forth by examining and interrogating how the process of interpretation 
functions, on the basis of agents‘ intentional behaviour and utterances. Understood in 
this way, interpretationism does not necessarily imply any particular thesis about how 
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the interpretive and intentional realm is structured. Davidson and Child do, however, 
make such a commitment, claiming that interpretation and intentionality are structured 
by the normative demands of rationality. I will term this thesis ―rational 
interpretationism‖, to distinguish it from a weaker view that would not necessarily afford 
a constitutive role to rationality. It can be captured by the claim that rationality is 
intrinsic to the concept of belief, and this impacts both on the conditions under which 
intentional concepts can be applied and the constraints that underpin the possibility of 
interpretation. For the rational interpretationist, these conditions of rationality are 
described by the Principle of Charity, namely the requirements of Correspondence and 
Coherence. 
 
If it is assumed that the demands of Charity are interpretive constraints imposed after 
the fact of having decided whether a piece of behaviour is intentional in the first place, 
then it is little surprise that Charity appears at best to be a potential aid to intentional 
attribution but is by no means constitutive of the interpretive process. Rational 
interpretationism, by contrast, seeks to shed light on the mechanisms of intentional 
thought by taking the epistemology of interpretation, structured by the norms of 
rationality, to reveal something about the metaphysics of mentality. By tying the rational 
epistemology of interpretation to the structure of the intentional realm, the objection that 
the constraints of Charity supply only pragmatic aids to interpretation is undermined. 
For, on the broadly Davidsonian view I am developing here, the normative constraints 
revealed by RI have their basis in real features of the mental realm, and are not merely 
addenda to the process of intentional state attribution. The very possibility of behaviour 
and beliefs being capable of falling under an intentional description depends upon their 
being interpretable as such by an observer53: “what attitudes a subject has is a matter 
of how she can be interpreted, which is answerable to what she says and does” (Child, 
                                               
53
 Davidson does not wish to deny that we have privileged access to our first-person intentional 
states, but rather claims that this knowledge is not demarcated by the kinds of privilege often 
assumed of first-person authority in contrast to third-person access, such as its being infallible 
or non-inferentially acquired. 
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1996b, p.9). This claim, however, appears only to push the objection one step back, 
and the Davidsonian approach faces a further, more complex challenge: what justifies 
this bold assertion that the epistemology of interpretation mirrors the nature of the 
intentional domain? Moreover, why could it not be the case that the rational 
interpretationist is making a further illegitimate step here: what grounds the assumption 
that the theoretical reconstruction of intentional attribution described by Radical 
Interpretation tells us anything at all about the way the intentional domain is structured? 
 
To answer this question the rational interpretationist appeals to a second claim, one 
that is considerably more contested but that, I suggest, acquits the thesis of the charge 
that the constraints on interpretation revealed by RI are dispensable. The view I 
propose will be set out here and unpacked and defended throughout the next two 
chapters. My central claim consists of a positive and a negative thesis. The negative 
thesis is that it is a mistake to conceive of intentional states as private mental entities 
with determinate content and to think that the process of interpretation is an attempt 
correctly and accurately to formulate hypotheses about these from an impoverished 
position of third-person epistemic access. Whilst I will not posit specific arguments 
either outlining this view, which is a remnant of Cartesianism about the mind, or the 
common objections to it, I aim to show that there are compelling reasons to prefer an 
alternative conception of the relation between mind, world and other people. The 
positive thesis, which I shall focus on in the spirit of a Wittgensteinian therapeutic 
exercise, comprises two claims: that the norms governing the application of intentional 
concepts are indeed those of truth and coherence, but secondly that these norms 
ought not to be construed as abstract codified principles that impose strong 
prescriptions on what we ought to do and believe. 
Language and Thought 
The interpretationist view of the metaphysics of intentionality I am advocating finds 
strong resonance with a similar and more established view about the nature of 
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linguistic meaning. The claim that meaning, like belief, is essentially public and 
intersubjective has its roots in a rich historical and philosophical tradition the most 
influential formulation of which is in Wittgenstein‘s argument against the possibility of a 
private language (1953, §243 onwards). With this in mind it is worth framing the 
constitutive claim about the nature of intentional states within the context of Davidson‘s 
particular understanding about the relation between thought, the world and language.  
 
Davidson‘s central aim in the philosophy of language was to devise a method of 
generating a truth-theory for natural languages, in a way that was achievable for formal 
languages: a project rendered problematic by the fact that natural languages are 
grammatically complex and contain intensional contexts that do not straightforwardly 
admit of axioms that specify the truth-conditions of sentences (Joseph, 2004). 
Nonetheless, using the resources of a Tarksi-style theory, Davidson sought to provide 
an account of how the meanings of linguistic utterances could be determined. As we 
have seen from the methodology of RI, the evidence Davidson appealed to took the 
form of sentences held true by the linguistic agent under interpretation, evidence that 
necessarily implicates facts about what he believes to be true. However, in contrast to 
those who consider a theory of meaning to be either dependent on a prior 
understanding of speakers‘ beliefs and intentions (such as Austin and Grice) or on 
some mental object, (such as that picked out by a Fodorian language of thought), 
Davidson refuses to prioritise the philosophy of mind over language. Whilst we cannot 
appeal to an atomistic notion of meaning, neither can we “hope to use thought to 
explain linguistic meaning” (Evnine, 1991, p.74). Davidson does not wish to divorce his 
theory of meaning from facts about propositional attitudes and intentions, nor, by 
implication, from the social context which he acknowledges is essential to language. 
Nonetheless, at the same time he rejects the idea, advocated by Dummett, that 
language is analytically prior to mind and in this respect strays from the formal 
semantics approach of Carnap and Tarski (ibid.). The mutual interdependence 
between thought and language is not a relation at the level of epistemology but is 
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rather constitutive of belief and meaning themselves: “belief and meaning are 
intertwined in such a way that there are not two elements there to be separated. This is 
an ontological point, not merely an epistemological one” (Føllesdal, 1984, p.308). 
 
It is a fundamental feature of Davidson‘s approach to thought and language that the 
meanings of sentences and speakers‘ intentions are constitutively interdependent 
(1975). Meaning is connected with truth conditions and is thus extensional, but is also 
indeterminate and must be construed in the context of the speaker‘s thoughts, 
intentions and actions, and vice versa54. For Davidson, the project of interpretation is 
“epistemology seen in the mirror of meaning” (Davidson, 1975, p.169) and therefore 
occupies a central role in our understanding both of the world and of other people. He 
is concerned with understanding belief and other propositional attitudes in terms of 
their relations to truth, in the light of meaning itself. This indicates that meaning and 
belief are thoroughly interpretive and neither can supply foundational conditions for 
understanding the other, as they are established only through an attempt by observer 
and agent to engage in a mutual process of understanding. 
 
I do not consider that the inherent circularity in this strategy of argument to be a 
weakness, however. As will become clear, seeking a foundational bedrock for claims 
about belief and meaning is misguided: I am not attempting to set out necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the interpretation of another intentional agent but rather to 
develop a view of the relation between thought, language and the world and the nature 
of intersubjective understanding that stands or falls together but is, as I shall argue, no 
worse off for its lack of observer-neutral evidence or criteria of justification55. 
 
                                               
54
 Thus neither intention nor a reference-based relation can play a foundational role in 
constituting meaning (Malpas, p.68): an idea that will have resonance with the discussion of 
rule-following to follow in chapter five. 
55
 This approach bears similarities to the hermeneutic philosophy of Gadamer, who regarded 
understanding as grasping the inter-relatedness of things within a common horizon, rather than 
acquiring an unshakeable foundation for knowledge (Malpas, 1992). 
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3.4. THE INTENTIONAL REALM 
Rationality, Intelligibility, Intentionality 
The rational interpretationist view contends there is a strong implicit connection 
between the nature of intentional states and the explanatory function they serve for 
interpretation. The intentionality of behaviour is a matter of its interpretability from a 
third-person perspective: it is the interpreter‘s judgements that dictate the conditions 
under which intentional concepts can be applied and the reason explanations that can 
be given for the agent‘s behaviour. Hence the role of the interpreter comes to the fore 
in a somewhat counter-intuitive way, as the implication of this thesis is that one‘s own 
beliefs and the meanings of one‘s utterances owe their very identity to the possibility of 
their figuring appropriately in a reason explanation for one‘s behaviour given by an 
interpreter: “certain types of thoughts necessarily depend for their individuation on an 
individual‟s relation to others” (Davidson, 2003, quoting Tyler Burge, p.698).  
 
The thesis presented thus far is compatible with the idea that whilst intentional 
concepts depend for their application on a third-person perspective, this requirement 
does not exhaust the extension of such concepts. But the Davidsonian approach is 
predicated upon the claim that the facts available to and the constraints exposed by the 
project of Radical Interpretation are all that there is to interpretation and intentional 
agency56 (Davidson, 1983). The intentional realm cannot be based on anything beyond 
the resources of Radical Interpretation: it is interpretively closed, despite being causally 
open to the non-intentional realm (Malpas, 1992, p.105), and only through the 
resources of interpretation can the concepts of language, thought and understanding 
find application (Davidson, 1994, p.126). Utterances and movements that are not 
interpretable as intentional behaviour are not, on this account, intentional at all. Hence 
there are no facts about an agent‘s beliefs, desires and intentions that are beyond the 
epistemic capability of an informed interpreter to know. All there is to propositional 
                                               
56
 This claim carries the implication that intentional content is intrinsically indeterminate, since 
there is no evidence beyond what is available to an interpreter by which to arbitrate between 
potential competing interpretations of intentional behaviour. 
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attitudes so described is the kind of information that is available to an interpreter, 
namely the actions and utterances of an agent, the conditions or circumstances under 
which he exhibits these behaviours, and any prior knowledge the interpreter has about 
the agent‘s history and past behaviour. 
 
One forceful criticism of this interpretationist view of mentality is that it appears to be 
anti-realist about mental concepts. The notion that the evidence available to an 
interpreter exhausts the conditions under which intentional concepts can be applied 
looks, at first, to be wildly implausible. Surely however they are described in folk 
psychological terms, intentional states are physiological states in the brain, whether 
these are conceived as atomistic representational mental entities or distributed patterns 
of neural firing? Whilst I am not denying the validity of the basic categories and 
concepts of the natural sciences, it remains the case that the concepts of intentionality 
and the explanations of behaviour that issue from them are not capable of re-
description in physical-causal terms57. If we take the interpretationist view of the mental 
realm seriously, then what counts as an intentional state, intentional action or linguistic 
utterance is contingent on its being interpretable, in folk psychological vocabulary, as 
occupying a role in a reason explanation: 
―What qualifies a movement as an action is that it is explained by a reason 
explanation rather than by a purely causal explanation. Similarly, to be a 
desire or a belief is just to be a factor that can figure appropriately in reason 
explanation‖ (Føllesdal, 1984, p.312). 
Let us consider a piece of intentional behaviour, for instance, grasping a cup and 
raising it to one‘s lips. This movement could be described in terms of the muscle 
contractions involved, the neural firing pattern that co-ordinates the motor activity, or in 
any number of ways using the physical-causal vocabulary of the natural sciences. 
What makes this motion the intentional action that it is, i.e., drinking, are the reasons 
that figure in an explanation of the motion, and these fall under a different vocabulary 
and set of concepts, the distinguishing features of which I outline below. The 
                                               
57
 The qualitative distinction here echoes Sellars‘ distinction between the realm of law and the 
space of reasons (Rosenberg, 2008). 
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mechanistic language of cause and effect characterised by explanations in the natural 
sciences is simply not suited to the provision of reason explanations, and any attempt 
at reduction will entail the loss of the explanatory purpose these reason relations are 
supposed to serve: “the capacity of one belief to explain another depends on relations 
that cannot be characterised except intentionally” (McDowell, 1984a, p.394). 
 
Before seeking to assess whether and how this conception of the relationship between 
intentionality and interpretation can be defended, two further characteristic features of 
this rational interpretationist view must be drawn out. These features have already 
been implicit in much of the discussion thus far, and here I aim to bring the former in 
particular to greater prominence than Davidson himself does, as I will go on to argue 
that as an intrinsic feature of the intentional realm it serves to temper the ostensibly 
stringent constraints imposed on interpretation by the demands of truth and coherence. 
Constitutive Holism 
Holism is the view that elements or items within a system are individuated only through 
the relations they bear to other items within that system. As an interpretationist thesis 
about the nature of the intentional realm it can be taken to comprise both an 
epistemological and metaphysical claim that the conditions of individuation of 
intentional states depend on their location within a whole network of other intentional 
states and attitudes. If we acknowledge that all propositional attitudes are part of an 
interconnected attitudinal system (Malpas, 1992, p.73), intentional attribution and the 
seeking of reason explanations for a particular instance of behaviour require an 
interpreter to take into account and attribute a host of related intentional states, 
utterances and behaviours. At this level, however, the holistic approach appears trivial, 
and is certainly not unique to theorising about the psychological realm. Holism is a 
feature of theory construction that is common throughout the natural and social 
sciences (ibid. p.54), and in theorising about language. Indeed, “Holism merely in 
respect of how one might…arrive at a theory of meaning for a language is…almost 
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banal” (Dummett, 1993, pp.25-6). Few would wish to challenge the claim that when we 
attempt to understand the behaviour and utterances of another person we should 
attribute intentional states on the basis of as much of the behavioural evidence before 
us as possible. However, holism about the intentional realm is not merely a claim about 
the constraints on evidence collecting in interpretation (Malpas, 1992, p.54): within an 
interpretationist system it is the metaphysical claim that it is the very nature of 
intentional states that they are constituted by the relations they bear to one another. 
 
This view, which I shall term ―constitutive holism‖, can be understood as a kind of 
functionalism that extends across the intentional realm and into the intersubjective 
world, one which dissolves the Cartesian divide between 'private' inner mentality and 
the social and physical context in which an agent is situated. Again, we can gain insight 
into the conception of intentionality advocated here by considering a related view about 
meaning. The interpretation of linguistic behaviour is a matter of understanding the way 
in which a speaker uses the words that he utters: “we interpret a bit of linguistic 
behaviour when we say what a speaker‟s words mean on an occasion of use” 
(Davidson, 1973b, p.141), and when we know what roles the constituent parts of an 
utterance play in an agent‘s language, we know what that utterance means. Thus, it is 
plausible to argue that what constitutes the meaning of a term is the functional role it 
occupies in a language. 
 
If we consider the meaning of a word to be constituted by its use, not only by an 
individual but in the context of a language shared within a community, the functional 
determinants of meaning are distributed across the whole network of patterns of use 
and intentional behaviour; hence meanings have holistic identity conditions. Davidson 
explicitly advocates a brand of semantic holism, largely derived from Quine, that stands 
in opposition to atomistic, correspondence or reference-based theories of meaning that 
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have been particularly influential since Locke58. In line with the communication-intention 
theorists such as Austin and Grice (e.g., Grice, 1957), who sought to characterise 
meaning in terms of a combination of beliefs and intentions, Davidson takes sentences 
(as opposed to individual words) to be the primary bearers of linguistic meaning 
(Evnine, 1991, p.74). In contrast to theories that seek to ascertain the meanings of 
words as discrete entities, there is no “single nugget” (Davidson, 2003, p.699) which is 
the thing that is meant by a word, phrase or sentence: “the meaning of a sentence, the 
content of a belief or desire, is not an item that can be attached to it in isolation from its 
fellows” 59 (Davidson, 1982, p.183). With this approach, Davidson follows Frege in the 
assertion that words can only have meaning in the context of the sentences in which 
they are used, stating that meaning can be imputed to semantic components60 of 
sentences “only as an abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it features” 
(1967, p.22). 
 
The functional conception of language, articulated most succinctly by the aphorism 
―meaning is use‖61 can be applied mutatis mutandis to belief. In order to attribute a 
belief with a given propositional content to an agent, the role that it plays in agent‘s 
psychology and the relations to other propositional attitudes need to be taken into 
account. The attribution of a single belief rests on the supposition of many more 
(Davidson, 1982, p.183). This holistic requirement is particularly clear if we consider a 
case in which an individual sincerely asserts something bizarre such as ‗there is an 
elephant in the desk drawer‘. Here an interpreter would be justified in querying what the 
content of this belief is. If an agent holds beliefs about desk drawers (including, for 
                                               
58
 He took the radical step of asserting that reference is nothing but a semantic abstraction that 
can play no explanatory role in a theory of meaning. The argument against reference is founded 
upon the rejection of the reification of meanings construed as entities (Davidson, 1977, p.215). 
59
 This approach to meaning is broadly similar to that taken by Structuralist theorists of 
language such as de Saussure, who construed language as a system of relationships and 
differences (Malpas, p.55). 
60
 In a defence of Davidson‘s position Ramberg asserts that the essential compositionality of 
natural languages is entirely compatible with denying the need for a wholly ‗bottom-up‘ 
approach to meaning (1989, p.35). 
61
 This phrase is often attributed to Wittgenstein but it does not do justice to the complex 
understanding of meaning that Wittgenstein develops throughout the Philosophical 
Investigations (McGinn, 1997). 
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instance, the fact that they are comparatively small) and about elephants (substantial, 
large creatures occupying significantly more space than a desk drawer) it is 
inconceivable that an agent could genuinely form such a logically inconsistent belief: 
“since the possession of propositional attitudes involves the possession of relevant 
concepts, it implicates abilities to exploit these concepts in ways that respect their 
logical roles” (Millar, 2004, p.7). In this instance the putative belief fails to respect the 
logical relations between the concepts of ‗elephant‘ and ‗desk drawer‘ and an 
interpreter inevitably would be baffled by a sincere assertion of this incoherent belief62. 
 
That thoughts are broadly consistent and integrated, and sustain relations of 
implication, confirmation, justification and reinforcement with one another, is an 
expression of the psychological unity characterised by the notion of holism (Malpas, 
1992, p.74). Intentional states are “individuated and identified by their relations to other 
beliefs” 63 64 (Davidson, 1997, p.124), but this holism extends throughout an agent‘s 
psychology and his interactions with the physical and social world. It is important not to 
underestimate the wide horizon over which this holism operates, as it undermines the 
idea that beliefs can be understood and attributed in isolation: “when we first begin to 
believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of 
propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole)” (Wittgenstein, 1969, §141). As 
children, we acquire a whole aggregation of beliefs, rather than a system consisting in 
a series of single beliefs.  
 
                                               
62
 An analogous theory in the philosophy of language is Conceptual Role Semantics (CRS), 
which is a sophisticated extension of the idea that a term‘s meaning is identified by its use in 
social interaction and communication (see e.g., Fodor & Lepore, 1992; Block, 1987 for a 
detailed critique). 
63
 I am not here claiming that the entirety of the psychological realm is propositional in nature. 
Numerous attitudes, such as pain, are arguably non-propositional and are not therefore 
necessarily subject to the relational constraints I have given for the propositional attitudes 
(Malpas, 1992, p.88). However, as the main focus of my discussion is on attitudes that are 
relevant to reason explanations and interpretation, I shall not consider the impact of non-
propositional content on this constitutive thesis of holism. 
64
 There is a similarity here with Parallel Distributed Processing, or connectionist models of 
cognitive architecture, in which the identity of interconnected nodes is entirely dependent on 
their location within a network space of multiple other nodes (e.g., McLeod et al., 2006). 
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It is not simply the case that in interpretation it does not make sense to ascribe a 
singular belief or desire without a holistic attribution of other beliefs, intentions, 
preferences and so on to an agent, but rather that without such relations the very 
concept of belief would lose its application. We see, then, that holism shifts the locus of 
interpretation away from thinking of the identity conditions of an individual‘s intentional 
states as a matter solely of their internal relations and connectedness, and into an 
encounter between the individual and his interlocutor or community (Pettit & McDowell, 
1986, p.14). Thus even though an interpretive encounter is an individual, circumscribed 
instance of interpretation, this does not isolate the interpretation from the world or the 
community within which it occurs (Malpas, 1992, p.100).  
 
If thoughts are constituted by their holistic relations to one another and by the role they 
occupy in interpretations of an agent‘s behaviour, how can they be said to be 
objectively real? Davidson‘s response seeks to undermine the demands of realism 
when discussing his semantic holism: 
―It is only if we have a Cartesian, individualistic conception of meaning and the 
intentional that we assume a conflict between realism and holism. Realism 
about correct interpretation does not, for me, entail that what someone means 
by his words is independent of what is understood by others‖ (Davidson, 
1994, p.126). 
Given the close inter-relation between beliefs and meanings in Davidson‘s theory, this 
point extends to realism about propositional attitudes. On an interpretationist view the 
intentional agent is not a solipsistic entity possessing internal intentional states, 
speaking a language and performing actions that fall under the concept of intentional 
behaviours, bearing only a contingent relation to the interpretations of others. Yet just 
as the lack of a constitutive relation of reference does not vitiate the ‗reality‘ of a term‘s 
meaning something, so too can propositional attitudes be said to be ‗real‘ even though 
they are not identified with a physical brain state or atomistic representational state. 
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Normativity 
The constraints of Charity, those of Coherence and Correspondence, are norms that 
on Davidson‘s view must govern a radical interpreter‘s intentional attributions if he is to 
find the agent intelligible as an intentional being at all. Thus the radical interpreter‘s 
theory ought to be disciplined by the requirements that the beliefs attributed to the 
agent are broadly coherent and largely true about the world: “each interpretation and 
attribution of attitude is a move within a holistic theory, a theory necessarily governed 
by concern for consistency and general coherence with the truth” (Davidson, 1974a, 
p.154). In Radical Interpretation then, the normative content of one‘s theory is that 
agents are interpreted as holding the beliefs that they ought to hold, according to the 
interpreter‘s own beliefs about what is true. For instance, an agent would be ascribed 
the belief that ‗snow is white‘ if that is what he ought to believe, by the interpreter‘s 
lights. In this regard the demands of Charity look to supply a set of requirements for 
interpretation: if the interpreter is to attribute intentional content to observable 
behaviour, he imposes a structure of broad coherence and truth on his attributions. 
 
Although Davidson‘s project is a theoretical abstraction of the conditions of possibility 
for interpretation in a radical scenario the constraints of Charity have frequently been 
taken to be directly applicable to ordinary interpretation, supplying an epistemological 
framework through which to build interpretation (Bortolotti, 2004a; Ludwig, 2004; 
Henderson, 1991). I will argue in the following chapter that this move of generating 
specific conditions on interpretation from Davidson‘s idealised methodology leads us to 
misconstrue the nature of the normative constraints on interpretation. However, as it 
has been a widespread presumption that Charity is applicable in this way, for the 
purposes of exegesis I shall assume this view is a tenable one, and term the normative 
requirements on interpretation derived from Charity the ‗Rationality Constraint‘ (RC). 
 
The Rationality Constraint is imposed on interpretation on the basis of a further 
assumption about the nature of intentionality that is central to the rational 
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interpretationist view. I shall term this the ‗Rationality Assumption‘ (RA): a metaphysical 
thesis that intentionality is constitutively rational. That is to say, it is of the very nature 
of beliefs and other intentional states that they are rationally related to one another, to 
linguistic utterances and to intentional behaviour. In this respect the normative 
requirements of Charity that constrain Radical Interpretation are also descriptive 
requirements on what it is to be an intentional agent (Ludwig, 2004, p.346). 
 
The assumption of Charity in RI (which supplies conditions for the epistemological 
Rationality Constraint) is intended to reflect the constitutive rationality and holism of the 
mental (the Rationality Assumption), by claiming that what it is to be an agent is to 
exhibit rationality in one‘s thoughts: “…all thinking creatures subscribe to basic 
standards or norms of rationality…it is a condition of having thoughts, judgments, and 
intentions that the basic standards of rationality have application” (Davidson, 1985a, 
p.195). Coherence and Correspondence therefore specify the kinds of relations that 
must obtain, not only for interpretation to be possible, but for the very identity of the 
propositional attitudes under scrutiny, and the close relations between propositional 
thought, language and the world entail that “for someone to be a speaker he must be 
interpretable, and to be interpretable, he must be mostly right about his environment” 
(LePore & Ludwig, 2006, p.16). Whilst we cannot ‗mainline‘ on truth, fixing belief 
content through a reference relation to objects and entities out there in the world, the 
notion that it is a condition of being an intentional agent that one‘s beliefs are largely 
true nonetheless retains traction on the world. Hence, whilst Charity is the basis for a 
theory of interpretation its requirements escalate into conditions of interpretability for 
intentional agents. This is because the concepts of meaning and thought are applicable 
only in virtue of the conditions under which they can be attributed by an interpreter. 
 
The normative constraints operating on interpretation thereby also apply to thoughts, 
meanings and intentional behaviour themselves, ensuring that the standards that apply 
to third-person interpretation mirror those that form constraints on the possession of 
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intentional, action-guiding states from the first-person perspective. Appealing to the 
beliefs held by interpreter‘s own lights as a way of initiating the project of interpretation 
is therefore not an unjustified imposition of one‘s own epistemic standards onto the 
behaviour of another, as the norms by which an interpreter makes intentional 
attributions are just those by which he himself is guided in forming beliefs, making 
inferences and acting intentionally.  
 
One of the key criticisms levelled against defenders of the rational interpretationist 
conception of intentionality is that it is at best unjustified, and at worst, plainly false. In 
particular, it makes irrationality in a system impossible to accommodate: if propositional 
attitudes are constitutively bound by rationality, occurrences of irrationality ought 
logically to be impossible. Intuitively, it must be conceded that irrationality is possible 
and indeed that irrational behaviour can nonetheless be interpretable, but this entails 
making a concession that threatens to sever the connection between rationality and the 
intelligibility of behaviour. Furthermore, if behaviour can be intentionally characterised 
despite violating the RC, which is supposed to underpin standards of rationality, this 
strikes a prima facie blow to the claim that its standards are shared across intentional 
agents. This is a particularly pressing concern given the myriad evidence that we are 
frequently irrational and inconsistent in our thoughts. The problems this kind of 
scenario poses for interpretation were evident in chapter two where I discussed the 
apparent logicality and coherence of some delusional belief systems, in which the 
agent's grip on reality was questionable and generated problems for the possibility of 
interpretation and the comprehension of utterances and behaviour. In the next chapter I 
consider whether and how instances of inconsistency can be accommodated whilst 
retaining a commitment to the rational interpretationist thesis that interpretation and 
intentionality are structured by rationality. 
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4. IRRATIONALITY 
4.1. THE CHALLENGE FROM IRRATIONALITY 
Do We Need Rationality? 
One of the most clear-cut challenges to the thesis of rational interpretationism emerges 
from the vast empirical literature on human reasoning, particularly studies on the 
consistency of people‘s beliefs65. Experimental psychological research on choice 
preferences, attributions and belief assertions is littered with examples of what 
Festinger (1957; cited in Elliot & Devine, 1994) first termed ―cognitive dissonance‖: the 
common phenomenon of subjects holding beliefs that are inconsistent with one 
another, and acting in ways that are at odds with their professed beliefs, values and 
desires. 
 
In this chapter I examine whether the claim that rationality is constitutive of 
intentionality can accommodate instances of intentional behaviour that seem to violate 
this central premise, given that “the basic methodology of all interpretation tells us that 
inconsistency breeds unintelligibility” (Davidson, 1982, p.184). Two objections to 
rational interpretationism will be outlined, each followed by a defensive move aimed at 
neutralising the objection posed. The main criticisms can be identified as challenges to 
the two components of the rational interpretationist view described previously, namely 
the epistemological Rationality Constraint, which sets normative parameters of truth 
and coherence for interpretation, and the ontological Rationality Assumption, which 
claims that rational norms are constitutive of the intentional realm.  
 
The first argument from irrationality challenges the Rationality Constraint. The Principle 
of Charity, from which the RC is derived, stipulates that in order to make intentional 
                                               
65 I here take consistency to be a prime example of a principle that Davidson considers 
constitutive of rationality; others include the principle of total evidence and the principle of 
continence, which directs one to perform the action judged best on the basis of all available 
relevant reasons. It is this latter principle that appears to be problematic for the akrates 
(Davidson, 1985a).  
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ascriptions an interpreter must assume that “by and large a speaker we do not yet 
understand is consistent and correct in his beliefs” (Davidson, 1973a, p.238), and this 
injunction is of central importance to the whole rational interpretationist project 
(Bortolotti, 2003, p.121). The objection to rational interpretationism, deployed by 
Bortolotti (2004b), aims to undermine these third-person requirements on interpretation 
by demonstrating that when we face problems in interpretation, such difficulties are not 
created by the agent breaching principles of rationality. She uses this point to argue 
that interpretation therefore does not require the interpreter to attribute true and 
coherent beliefs, as an assumption that the agent is rational is not warranted. 
Bortolotti‘s contrasting account of interpretive difficulties is that they arise when an 
interpreter does not know enough about the context and environment the agent is in, 
and thus considerations of rationality are irrelevant to interpretation. She seeks to deny 
that rationality constrains interpretation by reducing it to a psychological heuristic that 
may serve a pragmatic function but that is not essential. The pragmatic use of 
rationality is particularly applicable in cases in which the agent‘s behaviour can be 
made more intelligible and predictable by interpreting his beliefs or actions as irrational, 
in much the same way that Humanity counsels. Taking rationality to be a heuristic 
allows that attributions of irrationality are sometimes more explanatorily appropriate: 
making sense of someone does not always involve maximising true belief or attributing 
consistency (Henderson, 1987, p.366).  
 
If the RC is to serve its purpose in guiding interpretation, attributions of inconsistency 
need to be accommodated without thereby vitiating the claim that rationality is essential 
to the interpretive project. Although I have already outlined arguments rejecting the use 
of the norms of rationality as a pragmatic constraint on interpretation, here I expand 
upon the points previously raised by defending the role of rationality in the structure of 
reason explanations, arguing that rationality is in fact essential to interpretation: without 
a broad normative background of rationality, reason explanations would cease to 
function as explanations of intentional action. 
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The second and more fundamental argument from irrationality challenges the 
Rationality Assumption, that intentional states are at least partially constituted by the 
rational relations they bear to one another. The argument proceeds through an 
inference of modus tollens: one consequence of asserting the RA is that the logical 
possibility of a creature being an intentional agent and also being completely irrational 
(holding largely false and inconsistent beliefs) is ruled out. If rationality is a prerequisite 
for the very possibility of having beliefs and propositional attitudes, an intentional agent 
could not fail to be rational: “to the extent that we fail to discover a coherent and 
plausible pattern in the actions and attitudes of others we simply forego the chance of 
treating them as persons”66 (Davidson, 1970a, pp.221-2). Hence critics (e.g., Bortolotti, 
2004b; Henderson, 1987; Sesardic, 1986; Stich, 1983) cite obvious instances of the 
conditions of intentional agency being fulfilled in spite of inconsistencies in asserted or 
attributable beliefs as a refutation of the rational interpretationist‘s a priori 
commitments. Irrationality does pervade our belief systems, decision-making 
processes and actions: we frequently commit errors in reasoning, falling prey to logical 
fallacies and making intransitive choice preferences. In none of these cases would it be 
denied that the speaker is an intentional agent. Thus the prima facie objection to 
rational interpretationism arises in the form of a straightforward rejection of the RA. 
Against this challenge I suggest that taking the implications of the holism of the mental 
seriously relaxes these requirements for individual instances of intentional behaviour. 
This move enables instances of irrationality to be accommodated and understood as 
intentional against a background of broadly coherent, true beliefs. This is not a 
concession to the critic of the rational interpretationist view but rather a development of 
the idea that constitutive holism applies across the intentional realm.  
 
                                               
66
 Consistent with Davidson‘s conception of intentionality, I take it that ‗persons‘ here equates to 
‗intentional agents‘. 
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Davidson‘s strategy for accommodating irrationality introduces us to a further problem 
for the Rationality Assumption, however. He suggests that intentional attributions that 
appear to breach the assumption of rationality can be tolerated by his view on the 
condition that agents seek to resolve and eliminate errors once they are made aware 
that, for example, they hold mutually inconsistent beliefs. I term the notion that agents 
ought to recover from epistemic errors the ‗Rationality Requirement‘ (RR), and it is an 
explicitly normative prescription that we ought to be rational in our beliefs and actions. 
Davidson thus seeks to salvage his constitutive view of rationality from the threat posed 
by the existence of irrational beliefs by appealing to the inherent normativity of belief: 
the suggestion is that whilst it is possible to go wrong (for example, by holding false or 
inconsistent beliefs), in doing so one is deviating from what one ought to do or believe. 
This requirement, however, appears to impose a kind of rational imperialism on the 
beliefs and actions of others, setting the boundaries of intentionality according to what 
agents rationally ought to believe or do in a given situation. Yet the interpretability of 
actions and utterances does not seem to be beholden to their conforming to what an 
interpreter considers they rationally ought to be. Why are we entitled to believe that an 
agent has somehow gone wrong in his beliefs and judgements (and that he ought to 
believe or judge otherwise) if his behaviour does not appear to conform to the norms of 
truth and coherence?  
 
The RR does sufficiently explain our tendency to recover from error in our beliefs and 
judgements when they are pointed out to us. But responding to the objection that it is a 
demanding and stringent constraint on intentionality draws attention to a tension in the 
rational interpretationist view I am advocating, between the claim that the intentional is 
constitutively rational yet agents are perfectly capable of breaching these constitutive 
principles without being condemned as not doing or believing what they ought. This 
brings us back to the question of how the normative force of rationality ought to be 
construed. In describing what would count as a failure of rationality, Davidson‘s 
articulation of the rational requirements operating on intentional agents creates an 
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overly prescriptive notion of rationality that is unnecessarily stringent for the purposes 
of advancing rational interpretationism about the intentional realm. It is a mistake to 
consider that the normative obligation we are under as intentional agents is one that 
can be described in principled terms. Indeed, I suggest that much of the criticism 
directed at the rational interpretationist view is based upon a misconception of the 
nature of the normative demands placed on intentionality and interpretation. There is, 
however, a way of conceiving this requirement that does not place intolerably strong 
demands on the rationality of an agent‘s behaviour. I consider whether a route can be 
navigated that avoids the charges of the arguments from irrationality whilst 
acknowledging the intrinsically rational normativity of the intentional realm, by rejecting 
the view that the norms of rationality take the form of prescriptive obligations towards 
abstract principles of truth and coherence. In the next chapter I will develop the 
argument against the codification of standards of rationality, arguing instead that the 
norms of rationality emerge from the shared practices of intentional behaviour. 
 
4.2. AGAINST THE RATIONALITY CONSTRAINT 
Attributing Irrationality in Interpretation 
Agents frequently do act for bad reasons, make irrational plans and hold beliefs that 
they ought not to on the balance of evidence, yet we are still able to ascribe them such 
beliefs and explain their actions in intentional terms (Bortolotti, 2004). With this in mind 
the project of interpretation looks to be less constrained in what beliefs are potentially 
attributable to an agent than the demands of the Rationality Constraint would suggest: 
unlike the Quinean method of translation, contradictions are not completely precluded 
by strong a priori commitments to the logicality of intentional state ascriptions. If this is 
the case then the RC that is supposed, on the rational interpretationist view, to act as a 
normative framework for interpretation, appears unnecessarily stringent. Some 
philosophers have indeed suggested that conforming to constraints of rationality is 
necessary for the ascription of intentional states at all: “when we are not [rational], the 
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cases defy description in ordinary terms of belief and desire…when acts occur that 
make no sense, they cannot be straightforwardly interpreted in sense-making terms” 
(Dennett, 1987, p.87). Derived from the demands of Charity, the RC compels the 
interpreter to attribute to the agent beliefs that are coherent and true by his lights, but 
the potential occurrence of inconsistencies in an agent‘s belief set indicates that 
successful interpretation might not in fact hinge on the use of the RC.  
 
This problem is particularly pressing for a Davidsonian theory of rational 
interpretationism because of the close connection Davidson forges between language 
and thought. For him, the RC is not a constraint on interpretation that can be loosened 
or abandoned, since to do so would threaten the entire basis of his theory of mind, 
language and mental content. Recall that from the standpoint of the Radical Interpreter, 
the attribution of beliefs and what a speaker means by his utterances are both, as it 
were, up for grabs. Neither can be assumed and the process of interpretation is a 
matter of gradually building up a coherent picture of meaning and belief at the same 
time, refining these attributions as behavioural evidence supports one interpretation or 
another. Suppose therefore, that in interpreting a speaker our best interpretation leads 
to the conclusion that he holds beliefs that are inconsistent with one another67. We 
have no reason to suspect the speaker is being insincere, speaking in metaphor or 
attempting to deceive us, or that he is being subject to perceptual error. Davidson 
suggests that in such an instance we should seek to revise our translations or 
intentional state attributions, adjusting our theory of meaning for that language 
accordingly: perhaps we have mistranslated the meanings of the utterances (1974b, 
p.196). Davidson's efforts to bind the development of theories of meaning to theories of 
intentional action (stipulated by his view of the interdependence of belief and meaning) 
entail that whatever our strategy for interpreting the actions and utterances of an agent 
is, it carries implications for our theory of meaning for the language of that agent. Such 
                                               
67
 If the requirement of consistency is taken to mean that the set of our beliefs should not 
logically imply a contradiction, it is far too strong a constraint: none of us do or indeed could 
satisfy such a condition (Føllesdal, 1984) 
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a theory is supposed to enable us to make sense of behaviour in terms of the 
rationality of the attributed beliefs and desires of the agent but an unfortunate side-
effect of this position, fully admitted by Davidson, is that if our account involves 
attributing inconsistency in that agent's beliefs, the theory of meaning is undermined 
(Henderson, 1987, p.361). The mechanics of the strategy for dealing with this problem 
need not detain us here: what is of interest is the suggestion that on a Davidsonian 
account of interpretation, which relies on the RC, attributions of inconsistency are 
barriers to successful interpretation and potentially breed unintelligibility. 
 
Against this view is the claim that the RC is not a necessary constraint on 
interpretation, supported by the observation that the interpretability of intentional 
behaviour may in fact require attributions of inconsistency or error to be made. It is 
entirely plausible to argue that, as a matter of fact, speakers‘ beliefs generally do 
conform to the demands of rationality and that interpretation based on the RC is both 
possible and helpful in the attribution of intentional states, explanation and prediction of 
behaviour. Indeed, critics of rational interpretationism such as Bortolotti (2005; 2004a; 
2004b; 2003) and Henderson (1991; 1987) embrace the notion that an assumption of 
rationality is a useful heuristic for the methodology of interpretation, but reject the view 
that the demands of the RC amount to necessary conditions. This particular line of 
criticism attacks the necessity claim by demonstrating that interpretation and the 
provision of reason explanations for intentional behaviour do not require any 
assumption of rationality, either for the interpreter or the agent whose behaviour is 
under observation.  
Is Rationality Necessary to Interpretation? 
Bortolotti (2004b) addresses the challenge posed to interpretation by instances of 
apparently irrational behaviour. She seeks to undermine the RC by demonstrating that 
more psychologically realistic explanations and predictions of such behaviour are 
available once the RC is abandoned. The specific target of Bortolotti‘s attack is the 
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notion that the predictive and explanatory success of our folk psychological attributions 
rests upon the interpretive constraint to attribute true and coherent beliefs. On her view 
the interpretation of behaviour depends only upon such factors as the contextual 
information available to the interpreter. Hence when irrational behaviour occurs, what 
renders interpretation difficult is the potential paucity of such information, not the fact 
that the behaviour exhibits an apparent violation of norms of rationality. Bortolotti aims 
to develop an account of interpretation that, whilst incorporating the normal concepts of 
folk psychology, eliminates what she considers an overly stringent and unnecessary 
constraint on the ascription of intentional states and explanation of behaviour. Here I 
sketch out Bortolotti‘s distinction between a demanding rationality constraint and what 
is necessary for intentional explanation. I then argue that the Rationality Constraint she 
attributes to Davidson is indeed too strong to be a necessary constraint on 
interpretability. However, I suggest that in appealing to the utility of folk psychological 
reason explanations Bortolotti does in fact rely on a thinner notion of rationality for the 
explanation and prediction of behaviour, because it is implicit in the very idea of actions 
being guided by reasons.  
Reason Relations and Rationalising Explanations 
When interpreting an agent, his utterances and actions may pose difficulties for our 
attempts to ascribe to him beliefs and desires. To use Bortolotti‘s own example, take 
the case of a man who asserts that there are flies in his head (2004a, p.359). We may 
be unsure whether he is using words correctly or if he genuinely believes that flies have 
got inside his brain, but either way such a case is puzzling, and we may suspend 
judgement as to what he means or believes. The fact that we find this interpretive 
situation difficult is uncontroversial, irrespective of the theory of interpretation 
employed. I have already argued that because rationality is a holistic and flexible 
constraint it has the resources to accommodate and render intelligible cases in which 
agents appear to have inconsistent or false beliefs. But according to Bortolotti (2004a, 
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p.361), for the rational interpretationist the reason that interpretation becomes difficult 
here is because the behaviour appears to violate norms of rationality.  
 
Whilst advocates of rational interpretationism assert that an assumption of rationality is 
necessary for interpretation, none would wish to claim that it is a sufficient condition. 
There may be many other relevant requirements that are also needed in order for 
beliefs and desires to be successfully and usefully ascribed, such as an understanding 
of the specific context of the behaviour, the agent‘s history, some grasp of the 
functioning of human memory, awareness of the social and cultural background, and 
so forth. If we are committed to rationality being a necessary condition for 
interpretation, problems for or failures of interpretation need not be caused by 
violations of the norms of rationality. For instance, the interpreter could be unaware of 
limitations in the speaker‘s vocabulary, an unusual tendency to confuse words, speak 
in riddles or metaphor, be insincere or deceptive or that he is speaking in an unfamiliar 
cultural idiom. Bortolotti‘s own cited example of the man who claims he has flies in his 
head illustrates this point: whilst it is challenging for interpretation, it is not clear that 
such a belief does violate any norms of rationality. It is highly implausible but without 
further background information about the speaker‘s beliefs and perceptual experiences 
we cannot claim that the assertion of a particular belief entails that the speaker is 
departing from the canons of rationality. On the basis of the claim that rationality is a 
condition of possibility for interpretation, it is perfectly possible for failures or difficulties 
of interpretation to arise that have no bearing on the claims of the RC. 
 
Bortolotti makes an intriguing suggestion as to the origin of the Rationality Constraint 
for intentional explanation, claiming that it rests on an equivocation between the idea 
that behaviour can be explained in folk psychological terms on the basis of the 
ascription of beliefs and desires, what she terms a “schema for practical reasoning” 
(Bortolotti, 2004a, p.362) and the normative demand that behaviour conforms to some 
rational standards, termed “rationality as optimization” (ibid.). Whilst intentional 
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explanations make sense of an agent‘s behaviour by rationalising it, that is, by 
articulating the reasons for his beliefs and actions, Bortolotti argues that evaluating 
such reasons in terms of their conformity to some normative rational standard is a 
separate and demanding move that is superfluous to determining the status of the 
behaviour as intentional. One‘s reasons need not be good reasons in order to qualify 
as intentional. In interpreting behaviour for the purposes of explanation, there need be 
no presupposition that the beliefs and desires being ascribed to the agent are 
conforming or aiming to conform to standards of rationality (ibid. p.363).  
 
Drawing on a distinction made by Pettit and Smith (1990) helps elaborate upon the 
claims Bortolotti makes both about what the RC on interpretation consists in and why it 
is, on her view, false. Suppose that we can ascribe beliefs and desires to an agent 
without consideration for any of the underlying theoretical apparatus of interpretation. 
Given the set of beliefs and desires we can attribute to this agent, we can make sense 
of his action, that is, his behaviour can be seen as reasonable in light of the beliefs and 
desires he possesses. Pettit and Smith refer to this as the intentional conception of 
human beings (ibid. p.565) and it is a widely used picture of how we engage in folk 
psychological explanation and prediction of behaviour. They contrast this with the 
deliberative conception, according to which intentional behaviour is explained not only 
by a motivating reason, but also on the grounds that the action is appropriate, justified, 
or in some respect the correct option, given the agent‘s own values and standards 
(ibid. p.566). This is an explicitly normative conception of intentional behaviour, 
regarding what an agent ought to do in a given situation given his relevant beliefs and 
desires. Bortolotti draws a rough parallel between this deliberative conception and the 
demands of the RC as she portrays it.  
 
If the deliberative conception of rationality is the one that constrains intentional 
attribution, this is indeed far too strong a constraint. For if the RC requires that in order 
to qualify as intentional, the reasons attributable to an agent for belief and action must 
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be characterisable as good, justified or appropriate, it is immediately obvious that it 
must be false: “Rationality, as a responsiveness to norms governing the relations 
between propositional attitudes, is too demanding” (Bortolotti, pers. comm.). If not 
rationality then, what does constrain the process of intentional ascription by an 
interpreter? On Bortolotti‘s view, all that is required is that an agent‘s behaviour is 
capable of being given an explanation in terms of the beliefs and desires that can be 
attributed to him. A capacity to adhere to a schema of practical reasoning, to act 
according to one‘s beliefs and desires, is all that is necessary for one‘s behaviour to be 
construed as intentional and amenable to reason explanation: “[A]n intentional system 
does and says things for reasons…but this does not mean that their behaviour meets 
any normative standards of rationality” (2004a, p.369). The ascription of beliefs and 
desires does not depend on their being justified, or of the agent behaving as he 
rationally ought given his set of intentional states. To use Bortolotti‘s own example 
(ibid. p.372), say that an interpreter is attempting to ascribe beliefs to an agent X. X 
asserts a belief that p, acts upon that belief and can provide reasons for his holding p: 
all behavioural evidence enables the interpreter to ascribe the belief that p to X, and 
this is a successful instance of interpretation. It is irrelevant to the ascription of the 
belief whether X ought to believe p. There may be good reasons why, all things 
considered, X ought not to hold that belief but this doesn‘t undermine the possibility of 
the interpreter ascribing that belief, nor of the fact that this is the most intelligible 
explanatory attribution to make.  
 
Bortolotti‘s descriptive account of intentional explanation is intended to demonstrate 
that successful interpretation is not contingent on attributions of truth and coherence at 
all. She claims to have dispatched with the element of rationality in interpretation by 
distinguishing the possibility of providing intentional explanations for behaviour from the 
stringent normative requirement of adhering to principles of rationality, arguing that the 
former is sufficient for interpretability and, in consequence, intentionality. Thus whilst an 
agent may act in a way that ostensibly violates the norms of rationality, if an interpreter 
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can nonetheless rationalise this behaviour in light of the agent‘s beliefs and desires 
then he has all that is required for intentional explanation. It is possible to evaluate an 
agent‘s behaviour as rational or irrational, depending on whether he has good or bad, 
appropriate or inappropriate, justified or unjustified reasons for his beliefs and actions, 
but such evaluation is, on her view, independent of and subsequent to the process of 
ascribing such beliefs through the process of interpretation. 
Interpretation without Rationality 
In order to defend the RC from Bortolotti‘s attack I will now consider the cogency of her 
claim that the provision of reason explanations for behaviour is not necessarily 
underpinned by the normative requirements of rationality. I claim that reason 
explanations for behaviour cease to be possible if this is the case: without any 
normative constraints on interpretation and interpretability it is not clear how the 
ascription of intentional states enables behaviour to be explained at all. Arguing that 
interpretation is an intrinsically normative process I nonetheless also suggest that 
Bortolotti‘s strong conception of rationality as optimization ought to be rejected as a 
condition on intentional agency: an argument taken up again later in the chapter (4.4).  
 
The fact that reason explanations can account for individual instances of interpretation 
without reference to their being good, justified or appropriate reasons leads Bortolotti to 
the assertion that there is no necessary general requirement on intentional states to 
broadly conform to principles of rationality, nor is the interpretive process necessarily 
guided by the Charitable concerns for coherence and truth. Although her main focus is 
on the epistemology of interpretation the ontological question of the nature of 
intentional states is pressing. Bortolotti‘s remarks on interpretation suggest she agrees, 
with the interpretationist, that interpretability is required for an agent to count as an 
intentional being, since what is relevant to characterising reasons depends at least in 
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part on their being attributable by a third person68. She thus accepts there is a 
connection between the possibility of forming reason explanations for behaviour and 
the conditions of intentionality, but rejects the view that rationality is what sets the 
boundaries on interpretability (2004a, p.365).  Her conception of interpretation 
assumes that when an interpreter ascribes intentional states and generates reason 
explanations, a characterisation of the relevant intentional states can be given that 
does not itself rely on any notion of rationality. 
 
Bortolotti does not address this question of the conditions for intentional ascription 
directly but hints that reason explanations can be wholly supported by a causal story 
about the relations between beliefs, desires and actions. She suggests that ascribed 
intentional states may be explanatory of an agent‘s behaviour in virtue of their bearing 
the “right causal relations” (ibid. p.365) to one another: belief and desire pairs motivate 
action through causal, as opposed to rational relations. Whilst the rational 
interpretationist can acknowledge that intentional states are at least partly constituted 
by such causal relations, what provides the explanatory force of reason explanations 
are their rational relations. These carry normative implications for the agent‘s other 
beliefs, desires and actions, and this normativity is reflected in the way reason 
explanations function: the intelligibility of behaviour is dependent on it being in some 
sense appropriate in light of attributable beliefs and desires. By contrast Bortolotti‘s 
conception of reason explanations as underpinned by causal relations and independent 
of rationality appears to class reasons and intentional state attributions as arational. On 
an account stripped of all notions of rationality then, the causal connections obtaining 
between attributed intentional states must carry the fully explanatory weight of the 
interpretation. Furthermore, an account is owed as to what differentiates reasons and 
intentional actions from causal chains resulting in mere vocalisations or physical 
                                               
68
 Using the example of an apparent inconsistent believer, she states: ―If Mark‘s adherence to a 
schema for practical reasoning is totally compromised, then Mark will not count as an intentional 
system‖ (2004b, p.365), implying that the provision of reason explanation does mark out a 
condition on intentionality. 
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movements: without the normative weight of rationality, what is intentional about 
intentionality? 
 
Interpretation is, on this view, contingent on the interpreter‘s ability to ascribe 
intentional states to an agent without any normative guidance regarding what ought to 
follow from the holding of a given belief69. This raises the question of how the ascription 
of beliefs and desires could serve the purpose of providing reason explanations and 
enabling the prediction of behaviour: “[a] belief theory with no rationality restrictions is 
without predictive content; using it, we can have virtually no expectations regarding a 
believer's behaviour” (Cherniak, 1981, p.164). It is not clear that interpretation would be 
possible without the normative constraints articulated by the thesis of rational 
interpretationism. Consider Davidson‘s project of Radical Interpretation, starting from 
the basis of the behavioural evidence available to an interpreter regarding the 
propositional attitudes a speaker holds true. Without being able to assume what 
utterances mean in advance of ascribing beliefs and vice versa, there is an inevitable 
paucity of evidence from which to launch the interpretive project. Permit for a moment 
that intentional attribution is, as Bortolotti claims, possible without any normative 
rational constraints. Observing the behaviour of an agent A, an interpreter tentatively 
attributes to him the belief ‗that-p‘, and this attribution can be explained in causal terms: 
some event or object in the world caused the belief ‗that-p‘ in A. What follows from this 
attribution? A purely causal story might suggest that inductive inference suffices to 
account for what follows: something of the form ‗in situations akin to A‘s, agents holding 
the belief ‗that-p‘ are disposed to believe ‗...‘, where the ellipsis is filled in by such 
propositions as ‗not not-p‘ or whatever causally coincides with the belief ‗that-p‘. But 
even granting the availability of such inductive evidence about what tends to follow 
from a particular belief, the attribution of this isolated belief does not tell the interpreter 
much at all: he can go no further in his interpretation than causal chains of inference, to 
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 An assent theory of belief ascription is one such theory that involves no requirement of 
rationality at all, e.g., Russell‘s ‗On Propositions‘ (Cherniak, 1981, p.163). 
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hypothesise what else the agent might believe or to say why an agent performed this or 
that action. The language of causal concepts is simply inadequate to explain how a 
reason has motivational (and explanatory) force. Say for example that an agent puts 
the kettle on, and I seek to explain this action via an attribution of reasons: he wants to 
make a cup of tea. Undoubtedly, casual mechanisms are at work in his action, but what 
furnishes the reason with explanatory power is not the fact that an attributed desire for 
tea caused him to raise him arm and flip the switch on the kettle. Whilst I would not 
wish to deny the causal role beliefs play in action-guiding and in relation to one 
another, I suggest an explanatory account of why agents behave as they do on the 
basis of the beliefs (and desires) they possess cannot be couched in the language of 
physical-causal concepts alone: the causal story does not do justice to the kind of 
inferences an interpreter draws when making intentional attributions70. 
 
Without any normative guidance as to what the agent ought to believe or do in light of 
this belief, for example, that he ought not to also hold the belief ‗that not-p‘, the 
interpreter cannot formulate hypotheses and test them against the behavioural 
evidence available. In short, interpretation cannot progress: 
―[I]f the believer were not required to be at least more likely to undertake some 
of the apparently appropriate actions, then the attribution of a belief-desire set 
could never yield any predictions of behaviour, and would never be 
disconfirmable by observed behaviour. On the basis of such an attribution, no 
behaviour could be expected; every action would be equally probable‖ 
(Cherniak, 1981, p.166). 
Bortolotti is committed to the claim that actions are guided by reasons, but in rejecting 
the necessity of rationality in reason explanations we are left questioning what 
disciplines the guiding of actions by reasons, if it is not a normative commitment of 
some kind, such as ‗if I believe x then I ought not to believe not-x‟? The implicit 
normativity of reason explanations is implied by Bortolotti‘s gesture towards seeking 
the ―right‖ causal connections in interpretive attributions, indicating that successful 
explanations for behaviour are picked out by the normative appropriateness of the 
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 See Campbell (2009; 2007) for recent views on the role of causal processes in person-level 
psychological explanations. 
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relation between beliefs, desires and action. A causal account does not, however, do 
justice to the intuition that if the agent holds the belief ‗not not-p‘ it is because that is 
what he ought to believe, given his belief ‗that-p‘. Whilst reasons may also turn out to 
be capable of description in causal terms, perhaps as physiological brain states, what 
characterises them as reasons just is what is revealed through the project of Radical 
Interpretation: a normative process that seeks to render behaviour intelligible through 
making intentional attributions on the basis of what it would be reasonable or correct for 
an agent to believe, say and do in light of his epistemic context:  
―What makes the task practicable at all is the structure the normative 
character of thought, desire, speech, and action imposes on correct 
attributions of attitudes to others‖
71
 (Davidson, 1990, p.325).  
The description of beliefs, desires and actions in rational, reason-giving terms provides 
the explanatory power of folk psychological intentional explanations of behaviour. In 
seeking a theory of intentional explanation based upon the attribution of reasons to an 
agent, Bortolotti thereby inadvertently carries an intrinsic element of rationality into her 
account of intentional behaviour as essentially rationalisable. Belief-and-desire pairings 
sufficient to motivate an action can be attributed even in the case of behaviour that 
goes against the norms of rationality: the very fact that we can characterise the 
behaviour in this way ensures that it lies within the domain of rationality rather than 
brute causal explanation. 
 
I have suggested that rationality is necessary for the characterisation of reasons but 
the account I have sketched thus far does not touch upon the objection that imposing 
the normative demands of rationality on conditions of intentionality and interpretation is 
an overly restrictive and unnecessary constraint. Bortolotti‘s argument for this view is 
that the Rationality Constraint on interpretation rests on an equivocation between the 
conditions for intentional agency and an adherence to principles of rationality. 
However, this conception of the RC is based on a misconstrual of the relationship 
between what it is to be rational and what it is to be irrational. The case that is not 
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 This conception of the mental also underpins Davidson‘s thesis of the anomalism of the 
mental (e.g., 1973a; 1970a). 
 133 
amenable to reason explanation arises not when an agent violates norms of rationality 
in a particular instance, as in the case of irrationality, but when the behaviour- or belief-
causing states are not capable of characterisation in terms of rational relations at all, 
that is, when they are arational. In irrational behaviour the rational link between belief 
attribution and action is maintained, thus enabling a reason explanation to be given 
even if it fails to be a good reason. Bortolotti‘s (2004a; 2004b) objection to the 
necessity of rationality commits the error of thinking that because irrationality consists 
in a failure to have good reasons or to act as one ought, the requirements of rationality 
demand that one does have good reasons for one‘s beliefs and actions. If the 
possibility of intentionally characterising an action depended on there being good 
reasons for it, there would be no sense in which behaviour could be deemed 
reasonable or unreasonable, sensible or foolish, appropriate or inappropriate, rational 
or irrational, for there would be no logical gap between full and complete rationality and 
complete unintelligibility. I turn now to consider how the claim that the intentional realm 
is constituted by norms of rationality, which I call the Rationality Assumption, can best 
be cashed out and defended. 
 
4.3. AGAINST THE RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION 
Incoherent Contradictory Beliefs 
It is worth clarifying what possibilities for belief ascription are explicitly ruled out by the 
Rationality Assumption and what empirically feasible possibilities need to be 
accommodated if it is to hold as a plausible account of the structure of the intentional 
realm. The thesis rejects the logical possibility that an agent could sincerely and 
explicitly believe the conjunction of two inconsistent beliefs ‗p‘ and ‗not-p‘. That is to 
say, an agent cannot form a belief that endorses two contradictory statements and be 
cognisant of this inconsistency: “no one can believe a proposition of the form (p, - p) 
while appreciating that the proposition is of this form” (Davidson, 1985a, p.198). The 
very notion of an agent explicitly asserting ‗p and not-p‘ is unintelligible: an interpreter 
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would simply be unable to attribute a belief with propositional content to an agent 
making such assertions. Davidson terms this kind of irrationality ‗synchronic 
inconsistency‘, and it is doubtful whether an assertion of such a manifest contradiction 
could possibly be attributed to an intentional being: “[i]t is by no means easy to 
conceive how a single mind can be described in this way” (ibid. p.197). 
 
In a hypothetical case in which a speaker sincerely asserts a belief with the 
propositional content ‗p and not-p‘ (in a language that is understood, or in Davidson‘s 
terms, for which the interpreter has a reliable and accurate theory of meaning), it is not 
at all clear what the content of this assertion could be taken to be, or what was meant 
by the utterance. Such an event would be “an occasion for sounding the epistemic 
alarm” (Dennett, 1987, p.95). It is reasonable to suggest that without further 
behavioural evidence available for interpretation or the possibility of seeking 
clarification, the interpreter would lose traction on what it is the speaker meant by his 
utterances and what he believed. Few, however, would wish to challenge this point: 
such an assertion by a speaker would be incoherent and nonsensical irrespective of 
one‘s commitment to the relationship between rationality and intentionality supported 
by the rational interpretationist. Synchronic inconsistency falls below the threshold of 
what could count as intelligible, intentional behaviour (Davidson, 1985a) and does not 
therefore threaten the argument for the inherent rationality of intentionality. 
Non-Obvious Inconsistencies 
Whilst holding a belief of the form ‗p and not-p‘ is unintelligible the empirically robust 
fact that agents may hold beliefs that are inconsistent with one another, holding a belief 
‗p‘ and also, perhaps inadvertently or at a different time, a belief ‗not-p‘, poses a 
challenge for rational interpretationism. Such inconsistency is, for Davidson, at the 
heart of the problem of irrationality: “we call a single attitude, belief, or action irrational 
only when we assume it conflicts with other beliefs or attitudes of the agent” (1985a, 
p.193). Inconsistency between beliefs that can only be identified and asserted through 
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detailed questioning or inference, in the manner of those elicited from the slave boy in 
Plato‘s Meno, are undeniably common. This fact alone suggests it is probable that 
contained within one‘s network of intentional states one might hold beliefs that are 
inconsistent with one another. Given that inconsistency is often taken to be the 
paradigm of irrationality, how can rational interpretationism tolerate and account for the 
existence of such inconsistencies? Any explanatory theory of intentionality predicated 
on the presupposition of rationality faces this prima facie problem:  
―…it would not seem possible to have a propositional attitude that is not 
rationally related to other propositional attitudes. For the propositional attitude 
itself, like the proposition to which it is directed, is in part identified by its 
logical relations to other propositional attitudes‖ (Davidson, 1985a, pp.189-
90).  
Arguments seeking to explain this phenomenon whilst retaining a connection between 
intentionality and rationality often make use of the idea that the problem posed by 
inconsistencies of belief depends on their degree of salience to the agent (Føllesdal, 
1984, p.305). Within the totality of an agent‘s beliefs there may be lurking 
inconsistencies of which he is by and large oblivious and if such beliefs are not made 
salient simultaneously the irrationality remains, as it were, undiscovered. In holding a 
particular belief it is implausible that one holds true each of its logical consequences. 
Omniscience and infinite cognitive resources would be required to fulfil such a demand. 
Hence whilst holding a belief with self-contradictory content of the form (p, - p) would 
be incoherent, tacit inconsistencies may arise, for example through a failure of 
inference in which one is not aware of one‘s logical error in holding a set of beliefs of 
the form (p, p q, - q). If mutually inconsistent beliefs are not attended to or ‗activated‘ 
at the same time, then such beliefs may operate independently of one another in the 
agent‘s mental economy, even if they are directed towards the same propositional 
content72. The rational interpretationist can thus posit that the demands of rationality 
constrain only ―activated‖ beliefs (Bortolotti, 2003, p.118), which are those beliefs that 
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 We can distinguish between beliefs being endorsed, activated and attended to, to 
discriminate between different levels of awareness at which beliefs may be held. These 
distinctions make more plausible the idea that non-obvious inconsistencies are an ordinary 
feature of intentional life: beliefs held at, as it were, different levels, may manifest inconsistency 
that the agent is oblivious to (Bortolotti, 2003, footnote i). 
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are being consciously considered by an agent at a given time, as these are the 
cognitive states that motivate action and are thus attributable by an interpreter: “the 
activated belief subset is subject to a more stringent inference condition than the 
inactive belief set” (Cherniak, 1981, p.178). 
 
Although an intuitively plausible account of how inconsistencies may arise and persist, 
the level of an agent‘s awareness of his beliefs does not affect the logic of belief 
individuation. If we take it that the degree of salience or ‗activation‘ of beliefs is extrinsic 
to the conditions of their individuation, then the claim that beliefs can be possessed at 
different strata of attention is orthogonal to our concern here with defending the 
assumption that beliefs are intrinsically rationally related. Thus the fact that one is 
ignorant of an inconsistency in one‘s beliefs does not in itself do anything to explain 
how inconsistencies are possible on a theory that is based upon the claim that 
propositional attitudes depend for their identity on the rational relations they bear to one 
another. What this unsuccessful strategy for defending the RA does suggest, however, 
is that if such compartmentalising of conflicting propositional attitudes could apply to 
the logic of their individuation, the logical tension inherent in the idea that an agent 
could hold inconsistent beliefs would dissipate. In other words, if the rational relations 
that constitute the identity of a belief ‗that-p‘ are psychologically isolated from those that 
constitute the belief ‗not-p‘, the threat to the RA from the existence of inconsistency 
would be neutralised. 
 
Davidson‘s notion of mental partitioning is based on this idea of tolerating inconsistency 
by appealing to the relative isolation of incongruent beliefs from one another, and on 
his account it is not the agent‘s degree of conscious awareness that bears the 
explanatory weight of the division. Following a rich psychoanalytic tradition originating 
with Freud, he claims that the mind can be sub-divided into ―psychic regions‖ (Heil, 
1989, p.574) that, whilst fully rational and consistent within themselves, may contain 
beliefs that are inconsistent with those in another psychic region of the individual‘s 
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mentality. Thus local perturbations in rationality may emerge, such as inconsistencies 
that are identifiable as such only across the boundaries of different partitions. 
Davidson‘s partitioning strategy is intended to accommodate the possibility of holding 
inconsistent beliefs by circumscribing the extent to which the holistic identity conditions 
of intentional states are distributed across the whole network. Hence instances of 
psychological breakdown in which intentional attributions nonetheless apply can be 
accommodated by conceiving of psychic regions as largely autonomous islands of 
rationality, within the boundaries of which the identity of particular intentional states can 
be secured.  
 
Such a compartmentalising strategy faces the problem that it undercuts one of the 
central features of the rational interpretationist conception of mentality: the holism of 
the psychological realm as a coherent body of relationally constituted intentional states. 
The partitioning argument proceeds on the basis of the assumption that the 
hypothesised holism of the mental is incompatible with the possibility of internal 
inconsistency, and therefore seeks to de-emphasise the holistic claim by narrowing its 
scope to separate sub-regions of an agent‘s mentality. Some cases of irrationality 
could be viewed as the fragmentation of this holism; for example, Radden proposes a 
conception of madness as a disintegration of the overall rationality of the mind (1985). 
This approach does, however, weaken the holism that was intended to be a key 
strength of the rational interpretationist thesis. I suggest then that rather than weaken 
the holistic claim, instances of inconsistency can be accommodated by taking the 
holistic aspect of the relational identity conditions for intentional states seriously. 
 
To use a Quinean analogy, beliefs are identified by their location within a vast and 
elaborate web of interrelations with other intentional states, meanings and actions. No 
one belief is constituted by only one or two connections within the network but rather by 
many and varied relations. This entails that the identity conditions of particular beliefs 
may not overlap despite being in some way relevant to one another in terms of content. 
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Although there ought to be some rational relation obtaining between such beliefs in 
virtue of what they are about, constitutive holism allows that it is possible for this 
relation to fail whilst the different beliefs themselves are nonetheless maintained. It is 
then only by bringing the set of inconsistent beliefs to attention that this error is 
highlighted. Say for example that I believe that it is 1pm in England, where I am 
currently located, and I know that the clocks are set to British Summer Time. I also 
believe that Dubai is 3 hours ahead of BST and I desire to speak to my friend who lives 
in Dubai. I believe that she will be at home now because she finishes work at 5pm and 
thus form the intention to call her. Taken together, there is an inconsistency present: 
the consequence of one set of beliefs (regarding the time difference) is that I believe it 
is 4pm, whereas in forming the intention to make the phone call the belief that it is 5pm 
is also attributable to me. Nonetheless, if we conceive of beliefs as sets of 
interconnected nodes in a network, the propositional content of particular beliefs can be 
assured in virtue of their constitutive rational relations with other beliefs, even though 
they do not bear the appropriate rational relations to the beliefs with which they are 
inconsistent. Thus my belief about Dubai is still a belief about Dubai in spite of the 
failure of inference regarding its time zone, on account of numerous other beliefs I hold, 
such as the fact of it being located in the UAE, my friend‘s presence there, and so on. 
There are sufficiently many other beliefs and rational relations constitutively supporting 
the identity of each of the inconsistent beliefs that they can both be given an intentional 
description despite the logical tension between them. In this way the holism of the 
psychological realm ensures that beliefs that are inconsistent with one another can 
nonetheless be attributed to an agent (at least temporarily) without degenerating into 
incoherence, and without necessitating a compartmentalisation of the mind into 
discrete psychic regions.  
Delusions and the Background Argument 
The claim that identity conditions for beliefs need not overlap and can thus tolerate 
inconsistency explains how the assumption that intentionality is constitutively rational 
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can be retained in the face of evidence of reasoning mistakes and non-obvious errors 
in judgement. This account relies upon the idea that the inconsistent beliefs are the 
result of an error that is not obvious to the agent. However, a weakness in this defence 
of the RA is exposed by the existence of cases in which attributable beliefs are self-
evident and persistent in spite of their falsity or lack of coherence with other beliefs. 
Considering the case of delusion exemplifies the problem faced by the RA here: such 
cases make it seem implausible to suggest that even broadly construed, rationality is 
constitutive of intentional states. Patients suffering from delusions often have a 
tendency to undertake a form of ‗double book-keeping‘ through holding self-evidently 
inconsistent beliefs (Sass, 1994, p.86). Moreover, in cases such as Capgras syndrome, 
the delusional state itself is patently false but persistently retained, even if the patient 
acknowledges its implausibility and bizarreness. The belief is maintained in the face of 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary (DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p.275), the testimony of 
others he knows and trusts, the explanations of his doctors that he has suffered 
neurological damage, and he may even acknowledge the implausibility of the belief. 
The inconsistency cannot be written off as a rectifiable mistake or slip of the tongue 
and there are good reasons for characterising the delusion as an intentional state, as it 
plays a role in guiding action and rationalising at least some of the agent‘s actions: 
“[Delusional subjects] behave as believers when they act on their delusion, when they offer 
tentative arguments for it and when they relate the content of their delusion to the other 
beliefs they hold” (Bortolotti, 2005, p.206). Attributing the belief with the content ‗that 
woman is an impostor‘ to the Capgras patient renders his behaviour (avoiding her, 
expressing distress at her physical presence and so forth) amenable to a reason 
explanation.  
 
It therefore appears that the agent possesses a state that is action-guiding to a 
circumscribed extent, seemingly with determinate propositional content, available to 
conscious awareness and critical reflection, self-evidently bizarre and inconsistent with 
other beliefs, but that nonetheless does not satisfy the constitutive conditions of the RA 
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and thereby cannot fall under an intentional description. Two avenues are obvious from 
this point, neither of which is attractive from the perspective of the rational 
interpretationist. Either it follows that the norms of truth and coherence embodied by 
the RA cannot be conditions for the application of intentional concepts: a move that 
abandons the core of the rational interpretationist thesis by breaking the connection 
between interpretability and rationality, or the delusion is denied the status of a belief. 
The debate over the intentional status of delusional states is extensive (see e.g., 
Campbell, 2001), but even if such states are thought not to be intentional this creates 
further problems for the rational interpretationist, as it then follows that arational, non-
intentional states are capable of entering into reason explanations and providing 
reasons for behaviour: an intolerable consequence for a theory that posits rationality as 
a condition of intentionality. 
 
The most promising avenue for the rational interpretationist to defend the RA 
necessitates a shift of explanatory focus away from the isolated instance of delusional 
behaviour in order to view the irrationality instead as a localised disruption to a broad 
background of largely rational beliefs and behaviour. Thus rather than focusing on the 
individual constitutive conditions of intentional states, the rationality of intentionality is 
to be located at the level of the whole person, situated in an environmental and social 
context. This is essentially an extrapolation of the constitutive holism of the intentional 
previously discussed. The claim is known as the Background Argument (Bortolotti, 
2005), and it aims to accommodate instances of irrational behaviour from within the 
conceptual sphere of rationality, rather than considering them as challenges to the RA. 
The Background Argument is that it is only against a background of broadly true and 
coherent beliefs that intentional descriptions can be given to behaviours and utterances 
that breach the norms of rationality described by the Rationality Assumption.  
 
Davidson states that irrationality is “a failure within the house of reason” (1982, p.169), 
meaning that irrational behaviour and attitudes ought to be characterised as failures of 
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reason in a particular instance, not an absence of reason altogether73. Such failure can 
be understood only within the context of a background of intentional behaviour that 
does conform to the norms of rationality, that is, within a system in which the right 
logical and causal relations obtain between the world and the system, its beliefs and 
intentional actions:  
―To explain irrationality we must find a way to keep what is essential to the 
character of the mental – which requires preserving a background of 
rationality‖ (Davidson, 1985a, p.190). 
 
―[i]t is only by interpreting a creature as largely in accord with these principles 
[of rationality] that we can intelligibly attribute propositional attitudes to it, or 
that we can raise the question whether it is in some respect irrational‖ (ibid. 
p.196). 
The rational background extends into the world, incorporating the agent‘s intentional 
actions, utterances and interactions with others. This argument is central to Davidson‘s 
theory of belief ascription and has been advocated as a strategy through which to 
immunise an assumption of the necessity of rationality for intentionality against 
instances of irrational behaviour (e.g., Heal, 1998). 
 
What does it mean to say that agency requires a ‗background‘ of rationality? Bortolotti 
(2005, p.190) suggests two conditions, drawn from Davidson. Firstly, that an intentional 
agent generally holds beliefs that conform to the norms of rationality, that is, they are 
mostly true and coherent; secondly that an agent will seek to restore rationality if he 
happens to be in violation of its norms. At present I am focused on the former 
condition, examining whether or not the Background Argument is capable of salvaging 
rationality as a feature of intentionality in cases where the propositional content of 
beliefs appears to be determinate but false and inconsistent with other intentional 
states. I will consider the requirements on belief revision and recovery from error in 
section 4.4. 
 
                                               
73
 Considering delusions as involving an absence of reason would be consistent with Berrios‘ 
(1991) account of delusional utterances as ―empty speech acts‖ devoid of meaning and not 
falling under an intentional description. 
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Aside from the difficulties of ascertaining how the condition of ‗mostly‘ true is to be 
understood, it is not immediately clear how the Background Argument salvages the 
Rationality Assumption from the problem of delusions. Indeed, as Bortolotti argues, it 
appears to falsify the claim that agents are largely rational; there is a gaping hole in the 
rationality of the beliefs held by the delusional individual, who is an intentional agent 
nonetheless. Bortolotti concludes that considerations of rationality are thus irrelevant to 
determining the status of behaviour as intentional or not: it is not a constitutive aspect 
of intentional agency that one is broadly rational. 
 
However, I suggest that Bortolotti‘s rejection of the Background Argument rests on a 
misunderstanding as to how the background of rationality ought to be construed. The 
notion that intentional agency requires a background of rationality has found 
expression in a variety of ways and not always in the language of truth and coherence. 
For instance, John Searle‘s ―Background‖ and Wittgenstein‘s ―Bedrock‖ refer to our 
pre-reflective dispositions and capacities (Rhodes & Gipps, 2008) rather than epistemic 
standards specifically. Nonetheless, arguments for a necessary background against 
which behaviour can be understood as intentional and action-oriented are all 
predicated upon the idea that our ability to get on in the world, to successfully act, 
survive and satisfy our goals, depends upon certain conditions. The Background 
Argument identifies these as being that our beliefs are largely true and broadly 
coherent with one another. Holding true beliefs generally enables one‘s actions to 
succeed in their intentions, and coherence is required in any situation in which values, 
beliefs and intentions motivate the pursuit of a goal. This assumption goes largely 
unnoticed, but “what must be presupposed in any interpretative situation is the idea of 
the speaker‟s location in, and relationship to, a world” (Malpas, 1992, p.89). Yet such 
presuppositions are imperfect and this is thrown into relief in cases such as delusions. 
Here, we face an admittedly baffling situation, and it is difficult to know how the 
delusional assertion is to be understood. But as Davidson observes:  
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―The underlying paradox of irrationality, from which no theory can entirely 
escape, is this: if we explain it too well, we turn it into a concealed form of 
rationality; while if we assign incoherence too glibly, we merely compromise 
our ability to diagnose irrationality by withdrawing the background of rationality 
needed to justify any diagnosis at all‖ (Davidson, 1982, p.184). 
The Background Argument thus reflects an a priori commitment to the overall cogency 
and groundedness of the attitudes and behaviour of intentional agents within which 
localised perturbations can be characterised intentionally. Irrationality is not the inverse 
of rationality but a domain within it. What is essential to this notion of the background is 
that it is not individualist in nature: it extends across the “horizon” (Malpas, 1992) that 
we share as intentional agents74. Without an assumption that an agent is by and large 
rational, we could not even apply intentional concepts to instances of irrational 
behaviour and single them out as being bizarre. It is only once this foundation has been 
laid that inconsistencies can be intelligibly attributed at all. Thus, it is precisely the idea 
that in the case of delusions there is some failure or breakdown in one‘s normal way of 
going in the world that makes the delusional belief stand out as indicative of there 
being something ‗wrong‘ in the person‘s way of thinking: 
―We often, and justifiably, find others irrational and wrong; but such 
judgements are most firmly based when there is the most agreement. We 
understand someone best when we hold him to be rational and sage, and this 
understanding is what gives our disputes with him a keen edge‖ (Davidson, 
2982, p.184) 
I will return to the question of how best to characterise this notion of the background in 
chapter five, but here I wish to emphasise its holistic role as a prerequisite for 
identifying instances of irrationality in the first place. For instance, it is only because of 
the background that we can recognise the delusional assertion as a linguistic utterance 
rather than a meaningless vocal articulation, but also to identify it as somehow being 
out of place. It is not clear how Bortolotti‘s rejection of the Background Argument 
covers this possibility: if there is no background of broadly true and coherent belief, 
what makes the delusional assertion stand out as being odd, or indicative of there 
being something wrong in the patient‘s beliefs? 
                                               
74
 Malpas (1992) and Evnine (1991, p.154) argue that Davidson‘s account of the background of 
rationality is not incompatible with a phenomenological approach. Although there are interesting 
parallels to be drawn here, I am interested in the implications of seeking epistemic conditions 
identifying the boundaries of intentional agency. 
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Permitting the possibility of inconsistently held, contentful beliefs does not therefore 
undermine the RA as a broad delimiter of the boundaries of intentionality: it is a feature 
of the intentional realm that admits of exceptions but a valid feature nonetheless. 
Rather than challenging the intrinsic connection between rationality and intentionality, 
the possibility of inconsistency and irrationality in attitudes and behaviour reflects the 
broad, messily holistic nature of the psychological realm. Content can be attributed 
intelligibly to beliefs that fail to cohere with others or are patently false, thus 
undermining the objection that such states are intolerable for the rational 
interpretationist. 
 
4.4. OUGHT WE TO BE RATIONAL? 
Recovery from Error 
Having claimed that inconsistency can be accommodated by the rational 
interpretationist thesis, we now face a further problem. Since inconsistency in belief is 
possible and attributable by an interpreter, on the view I have developed thus far there 
is a danger of losing sight of the claim, central to the rational interpretationist thesis, 
that the boundaries on interpretability and sense-making in intentional behaviour are 
normative in nature. If inconsistency can be accounted for within a rational framework, 
in what sense is it a mistake to hold inconsistent beliefs? If we wish to retain the claim 
that inconsistency is indicative of a normative lapse, and that an inconsistent agent has 
gone wrong in his reasoning and epistemic processes of belief formation, a further 
requirement on intentional agency is needed. 
 
The problem can be elucidated if we consider the intuitive differences between 
straightforward errors in reasoning, such as the mistake committed by the person who 
commits the conjunction fallacy or my unreflective inconsistency in beliefs about Dubai, 
and the case of the delusional individual who believes his wife is an impostor. Clearly, 
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the latter is irrational in a way that the former examples are not, but examined solely in 
terms of attributing intentional content to these agents, the RA and RC are incapable of 
distinguishing between them. Where they differ is in the processes by which these 
beliefs are maintained and subjected to revision in the face of evidence or awareness 
of the inconsistency. The defence I have given of the rational interpretationist thesis 
suggests that by and large, inconsistencies in belief are indicative of an error that the 
agent will seek to correct, given the appropriate cognitive resources. The rationality or 
irrationality of a particular belief thus lies not in the content that it has but rather the way 
in which the agent behaves in response to it. In the case of the conjunction fallacy, we 
would expect an agent to revise his beliefs once he realises the error in his probabilistic 
judgement. By contrast, the Capgras patient is characterised by the steadfast and 
stubborn conviction by which he maintains his delusional assertion, even whilst 
acknowledging its implausibility. These cases help identify the motivation for the 
intuition that the delusional patient is irrational whereas the reasoning task participant is 
simply mistaken. Irrationality arises not when attributed content is inconsistent or false, 
but when agents do not respond or react to such beliefs in the right way:  
―A person is irrational if he is not open to reason—if, on accepting a belief or 
attitude on the basis of which he ought to make accommodating changes in 
his other beliefs, desires, or intentions, he fails to make those changes‖ 
(Davidson, 1982, p.179-80). 
In the instance of delusion, the agent does not recover from the false belief he has 
formed: he is failing to do something he ought when confronted with the bizarre nature 
of his beliefs. One way of describing what appears to be a normative obligation on 
intentional agents is to suggest that we ought to be rational in our beliefs, even though 
we might, and frequently do, fail to achieve truth and coherence. I will refer to this 
obligation as the Rationality Requirement (RR). Whilst it is clear that Davidson 
advocates the idea that intentional agents ought to be rational and there are clear 
explanatory advantages of stipulating such a requirement in this way, I will argue that it 
is a mistake to construe the norms of rationality that are constitutive of intentionality in 
terms of the prescriptive principles he suggests. 
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Ordinarily, if one is alerted to the fact that there is an inherent inconsistency in one‘s 
beliefs, or that one has acted in a way that is inconsistent with one‘s professed beliefs, 
desires and so forth, one would attempt to resolve what is perceived as a tension in 
one‘s intentional behaviour. The claim that agents usually seek to resolve 
inconsistencies is supported in principle by observations of psychological discomfort in 
studies of cognitive dissonance (Elliot & Devine, 1994). When subjects are aware of 
the conflict between their beliefs they feel psychologically uncomfortable and attempt to 
dissolve the dissonance either by explaining it away or by modifying one or other of the 
dissonant beliefs. A common example of cognitive dissonance occurs in smokers, who 
may hold the belief that smoking causes cancer but nonetheless acknowledge that they 
do continue to smoke75 (Aronson, 1969). Here, the habitual smoker may be compelled 
either to stop smoking or to rationalise the dissonance by citing numerous other beliefs 
such as discrediting the scientific evidence, citing examples of family members who 
smoked for years without their habit leading to cancer, and so forth. Quite how the 
individual reduces the dissonance is beside the point: the fact is that he attempts to 
eliminate the inconsistency. Aronson observes that “dissonance theory does not rest 
upon the assumption that man is a rational animal; rather, it suggests that man is a 
rationalising animal” (ibid. p.3, emphasis in original). Thus whilst it is possible and 
indeed common to hold beliefs that fail to be true or coherent, it is an empirical fact that 
awareness of such inconsistencies is a source of psychological discomfort and that, 
time and cognitive resources permitting, we generally seek to eliminate them.  
 
However, from empirical observation of the fact that agents tend to attempt resolution 
of manifest inconsistencies in their beliefs it is a further step to argue that they are 
normatively obliged to recover from such error, which is what the Rationality 
                                               
75
 There is not a formal inconsistency in this case of the kind characterised by holding true both 
the propositions ‗p‘ and ‗not-p‘. Rather, together with the assumption that it is reasonable to 
suppose the agent would not wish to suffer cancer, the inconsistency between his beliefs is 
made manifest. 
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Requirement implies. Is the claim that we ought to be rational justified? Let us consider 
the implications of the idea that in holding inconsistent or false beliefs one has made an 
error that one ought to resolve. The normative prescription that one ought to fix such an 
error entails that the interpretation of one‘s behaviour by a third-person carries 
significant predictive power. An example used by Dennett (1987, ch.4) to defend his 
intentional systems theory will serve (in modified form) to illustrate how the notion that 
one ought to recover from one‘s errors equips interpreters with a powerful explanatory 
strategy. It might not be able to predict the occurrence of inconsistency or error, but it is 
nonetheless capable of explaining and predicting agents‘ responses to such mistakes 
in reasoning and action. Suppose that I see a boy selling glasses of lemonade at a stall 
by the side of the road. A sign on the stall reads ‗Lemonade - £1.20 a glass‘. I purchase 
a glass, handing over two pound coins to the boy. He then gives me a fifty pence piece 
and a twenty pence piece in change and thanks me for my custom. The boy has made 
a mistake in handing over my change: he ought to have given me eighty pence. The 
Rationality Constraint looks to be capable of generating intentional attributions in this 
scenario: we could attribute to the boy the belief he had given me the correct change76. 
However, it is also capable of allowing further attributions and predictions: we would 
expect that once his mistake has been pointed out to him, the boy would exhibit 
surprise, possibly embarrassment (ibid. p.85), he would apologise and hand over an 
additional ten pence. How can we predict this? It is in virtue of the idea that in giving 
me the incorrect change the boy has failed to act as he ought, and that he would seek 
to correct this error upon realising what he had done.  
Going Against One‟s Own Norms 
What content can be given to the idea that there are constraints on what one ought to 
do when faced with an error in one‘s beliefs? Davidson‘s strategy for explaining the fact 
that we do tend to attempt to recover from error is to claim that as intentional agents we 
are under an obligation to adhere to our own norms of belief and action.  He argues 
                                               
76
 Dennett himself argues that we cannot make definite explanatory attributions, but here I use 
the example only to highlight the scope and possible predictive power of attributing false beliefs. 
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that “if someone does on occasion think or act or feel in ways that offend against those 
norms, he must have departed from his own standards, that is, from his usual and best 
modes of thought and behaviour” (1985a, p.197). The normative dimension to 
intentional behaviour can be construed as the idea that we can fail to do and think what 
we have best reason for. Thus, what is wrong with being inconsistent in one‘s beliefs is 
that one is failing to adhere to one‘s own conception of what it would be right to believe. 
Recovery from normative epistemic breaches is instigated by the recognition that in 
holding inconsistent beliefs one is violating one‘s own standards of belief, and is 
compelled to resolve it in order to restore coherence (Davidson, 1982). According to 
the Rationality Requirement, the standards of belief in play here are those of rationality.  
 
I may hold one belief for good reasons at one time, and another inconsistent belief at 
another, but what I cannot do (according to Davidson) is assert both beliefs 
simultaneously and be content to accept this tension, because to do so would 
constitute a breach of my own epistemic standards. This claim needs unpacking if we 
are to be clear about what obligations the Rationality Requirement are supposed to 
place on agents. The normative content of the RR is that one‘s beliefs ought to be true 
and coherent, both with one another and with one‘s intentional behaviour and 
utterances. Going against these standards would be indicative of irrationality 
(Davidson, 1985a, p.192). To clarify this point and the significance of the argument that 
irrationality is a matter of breaching one‘s own norms, let us consider the idea in logical 
form. An agent holds two beliefs that imply the negation of one another, one with the 
propositional content (p), the other, (-p). On the holistic construal of the RA and the RC 
I have developed, it could be both possible and rational for an interpreter to attribute 
these beliefs to the agent. But if we add the stipulation of the RR, the irrationality of 
such inconsistency is noticed: the rational norm of consistency derived from the law of 
non-contradiction, (if p, then not -p), has been breached. The principle sets out what 
ought to follow from the holding of a belief, in this instance proscribing the belief (-p) 
from being held. With that principle in place, the inconsistency indicates that the agent 
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has committed an error, since one cannot simultaneously hold (p, if p then not -p, -p). 
Agents whose behaviour does not obviously violate this principle can be described as 
conforming to it, even if not intentionally seeking to maintain consistency: “It is true that 
believers conform to consistency in the sense that they do not engage in an obvious 
inconsistency” (Bortolotti, 2003, p.118). 
 
Introducing the notion of the agent‘s own standards has the advantage of providing a 
way of distinguishing the case of mistaken reasoning from that of delusion. In the 
former case, if conscious awareness of the inconsistency prompts one to revise one‘s 
beliefs or correct one‘s response, one is eliminating the error and seeking to maintain 
conformity with one‘s own epistemic standards. In the case of delusion, by contrast, the 
problematic belief is maintained and thus represents a continued and persistent breach 
of these standards, and it is this failure to modify one‘s beliefs in accord with the 
requirements of rationality that makes the belief an irrational one. According to this 
view then, irrationality arises “only when beliefs are inconsistent with other beliefs 
according to principles held by the agent himself” (Davidson, 1985a, p.192). This 
application of the Rationality Requirement extends beyond strictly epistemic concerns, 
for example, a set of beliefs or an action would be irrational if an agent acts against his 
own conception of what would be in his best interests, or against what he justifiably 
values. Here I am concerned only with the characterisation of irrationality as a breach 
of the norms operating on one‘s standards of belief formation and maintenance: 
―The possibility of (objective) inconsistency depends on nothing more than 
this, that an agent...must show much consistency in his thought and action, 
and in this sense have the fundamental values of rationality; yet he may 
depart from these, his own, norms‖ (ibid. p.197). 
However, as Davidson acknowledges, construing irrationality as a failure to adhere to 
one‘s own standards leads to the following question: “why must inconsistency be 
considered irrational? (Alternatively, or perhaps equivalently, one could ask: who is to 
decide what consistency demands?) Isn't this just one more evaluative judgment, and 
one that an agent might reject?” (ibid. p.194, emphasis in original). In other words, do 
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rational norms such as consistency exert any necessary normative demand or are they 
merely contingent values that one might or might not adopt? The norms of rationality 
are not relevantly similar to contingent values, because breaching them exemplifies 
what Davidson terms “objective irrationality” (ibid. p.189): objective because, on his 
view, all agents have these fundamental rational values. 
 
The compulsion to recover from error is crucial for reconciling the apparent dissonance 
within rational interpretationism, and appealing to the RR ostensibly resolves this 
problem: whilst inconsistencies in belief possession and attribution are possible, if 
made salient then the agent‘s awareness that he has gone against his own norms will 
provide motivation to remove the tension in his belief system. If an agent fails to 
resolve a manifest inconsistency in his beliefs he has violated a fundamental norm of 
rationality. However, if we examine how the claim that agents ought to be rational (but 
yet can fail to be) is supposed to function in practice then an intractable problem for 
rational interpretationism emerges, the source of which, I will suggest, is in the idea 
that norms of rationality can be codified in principles. 
Conformity and Subscription 
The rational requirement of recovery from the error of going against one‘s own 
principles introduces something akin to the competence/performance distinction 
previously discussed with regard to psychological accounts of human reasoning. Here 
descriptive accounts of behaviour are framed around the question of whether or not the 
person performing a reasoning task successfully conforms to the principle under 
scrutiny. Defenders of the view that humans are rational have argued that committing a 
logical fallacy does not entail that a person is fundamentally irrational (Stein, 1996). An 
agent‘s performance is not necessarily indicative of his underlying reasoning 
competence, as there may be numerous reasons for errors that arise. However, once 
the fallacy is pointed out or explained, we would expect him to acknowledge he had 
committed an error, thus demonstrating that despite the evidence of his performance, 
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his reasoning competence was intact. The disposition of agents to recover from 
inconsistency indicates that the occurrence of irrational ‗performance‘ errors does not 
undermine the claim that agents possess a necessary underlying rational competence, 
conceived by the Rationality Requirement as a commitment to fundamental norms of 
rationality. Without the normative conception of competence entailed by the claim that 
we ought to be rational it is difficult to explain why agents are in fact motivated to 
recover from errors in their reasoning and beliefs (given the constraints of time and 
cognitive resources). Bortolotti (2003) casts this distinction in terms of an agent‘s 
conformity to standards of rationality versus his subscription to them. Rather than rely 
on the idea that individuals‘ intentional behaviour does in fact exhibit conformity to 
standards of rationality, we can argue instead that they subscribe to standards of 
rationality but may on occasion behaviourally deviate from them. This gives substance 
to the idea that rationality is a normative standard, since it is possible to fail to act as 
one rationally ought. 
 
Davidson states that the question of whether or not an agent subscribes to principles of 
rationality “is not an empirical question” (1985a, p.196), but rather a condition of 
possibility for ascribing intentional states to a creature:  
―These are principles shared by all creatures that have propositional attitudes 
or act intentionally…it comes to no more than this, that it is a condition of 
having thoughts, judgments, and intentions that the basic standards of 
rationality have application‖ (ibid. p.195). 
Subscription is, on his view, an a priori requirement of intentional agency. An agent 
could not explicitly violate a norm of rationality or fail to recover from the error once it is 
made obvious to him and still be ascribed intentional status by an interpreter 
(Davidson, 1982). Bortolotti (2003, p.118) observes that Davidson‘s account of 
subscription is never clearly articulated but rather hinted at in numerous places 
throughout his writings (especially 1986b; 1985a). When referring to the fundamental 
constraints of rationality Davidson suggests that as intentional creatures we are “largely 
in accord” (1985, p.196) with such principles, but being in accord does not entail 
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conforming to them in all cases. Nor for that matter does being in accord with a 
principle entail one is aiming to be in accord with it. It is not necessary (and indeed 
unlikely) that these rational standards are available to conscious awareness and the 
agent need not explicitly endorse them as constraining his processes of belief 
formation and revision of his intentional actions. The notion of subscription is perhaps 
misleading, since Davidson acknowledges that one need not be able to articulate or 
even recognise such a constraint: “I think everyone does subscribe to those principles, 
where he knows it or not” (ibid. p.186). The behavioural manifestation of subscription 
consists only in a speaker not engaging in obvious inconsistencies and in being 
motivated or disposed to eliminate them when they arise (Bortolotti, 2003, p.118-9). 
Hence the only evidence for the claim that one subscribes to such standards is the 
capacity to recover from error: in the case of cognitive dissonance for instance, it is 
thanks to one‘s subscription to the norm of consistency that one sees the tension and 
seeks to remedy it. 
 
Føllesdal (1984, p.316) considers this capacity to be a second order disposition, 
comparing subscription to rational principles to the grasping of grammatical rules. One 
intrinsically knows when one has committed a grammatical error even if one is unable 
to articulate the rules of grammar for one‘s language. In the same way, he suggests 
that the disposition to be rational enables one to acknowledge when one‘s own 
behaviour is somehow in error, or that one‘s beliefs are mistaken. This is all that is 
necessary for motivating one to revise and change the deviant behaviour even if one is 
not cognisant of the nature of the normative lapse77. Hence subscription allows us 
broadly to observe the principles of rationality without an awareness of the nature of 
their prescriptions or the fact that one‘s thoughts and behaviour are rationally 
constrained.  
 
                                               
77
 Frequent or large-scale failure to conform to such standards would, however, put the 
possibility of attributing intentional states in jeopardy. 
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In ordinary cases conforming to a norm, that is, behaving in a way deemed appropriate 
or correct by it, and subscribing to it go hand in hand. For the rational interpretationist 
the very possibility of interpretation hinges on the notion that a speaker‘s observable 
patterns of behaviour enable an interpreter to ascribe intentional states to him, on the 
basis of the assumption that this behaviour conforms to broad rational requirements. 
However, distinguishing between conformity and subscription ensures that if particular 
instances of behaviour, beliefs and utterances are irrational, this does not threaten the 
assertion that there are normative obligations imposed by a commitment to rationality, 
on the condition that agents exercise their capacity to eliminate obvious, acknowledged 
inconsistencies in their beliefs78. The distinction thus allows the freedom to permit 
instances of irrationality in an agent and to recognise them as being deviations from 
what he ought to do or believe, whilst continuing to assert that his behaviour can be 
described in intentional terms and is amenable to reason explanation. 
Subscription and the Project of Interpretation 
Treating subscription to principles of rationality as constitutive of agency and 
distinguishing this from mere conformity provides a Davidsonian account with the 
resources to defend against the charge that evidence of reasoning errors and 
inconsistency in beliefs would undermine the interpretability of an agent. However, 
employing this strategy has significant implications for his overall interpretive project 
(Bortolotti, 2003). If what is constitutive of rationality is an agent‘s capacity to recover 
from inconsistency (or indeed any other breach of rational standards), a gap opens up 
between the constraints guiding interpretation and the behavioural evidence upon 
which interpretation must be based. The rational interpretationist account is intended to 
provide a strategy for ascribing beliefs on the basis of the evidence supplied by 
observable behaviour. The very appeal of rational interpretationism is the assertion that 
an insight into the nature of propositional attitudes can be gained by understanding 
how we go about interpreting behaviour (Child, 1996a), and that by reflecting on and 
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 Subscription is not necessary for conformity: one‘s behaviour may indicate conformity to a 
norm contingently and not be in any sense bound by a normative constraint on future actions. 
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analysing our practices of interpretation we can specify the conditions of intentional 
agency (Bortolotti, 2004a, p.371).  
 
In order to accommodate instances of irrationality the Rationality Requirement must be 
pitched at the level of subscription rather than behavioural conformity. Subscription 
may be manifested by the speaker‘s recovery from an obvious inconsistency, but he 
need not display conformity to these principles in every instance of behaviour 
(Bortolotti, 2003, p.119). Bortolotti argues this entails that for any particular utterance or 
action that is being interpreted, the demands of the Rationality Constraint on 
interpretation need not necessarily apply. As a framework for guiding the interpretation 
of utterances and behaviour, the RC then falters since the constraint dictating that an 
interpreter ought to attribute beliefs that are coherent and largely true does not permit 
attributions that necessarily reflect the structure of the agent‘s intentional behaviour. 
The RC cannot therefore be necessary and fundamental to individual interpretive 
encounters. That is to say, the ascription of beliefs to an agent cannot be underpinned 
by the assumption that they are rational, as it is plausible that he is not conforming to 
the demands of rationality in that particular instance. 
 
There are two issues here. Firstly, Davidson‘s solution for accounting for error in beliefs 
and reasoning has inadvertently generated a practical issue for his commitment to the 
claim that interpretation is normatively structured: on the modified view standards of 
truth and coherence do not necessarily constrain individual instances of interpretation. 
This is because the interpreter cannot rely on the necessity of a connection between a 
speaker‘s behaviour, on the basis of which he ascribes beliefs, and the standards of 
rationality to which he ought to adhere. It is not, on Bortolotti‘s reading, therefore clear 
what role the notion of rationality is playing in the interpretive project. Secondly, the link 
between a speaker‘s behaviour and the standards to which he ought to adhere now 
appears to be one of contingency rather than necessity. In creating this gap the 
account has driven a wedge between what is behaviourally manifested, and thus 
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evidence for interpretation, and what is necessary to rationality and hence intentional 
agency. Bortolotti articulates the worry this distinction between subscription and 
conformity generates for the Rationality Constraint:  
―The relation between patterns of behaviour and norms could not be weaker 
than conformity, since it is by hearing a creature‘s utterance and observing its 
behaviour that the interpreter can find a large background of rationality and 
legitimately ascribe intentional states and action to that creature‖ (Bortolotti, 
2003, p.119, emphasis added).  
If behaviour is supposed to provide evidence in support of the attribution of rationality 
to an individual, nothing less than complete conformity to principles of rationality will 
suffice to ensure that rational interpretationism is a true reflection of the structure of the 
intentional realm. If subscription to principles of rationality is manifest merely as a 
disposition to conform but there is no substantive requirement for one to do so in 
individual instances of behaviour, then the utility of the Rationality Constraint as a 
necessary starting point for interpretation is undermined. On this reading, the demands 
of rationality do not necessarily guide an interpreter‘s options in ascribing beliefs based 
on individual instances of behaviour, and this calls into question the need to suppose 
that the speaker being interpreted subscribes to principles of rationality in the first 
place. 
 
Although the ambiguity of Davidson‘s own wording makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether this was a view he actually held, I suggest that this understanding of the 
relation between conformity and subscription is a misconstrual of the nature of the 
relation between Rationality Requirement and the constraints on third-person 
interpretation captured by the Rationality Constraint. Bortolotti takes it that if an 
interpreter fails to find conformity to principles of rationality in an agent‘s behaviour then 
he has no justification for asserting that the agent subscribes to these principles. This 
assumes the relation to be an evidential one: a view exemplified by her claim that in 
observing behaviour and utterances an interpreter ―can find‖ a background of 
rationality. On this view it follows that if the interpreter does not find rationality in an 
agent‘s beliefs, desires and actions, he cannot interpret his behaviour and cannot 
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thereby treat him as an intentional agent at all. An analogy will serve to illustrate the 
error in conceiving of the relation in this way. Let us imagine that interpreting behaviour 
is, in the relevant respects, like watching a game of football without any prior 
knowledge of the rules. If we take the purpose of the game to be that of winning, 
achieved through scoring more goals by kicking the ball into the opposing team‘s net, 
this makes sense of and explains many of the moves that the players make in kicking 
the ball up the pitch, tackling and so forth: in making these moves, players are doing 
what they ought to do (whether or not they do actually score). However, in particular 
instances behaviour might not conform to the rules of the game, say in giving away a 
free kick, going offside, knocking the ball onto the sidelines and so forth. On Bortolotti‘s 
construal of the relation between conformity and subscription, such instances threaten 
to undermine the idea that the players are aiming to score goals and win the game. 
 
If an observer knows that the players are playing a game, the degree to which they 
conform to the rules of the game does not play a justificatory role for the observer‘s 
judgement about the aim of their behaviour. Subscription to the rules is presupposed 
by the idea that the players are engaged in a game of football. This is not a claim that 
is either supported or undermined by particular instances of behavioural evidence, 
unless the behaviour is such a widespread radical departure from the rules that it is no 
longer comprehensible as the same game (if the footballers picked up the ball, formed 
rucks, touched the ball down behind the back line and intentionally kicked it over the 
crossbar, for example). If players commit errors this does not undermine the observer‘s 
commitment to the idea that they are playing football and hence that they subscribe to 
the rules constituting that game. In fact, it is only because we conceive of such 
behaviour as a failure to behave in such a way as to satisfy the aim of the game that it 
can be understood as an error, an accidental handball for instance. By the same token 
then, evidence that agents fail to conform to principles of rationality does not vitiate the 
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claim that agents ought to be broadly rational in their beliefs because the claim for 
subscription is not one that is justified by the available behavioural evidence79. 
 
Bortolotti‘s insight is not, however, entirely misplaced because it leads us to question 
what supports the claim of subscription, if not the evidence from behaviour. Recall that 
the components of rational interpretationism form a holistic circle reflecting the 
constitutive inter-relatedness of the possession of intentional states and the 
interpretability of actions and utterances through third-person ascriptions. There are no 
resources that can serve to justify intentional attributions beyond those available to 
interpretation. If the claim that agents subscribe to principles of rationality lacks 
empirical support from the behavioural evidence available to an interpreter, the thesis 
of rational interpretationism is under threat. However, for Davidson the argument for 
subscription is a transcendental one: subscription to norms of rationality sets the 
boundaries of intentionality itself. This is not to deny that behavioural evidence is what 
drives the project of interpretation. It cannot be known a priori what norms of rationality 
are guiding an agent‘s behaviour in a particular instance, but the evidence is not used 
to justify the claim that the agent is constrained by rationality more generally. The claim 
that we are committed to finding rationality in agents is therefore not a hypothesis or 
empirical postulate that could turn out to be false. Our primary commitment is to 
treating and interpreting people as intentional agents and this is not a prescription we 
can possibly go against: seeking rationality in beliefs and actions as far as possible is 
not something we could choose to abandon whilst continuing to treat people as agents 
capable of intentional action and linguistic behaviour. 
Failure To Recover from Error 
Throughout this chapter I have attempted to immunise the thesis of rational 
interpretationism against arguments from irrationality and objections that its 
requirements undermine the attribution of intentionality to perfectly explicable 
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 If behaviour persistently exhibits such violation of the rules that it breaches the bounds of 
intelligibility, we can question whether it is intentional at all. 
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behaviour. Rational interpretationism has the resources both to tolerate the existence 
of sets of beliefs with inconsistent content and to allow such intentional attributions in 
interpretation. I have emphasised the holistic nature of the normative constraints of 
rationality, its flexibility in accommodating apparent irrationality and the idea that it is 
only against a broad background of rationality that behaviour is even identifiable as 
intentional in the first place. Thus, even though a delusional belief does not cohere well 
with the totality of the agent‘s other beliefs and actions, and is a bizarre departure from 
his ordinary epistemic standards, it can nonetheless be attributed content and enter 
into reason explanations for a circumscribed set of actions. What marks a delusion out 
as being irrational is that the delusional agent is not responding appropriately to the 
bizarre belief, i.e., not seeking to resolve the epistemic mistake once he is made aware 
of it. In persistently asserting a delusional conviction, the agent is going against his own 
conception of what he rationally ought to believe and do. This is an important point as it 
highlights the pre-philosophical puzzlement we face in attempting explain delusions: 
they are bizarre and baffling. Davidson attempts to cash out this normative requirement 
on what agents ought to believe and do by positing principles to which intentional 
agents necessarily subscribe. However, whilst his account allows that we can on 
occasion fail to conform to such principles, it seems to carry an unfortunate 
consequence: agents who fail to recover from obvious error, such as the delusional 
individual, cannot be understood as intentional beings. As empirically robust cases of 
persistent failure to conform to principles of rationality, the very existence of delusions 
casts doubt on the transcendental claim that agents subscribe to principles of 
rationality, forcing us to question why we should be committed to such a claim in the 
first place. 
 
I consider the implication that persistently irrational individuals have questionable 
intentional status to be a mistaken step, and I will address why this is the case in the 
next chapter. I suggest, however, that a rational interpretationist account can deny the 
claim that failure to recover from error undermines intentional status, without sacrificing 
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the claim that agents are constitutively rational. Although I have set Bortolotti‘s account 
up as a foil to the thesis of rational interpretationism, the conflict between the two 
positions does, I submit, amount only to a difference in conceptions of what the 
normativity of rationality consists in. It is only if the demands of rationality are thought of 
as imposing strict conditions on the attribution of intentional states and propositional 
content that the possibility of providing reason explanations for all but the most logically 
watertight actions is in jeopardy. A conception of rationality as highly prescriptive and 
demanding is familiar in empirical psychology literature on reasoning and, as 
suggested in previous chapters, has formed the basis of what Stein refers to as the 
‗standard picture‘ of rationality (1996, ch.7). There is textual evidence that Davidson 
subscribed to such a view, for instance advocating an idealised consistency constraint 
on interpretability and implying that violations of transitivity in preferences would be 
unintelligible (e.g.,1973a, p.237). This commitment to a strong principled conception of 
rationality reflects Davidson‘s Quinean heritage, since the notion of ideal rationality and 
the necessity of behavioural adherence to logical laws underpin Quine‘s conception of 
Charity for the purposes of Radical Translation. Davidson also cites the principles of 
continence, total evidence, sentential calculus and those derived from Decision Theory 
as requirements for the possibility of ascribing intentional states (1985a; 1973a). 
 
I agree with Bortolotti that this conception of rationality is indeed far too demanding. It 
cannot be a condition of possibility for interpreting an agent‘s behaviour in a given 
instance that the intentional states ascribed ought to adhere to abstract norms of truth 
and logical coherence. Most proponents of rational interpretationism concur that if the 
requirements of rationality are too strong, requiring deductive closure and logical 
consistency, our theory of interpretation would be “embarrassed by absurdities” 
(Dennett, 1987, p. 94). However, the problem with this view lies not in the thesis of 
rational interpretationism itself but rather with the claim that the normative content of 
the thesis is that agents ought to be rational, formulated in terms of subscription to 
principles of rationality. A principled conception of the demands of rationality 
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exemplified by the standard picture and the notion of procedural rationality (Bermúdez, 
2001), combined with the epistemic standard of true belief, has been predominant in 
literature on reasoning and decision-making. This narrow view need not, however, be 
the conception of rationality required by the thesis of rational interpretationism. I 
suggest that this particular commitment to principles of rationality can be abandoned 
whilst retaining a claim to the essential normativity of the intentional realm. This view is 
not without precedent; Cherniak, for instance, conceives of the minimal conditions for 
rationality as a cluster concept, employed probabilistically (1981, p.175), rather than 
the rigidly defined set of rules implied by the notion of subscription.  
 
In the next chapter I elaborate on this proposal, arguing that standards of rationality 
ought not to be construed as a set of abstract principles that can be applied to evaluate 
whether or not a reason or action is the one the agent ought to commit to in a particular 
instance. The absence of such principles nonetheless does not threaten the status of 
rationality as a universal and necessary constraint on interpretation and interpretability. 
I will argue that judgements of rationality are not characterised by contingent 
agreements between interpreter and speaker over the truth-value of beliefs, 
convergence on particular values or over standards of evidence evaluation, but are 
instead underpinned by the norms that are constituted by and emerge from the social 
practices we are embedded in as intentional agents. 
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5. PRINCIPLES & PRACTICE 
5.1. NORMATIVE STANDARDS OF RATIONALITY 
Reconsidering the Rational „Ought‟ 
I take as a departure point in this chapter the assumption that there are normative 
standards that constrain interpretation and are constitutive of intentionality. I wish to 
address what the status of such norms is, and how they can be characterised. Here I 
set out the two horns of a dilemma faced by the rational interpretationist. The 
Rationality Requirement attempts to cash out the normativity of belief with the claim 
that we subscribe to principles of rationality: codifying the demands of rationality 
appears to enable prescriptions to be made about what it is rational to intend or think in 
a given situation, and also to provide explanations as to why certain beliefs or 
behaviours are rational or irrational. However, I have suggested that it is a mistake to 
attempt to construe rationality in this way. If rationality is to be conceived in terms of 
principles to which we subscribe, the question arises as to why we should be obliged to 
adhere to these principles and what justifications we have for thinking they are 
constitutive of intentionality. The first aim of this chapter is to seek to explain why the 
principled view of rationality cannot fulfil the role of specifying the norms of rationality 
that are essential to intentionality and interpretation. On the other hand, without 
codification it is unclear whether there is any sense of rationality that universally and 
necessarily constrains intentional behaviour and disciplines our interpretive practices, 
since being unable to prescribe correct belief in advance implies the norms of 
rationality are not force-makers that guide us in how particular intentional states and 
actions ought to be attributed80. If rationality is not strictly prescriptive then it is an open 
question as to how it exerts any normative constraint at all.  
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 Schroeder (2003) argues that a Davidsonian interpretationist theory is non-normative, 
because the normative force-maker of ‗rationality‘ is extrinsic to the machinery of the descriptive 
categorisation of intentional states, and is thus superfluous. It should be clear from the 
argument developed thus far that I consider this argument to be misplaced: the norms of 
rationality are not incidental to the categorisation of intentional states but rather intrinsic to their 
description as intentional. 
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I suggest that this is a false picture of the challenge to rational interpretationism. By 
considering insights from Wittgenstein‘s rule-following considerations, I move to 
undermine the picture of normativity that forced us onto the horns of this dilemma in the 
first place: the normativity of rationality need not and indeed cannot correctly be 
thought of in this way. Furthermore, attempting to seek universal principles of rationality 
is a misguided step, generating the illusion that the normative force of rationality 
derives from abstract principles themselves. I diagnose the source of this 
misconception and suggest that committing to rational interpretationism does not entail 
a commitment to a conception of rationality as a set of context-free principles operating 
to prescribe what one ought to do or think. 
Rationality as a Set of Explanatory Principles 
If we conceive of rationality as imposing a normative constraint on intentional behaviour 
and interpretations of that behaviour, it is natural to think that this constraint could 
usefully be characterised in terms of principles or rules to which we subscribe. A rule is 
like a function that, given a relevant set of inputs, identifies one option as being the 
correct or most appropriate output (Pettit, 1990, p.3). Thus, rules of rationality would 
specify what one ought to do or believe in light of the particular beliefs and desires one 
has. Appealing to abstract principles such as that of consistency or of non-contradiction 
makes it appear as though the demands of rationality can be articulated and imposed 
as constraints on interpretation that reflect the normative nature of belief:  
―It seems that any theory of belief which is to satisfy the fundamental 
constraints of having significant empirical content...must include the basic 
principle that a believer has some, but not ideal, logical ability‖ (Cherniak, 
1981, p.182).  
A creature whose belief system and actions adhered to all of these principles would 
represent the picture of ―perfect rationality‖ (Heal, 2008), taken by many researchers in 
the field of human reasoning and logic to be the normative ideal to which we, as 
rational agents, should aspire in our beliefs and actions. Even if we do not always 
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conform to these demands, our intentional behaviour can be defined and evaluated in 
reference to them (ibid. p.53).  
 
Whilst this picture of rationality may appear to belong in the domain of abstract logical 
calculi, Davidson goes some way towards encouraging the view that subscription to 
these kinds of principles is a condition of intentional agency: “these are principles 
shared by all creatures that have propositional attitudes or act intentionally” (Davidson, 
1985a, p.195). Commitment to rational principles may not always be manifested in an 
agent‘s behaviour but nonetheless they are principles an agent holds and aims to 
conform to. Recall that this distinction between actual behaviour and higher-order 
reflection on one‘s thoughts and behaviour is the basis for the distinction between 
conformity with and subscription to principles, which Davidson needs to retain in order 
to accommodate instances of irrationality within a rational framework. Principles are 
therefore taken to be explanatorily basic, because the rationality or irrationality of an 
agent‘s beliefs or behaviour can be explained in terms of his conformity or failure to 
conform to these principles. On this view it is because an agent ought to be consistent 
that he seeks to resolve obvious tensions in his beliefs, and generally intends to act 
consistently with what he believes.  
 
Appealing to principles can generate useful explanations for the irrationality of, for 
example, akrasia in the case of action. It is reasonable to have competing desires and 
part of the process of forming an intention and executing an action involves weighing 
these up against each other, but akratic action occurs when an agent acts contrary to 
his own best wishes, behaving, as it were, in spite of himself. What makes this action 
irrational? It is capable of being explained in intentional terms, perhaps by reference to 
conflicting desires the agent possesses. But if we appeal to the principle of continence 
which prescribes that an agent ought to perform the action that he does, all things 
considered, judge best, the irrationality becomes manifest: the agent has violated his 
own standard in failing to act according to his best judgement (Davidson, 1985a, p.193; 
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1982, p.174). I will argue below that understanding rationality in this way rests on a 
flawed assumption about the nature of the normative commitment entailed by being a 
rational agent. However, even taken at face value, any account of interpretation that is 
underpinned by an assumption that agents are broadly rational runs into particular 
difficulties if it is based on a principled conception of what rationality demands. 
What do Principles Demand? 
It is worth attempting to establish what the relevant principles of rationality are thought 
to be, and how they are supposed to function to impose constraints on interpretation 
and intentional ascription. I have already mentioned the conjunction rule, which follows 
from the extension rule of probability. Davidson himself refers to the principle of 
consistency, which derives from the law of non-contradiction, throughout his writing on 
rationality. He also considers the principles of Decision Theory to be necessary and 
adds “the basic principles of logic, the principle of total evidence for inductive 
reasoning, or the analogous principle of continence” (1985a, p.189) to the non-
exhaustive but demonstrative list.  
 
Compiling such a list of principles does not, however, help clarify what demands are 
imposed upon us as agents. For a start, it is not obvious precisely which principles of 
rationality can or should be applied in a given situation. Decision Theory relies upon the 
assumption that one may possess degrees of belief, ranging from confident assertion 
to scepticism or suspension of judgement; hence this perhaps implies that the canons 
of rationality should be expanded to include Bayesian notions about the degrees of 
probability assigned to beliefs. Furthermore, given that choice preferences are rarely 
made in isolation but instead might be strategic with respect to other individuals, 
perhaps the complex canons of game theory ought also to be included in the 
specification. Heal (2008) suggests there are numerous principles of logic that could be 
incorporated into the demands of rationality in addition to propositional and predicate 
calculi. But if such principles as these are accepted, we see the beginnings of a 
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proliferation: a vast array of canons of rationality could be argued for, without any clear 
distinction between what is necessary for intentional ascription and explanation and 
what is not. 
 
A further problem for the view that takes rationality to be codified in principles that can 
be straightforwardly applied in interpretation concerns the way that logical functions 
map transitions from a given set of premises to a conclusion. I have talked loosely of 
an agent‘s set of beliefs and desires, considering them as determinable starting 
premises upon which the dictates of rationality operate. If these dictates are to have 
traction on our behaviour, a determinate specification is required of what is referred to 
by the phrase ‗the set of an agent‘s beliefs and desires‘ in a particular instance (Heal, 
ibid.). However, I query whether it is possible to circumscribe this set of beliefs and 
desires for the purposes of seeking to establish what an agent rationally ought to 
believe or do. I will argue below that we are motivated to think that such a notion is 
meaningful by a mistaken view of the nature of our psychological makeup. For now, I 
wish to explore the implications this vaguely characterised obstacle has for a principled 
conception of rationality. Even if we could specify a set of starting premises there is no 
way of determining in advance what other factors will be relevant to the processes of 
forming and revising one‘s beliefs and intentions: the concerns we bring to a decision-
making process do not form a complete and closed system (Wiggins, 1975). Whatever 
the constraints of rationality are, they cannot be specified in a way that allows us to 
ascertain what they demand in a given situation: “the broad notion of rational 
coherence…does not seem to admit of precise conditions of application” (McLaughlin, 
1985, p.356).  
 
Thus the question of what one rationally ought to do or think in a particular set of 
circumstances cannot be settled by appeal to principles of rationality (e.g., Child, 1993, 
p.219). It is commonly presumed (see Stein, 1996) that any characterisation of the 
normative demands of rationality would have to provide a specific prescription about 
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what an agent rationally ought to do or believe on a particular occasion: a view of 
rationality as prescribing correct belief or action that is prevalent in the philosophical 
and psychological literature. I have already rehearsed the arguments for Bortolotti‘s 
claim that rationality, conceived of as this kind of prescription on what one ought to do 
or think, imposes an implausibly strong demand on interpretation and intentional 
explanation. Whilst I agree that codification in terms of principles fails, I do not consider 
that such codification is necessary in order to ascertain whether a given decision, belief 
or action is the one that ought to have been made, held or performed. In other words, 
codified principles are not what underpin the claim that there are normative constraints 
operating on intentional behaviour and interpretation. I will return to this question below 
when considering the nature of the normativity of rationality and the kinds of obligations 
entailed by agents in virtue of being intentional creatures. 
The Uncodifiability of Rationality 
In highly circumscribed domains such as in experimental tests of rational choice theory 
(developed from decision-theoretic approaches), the psychological variables implicated 
in decision-making or probability judgement are artificially controlled (Elster, 1984). In 
such cases it is clear what conformity to canons of rationality entails, for example 
through expressing transitive preferences or obeying the conjunction rule. However, in 
the context of ordinary interpretation, belief-desire pairs do not form closed systems 
devoid of relations to a whole network of other relevant psychological elements: a 
sentiment echoed by Heal‘s argument that “our thinking and desiring life does not go 
on in a form which allows the demands of deductive logic, decision theory and so on to 
get a direct and unproblematic grip on it” (2008, p.56). It may be that such principles 
enable intentional behaviour to be explained or accounted for in certain circumstances: 
there is no doubt that, for instance, the principle of consistency captures an important 
inductive generalisation about our beliefs and behaviour. But an appeal to principles of 
rationality cannot prescribe in advance what an agent rationally ought to do or think: 
“there are no a priori criteria of rationality” (Malpas, 1992, p.81). 
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These considerations gesture towards the view that the demands of rationality are 
uncodifiable81. This is the claim that it is not possible to derive a prescription of what it 
would be rational to do or think in a given set of circumstances from an appeal to 
principles of rationality. McDowell makes the parallel case in the domain of morality for 
denying the requirements of virtue are susceptible to codification: 
―[T]he best generalizations for how one should behave hold only for the most 
part. If one attempted to reduce one‘s conception of what virtue required to a 
set of rules, then…cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical 
application of the rules would strike one as wrong…one‘s mind on the matter 
was not susceptible to capture in any universal formula‖ (McDowell, 1979, 
p.336). 
If we wish to remain committed to the rational interpretationist thesis that the demands 
rationality do act as a necessary and constitutive constraint on interpretation, then the 
uncodifiability of rationality translates into the claim that there can be no principled 
determination of what intentional states an interpreter ought to attribute to an agent in 
order to make his behaviour and utterances intelligible (Child, 1993). In the language of 
the earlier discussion of Davidson‘s theory of interpretation, it looks as though there 
can be no specification of how Charity should be applied in practice. 
 
What is interesting about the uncodifiability thesis for rationality is that it does not 
appear to be susceptible to positive proof82. Rather, as a thesis about the constraints 
on interpretation and intentionality it is supported by negative claims that codification 
cannot provide an account of what rationality demands. In spite of his frequent 
reference to the necessity of principles of rationality, Davidson acknowledges the futility 
of attempting to formulate a formal theory of human reasoning in principled terms, 
citing his failure to do so as a reason for abandoning his career as an experimental 
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 Davidson exploits this claim in his account of Anomalous Monism, arguing that the 
uncodifiability of rationality entails there can be no psychophysical laws: the norms of rationality 
“have no echo in physical theory” (Davidson, 1973a, p.230). I will assume here that the 
normativity of rationality does preclude its reduction to principles given in physical-causal 
language, but it is not necessary for a defence of this position to embrace Davidson‘s 
contentious theory of psychophysical relations. 
82
 Although see McDowell (1984a) for a view that it might be. 
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psychologist (Davidson, 1973a, p.232). He thus agrees that what rationality requires is 
not amenable to complete codification:  
―I have greatly oversimplified by making it seem that there is a definite, and 
short, list of ―basic principles of rationality‖. There is no such list‖ (1985a, 
p.196). 
―There are no rules in any strict sense, as opposed to rough maxims and 
methodological generalizations‖ (1986a, p.446). 
―Rationality is…a normative notion which by its nature resists regimentation in 
accord with a single public standard‖ (1985b, p.245). 
―In neither case [theoretical or practical rationality] is there a fixed weighting or 
ordering of the competing considerations, or any definite rule for comparing 
them‖ (Child, 1993, p.222). 
Child (1993) draws an analogy with theory choice in science to clarify the thesis of 
uncodifiability, discussed most prominently by Kuhn (1970a). In comparing scientific 
theories, numerous values are brought to bear on the consideration of which theory it 
would be best or correct to adopt. A good theory is one that is parsimonious, accurate, 
consistent, fruitful in its explanations and broad in scope, to name but a few principles. 
Each of these features takes the form of criteria for assessing theories, the fulfilment of 
which count in favour of the theory. But judgements about the relative merits of 
different theories are not a matter of mechanically checking off these criteria, as they 
make different demands that need to be balanced and weighed up against one another 
and that may apply differently in different theories.  
 
An analogy from aesthetic judgement helps to clarify this point. Aesthetic principles 
such as beauty, elegance, simplicity and so forth may all be relevant considerations 
that enter into a judgement of the aesthetic worth of an object, but this value is not 
determined by deductively ascertaining how these principles apply to a situation83. In 
making an aesthetic judgement every detail of the situation is relevant, and incapable 
of being reduced to an evaluation of a mere subset of its features (Child, 1993). There 
are always numerous ceteris paribus clauses that could defeat the prescription of one 
particular principle in favour of another, hence there can be no account of what, all 
                                               
83
 Kuhn makes a similar point regarding the role of aesthetic values in forming the basis for 
comparison between scientific theories (1977). 
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things considered, the correct judgement derived from these principles could possibly 
be. We could extract a general principle of aesthetic taste by building in all the 
characteristics of a particular case but this would simply be a summary of the 
judgement in that case, incapable of being used to derive prescriptive guidance about 
each new case. We could not therefore provide the means of codifying general rules 
about aesthetic judgement or specify in virtue of what something could be deemed to 
be aesthetically good. Child draws out the analogy with rationality thus: “principles like 
that are not the materials for a codification of rationality; they are the results of applying 
the uncodifiable norms of rationality to a particular case” (ibid. p.224). Although such 
analogies are epistemological and therefore not directly comparable to the norms of 
rationality implicated in rational interpretationism, they lend credence to the idea, to be 
developed in this chapter, that constraints need not be codified in order to guide 
judgements normatively. 
Uncodifability and Objective Standards 
The principled conception of rationality purported to provide abstract, universal 
standards, conformity with which could be determined in any given situation. One of the 
key motivations for seeking principles is that considerations of what rationality 
demands may appear to be less objective unless the canons of rationality are 
codifiable (Child, ibid. p.221). What implications does an acknowledgement of the 
uncodifiability of rationality therefore have for the claim that there are objective 
normative constraints on interpretation and intentionality? If uncodifiability entails that it 
is not possible to generate a normative prescription specifying what an agent rationally 
ought to believe or do in a given situations, it is not clear that there is anything that 
could be called a normative constraint exerting an effect either on intentional behaviour 
or interpretation. Moreover, if we cannot derive a statement about how one rationally 
ought to behave, the normative force of rationality loses its impetus. Bortolotti (2004b) 
exploits this fact to great effect by pointing out an apparent flaw in the interpretationist 
theory of the conditions of belief ascription: failure to articulate what rationality 
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demands in a given case means that there is no normative ideal in place against which 
an agent‘s behaviour can be judged or evaluated. Lacking any clear specification of 
what the correct or appropriate behaviour in the given situation would be, how can we 
say whether a piece of behaviour is rational or irrational? 
 
Following this line of thought, if the norms of rationality are not codifiable and this 
uncodifiability threatens their objectivity, then whatever standards do govern 
evaluations of rationality could in principle differ between people, communities and 
populations, being relative to each particular group. I have suggested that rational 
interpretationism undermines this conceptual possibility, but I have not yet offered a 
substantial argument to support this view of the normative structure of intentionality and 
interpretation. On a relativist conception of the demands of rationality, it is empirically 
possible that the reasoning processes, conditions governing the formation of beliefs 
and intentions, the weighing up of evidence and the processes of decision-making 
could all potentially diverge between different groups of people. In this respect 
rationality would be akin to a set of values that guide what one would think of as 
reasonable or appropriate in a given situation. However, I will argue that the plausibility 
of such relativism about rational standards rests upon a misconception about the 
normativity of rationality, because there are limits to the intelligible hanging together of 




Language Use and Belief 
To address the question of whether or not normative standards of rationality are 
objective and to ascertain how they could be characterised, I turn now to a discussion 
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of Wittgenstein‘s famous rule-following considerations84. In the Philosophical 
Investigations (1953) Wittgenstein queries what it is to mean something by a word and 
how this is connected with the way it is used by a speaker. In doing so he suggests that 
using a word correctly is akin to following a rule that specifies the correct conditions of 
that word‘s application85. The focus of these initial remarks and the vast secondary 
literature they have spawned, in particular Kripke‘s (1982) influential treatment, is on 
linguistic usage and meaning which, although relevant to interpretation, is not directly 
applicable to the discussion at hand86. Nonetheless, here I aim to provide a brief 
exposition of the problematic regarding linguistic meaning and to consider the parallels 
between grasping the conditions for the correct application of a rule and the conditions 
on the attribution of intentional states. I shall extract some general insights about rule-
following from the original context in which they were made, in order to apply them to 
considerations of how rationality might exert a normative constraint on our behaviour 
and interpretive practices87.  
 
Much of the discussion about what it is to follow a rule can be brought to bear on the 
question of whether there is any essential normative obligation entailed by the 
possession and ascription of intentional states. In elucidating the way in which the 
meanings of words impose conditions of correctness or appropriateness on linguistic 
moves, I argue that it is a mistake to consider that the only way a normative constraint 
can function is via a codification of its demands in terms of rules or principles. This 
insight carries implications for our understanding of what rationality requires and how it 
ought to be construed, and in the course of this discussion, I attempt to correct the 
                                               
84
 It is misleading to suggest that there is a definitive interpretation of Wittgenstein‘s remarks on 
this subject. At best, we can point to a set of philosophical problems raised without claiming to 
provide an exegesis of Wittgenstein‘s own view (Schulte, 2008). 
85
 McDowell and Pettit jointly argue that Wittgenstein should be understood as advocating the 
normativity of mental content: “mental activity is undertaken under the aspect of allegiance to 
norms” (Kusch, 2006, p.51). 
86
 Pettit argues that the capacity to follow rules is not only a condition of possibility for speech, it 
is also necessary for thought (1990, p.5). 
87
 Wittgenstein draws attention to the topic of interpretation in §§205-207 and refers back his 
earlier remarks on rule-following. He also employs something akin to the notion of a radical 
interpreter to cast light on meaning and intentionality. 
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mistaken assumption about the normative force of principles that underpins the 
apparent forced choice between the codification of rationality and relativism about 
rational norms. The crucial question here is whether there are non-principled standards 
of rationality that form an intrinsic condition of possibility for interpretation, or whether 
interpretation and intentional ascription are contingent only on standards that are 
constructed and constituted by consensus within a particular community. I will claim 
that freed of the misconception exposed by the rule-following considerations, the 
rational interpretationist thesis is in a far stronger position as an account of 
intentionality and interpretation. 
Wittgenstein‟s Rule-Following Considerations 
There are normative constraints on what we ought to say if we are to use a word or 
deploy a concept appropriately or correctly. In §§138-242 of the Investigations 
Wittgenstein draws attention to a philosophical tension between the way that we use 
words and our ability to understand their meaning88. When we understand words we 
appear to grasp them “in a flash” (§139), as though something is instantly presented to 
the mind, but at the same time we think of meaning as being determined by use, which 
is extended in time (§138). In this latter respect, the use one makes of a word is what 
McGinn refers to as a ―criterion‖ for what one means by it (1997, p.74). On the one 
hand therefore, grasping linguistic meaning looks like having a kind of mental state but 
on the other, such understanding seems to consist in an ongoing obligation towards 
picking out the right conditions of application for the term. The problem Wittgenstein 
identifies is that of how to reconcile these two intuitive aspects of what it is to mean 
something by a word: how can one‘s sudden grasp of the meaning of a term also 
provide a normative constraint as to how one should go on in the future?89 What is 
                                               
88
 All citations of sections (§) will refer to the Philosophical Investigations (1953) unless 
otherwise indicated. 
89 Many commentators (Thornton, 2005; Luntley, 2003, p.115-9; Pettit, 1990; McDowell, 1984b) 
have taken it that this normative obligation is not merely contingent on a desire to be 
understood by others, but rather is fundamental to the meaning of the term used. This obligation 
is therefore made “on pain of failure to obey the dictates of the meaning we have grasped” 
(McDowell, 1984b, p.325), suggesting that meaning itself is intrinsically normative. Critics of the 
semantic normativity thesis such as Kusch (2006) and Hattiangadi (2006) argue nothing intrinsic 
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perhaps most puzzling about this philosophically charged difficulty is that we do grasp 
meanings and know how to apply terms correctly, often without difficulty or even 
conscious effort90. Therefore the question arises as to how this is possible: what kind of 
entity could satisfy the condition of being both graspable and applying to an indefinitely 
large set of cases? 
 
Wittgenstein develops this question by considering understanding meaning as an 
instance of rule-following. It is natural to think of the constraints on using words 
correctly as rules that guide our actions and utterances, in the sense that it is possible 
to specify what action, utterance or behaviour would be in accord or fail to be in accord 
with that rule. There are numerous and detailed technical accounts exploring what a 
rule consists in (e.g., Pettit, 1990) but for present purposes it will suffice to pick out a 
couple of features of an intuitive lay concept of a rule that will bear relevance to my 
focus on the normativity of rationality. Firstly, a rule prescribes conditions of its correct 
application. When we apply the concept ‗green‘, for example, we can be said to be 
following a rule regarding the use of the concept: if we apply the concept only to things 
that are green and not to those that are not green, we have succeeded in using the 
concept correctly. Similarly if I use the word ‗green‘ there is something I mean by that; I 
am communicating an intention. McDowell suggests that it is entirely plausible to “think 
of meaning…in…contractual terms” (1984b, p.221), highlighting the sense of obligation 
one feels when attempting to use a word in the right way. In a semantic context this 
means that following a rule entails knowing how to apply the term correctly, for 
example by picking out the correct referent. In a decision-making context rule-following 
amounts to identifying what options or subset of options it would be correct or 
                                                                                                                                         
to meaning renders it normative. However, the implications of the view of rationality and the 
constitutive interdependence of belief and meaning I will adopt position my views in the former 
camp, committing to the thesis that meaning is indeed normative. 
90
 We can reflect on Wittgenstein‘s use of philosophy as a non-revisionary and therapeutic 
exercise: “Philosophy…leaves everything as it is” (§124). In everyday interaction we are 
confident in our use of words and our ability to understand another‘s intended communication. It 
is only philosophical theorising about meaning and rule-following that is being queried here. 
Indeed, it takes a degree of philosophical training to even find difficulties such as Wittgenstein‘s 
puzzlement in §138 and §139 compelling (Kusch, 2006, p.4). 
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appropriate to choose91. This feature of rules is reflected in the principled conception of 
rationality: obeying the dictates of certain principles entails believing or intending what 
one ought to in a given situation.  
 
The obligation implicated in the idea of following a rule projects beyond actual 
examples or instances of its application: it seems to provide “rails invisibly laid to 
infinity” (§218) that show us how to go on in future cases. A rule determines a 
potentially infinite number of moves made in accord with it. In the case of meaning, the 
rule provides a measure against which to judge one‘s linguistic behaviour as correct or 
incorrect. However, the extension of these correctness conditions may not be 
specifiable in advance of a particular instance of application92. For example, it is not 
possible to specify the complete set of circumstances in which the normal use of a 
particular word such as ‗chair‘ may apply. Certain rules may be circumscribed to a 
specific situation such as within the context of a game93. Even here however, for 
example in a game of chess, whilst the number of possible moves that satisfy the rule 
for a rook is potentially calculable, it is in effect indefinite for the purposes of human 
comprehension. The rule therefore acts as an abstract function that operates on certain 
inputs such as a set of premises or a particular word or concept, to produce as an 
output a specification of the correct or appropriate decision, or application of the term 
or concept. Referring to this as the ―rule-in-intension‖, Pettit (1990, p.3) suggests that 
this concept of a rule is more pre-philosophically familiar to us as a graspable abstract 
object: a concept, property or universal that somehow identifies conditions of its own 
correct application. 
                                               
91
 ―Appropriateness‖ may be constituted by norms of etiquette, prudence, pragmatism, justice or 
any other normative standard to which behaviour could be said to conform, such that the 
constraint “should tell me what I ought to do” (Kripke, 1982, p.24). 
92
 Pettit refers to the exhaustive set of correctness conditions as the ―rule-in-extension‖ (1990, 
p.3). It would obviously not be possible to grasp any such infinitely large set identifying the 
meaning of a word. 
93
 The analogy with games should not be taken literally as it implies that rules of language are 
fixed and definite. In §81 Wittgenstein suggests that the source of misunderstanding about 
language and meaning that he goes on to consider derives from thinking of using a language in 
terms of playing a game operating with a calculus according to definite rules that form an ‗ideal‘ 
standard. His view of language as a calculus was prominent in the Tractatus, but here he is 
suggesting that such a view is mistaken. 
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This sense of indefinite applicability can be drawn out by considering the case of the 
stubborn pupil being taught to continue a mathematical series, which Wittgenstein 
revisits in §185 and elsewhere (e.g., Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 
1956, hereafter RFM). Having been given the instruction to ―add 2‖, the correct 
application of this rule requires expanding the series by adding 2 at each step 
(0,2,4,6,8…n). In this sense, to say one is following the rule is to say that one is 
committed to a certain pattern of continuation (Wright, 1980, p.21). Obeying the rule 
seems to be a matter of tracing out what is, in a sense, already there (Bloor, 1973, 
p.181). Understanding the rule requires grasping how one ought to go on, and it is the 
aim of Wittgenstein‘s dialectic on rule-following to consider how it is possible to do this 
and to get the pattern of usage correct94. 
 
This brings us to the important second feature of the concept of a rule: that it is 
possible to be in error about its correct application. No matter how certain that one has 
grasped the rule correctly, this does not provide an epistemic guarantee that one has 
got its obligations right (Pettit, 1990, p.3). One can be mistaken about the meaning of a 
word and apply it inappropriately: if one could not fail to follow a rule there is no sense 
in which one‘s behaviour could be deemed correct or appropriate. It is therefore only 
because it is possible to fail to conform to a rule that it makes sense to talk about 
behaviour and utterances in normative terms. In being part of a linguistic community 
there are ways in which one is obliged to speak or act in order to be understood, and 
one‘s linguistic behaviour may be in accordance with or against certain rules. Violating 
these rules entails one‘s utterances may not be understood95. There are many rules of 
language use that are matters of social convention, prudence, pragmatism, justice and 
                                               
94
 Although Wright suggests we do this by a process of ―cottoning on‖  (Wright, 1980, p.216) to 
the pattern a teacher is attempting to convey, Wittgenstein seems to oppose this as an 
explanation when his interlocutor (typically set up as articulating a position to which Wittgenstein 
is opposed) suggests this understanding is a matter of guessing the essential drift of 
explanations (§210). 
95
 One may of course violate these rules intentionally in order to deceive, to provide a humorous 
context, to be insincere, etc. The point is that in such cases it is only because we are using 
words incorrectly that these intentions can succeed. 
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so forth, but what the rule-following considerations expose is that grasping the 
meanings of words can itself entail some normative obligation towards their correct 
use. 
 
The most forceful objection to the claim that we can and do follow rules in using a term 
correctly comes from Kripke‘s (1982) influential sceptical challenge, which has framed 
a substantial debate around the normativity of meaning. I do not wish to provide an 
exegesis of Kripke‘s interpretation of Wittgenstein‘s remarks nor of his attempts to 
recover the notion of meaning from a position of scepticism. Rather, I am concerned 
here to use the challenge Kripke poses to shed light on the nature of the normative 
obligations entailed by using a term and on how one is justified in claiming that one 
remains faithful to its correct use. The challenge elaborated by Kripke aims to 
undermine the pre-philosophically intuitive fact that one can mean something by a word 
one uses. He asks what kind of fact could constitute a person‘s following a rule (ibid. 
p.11). In line with Pettit (1990) I will shift the emphasis from facts about a person to a 
consideration of what kind of thing could constitute a rule, given that my focus here is 
on the nature of normative constraints of meaning and how these could be 
characterised. Taking the usage of the addition function ‗+‘ to be typical of a rule, 
Kripke queries whether there is anything about one‘s past behaviour and intentions to 
use ‗+‘ when performing mathematical additions that determines the correct answer, 
the answer that one ought to give, to a novel addition calculation. What makes it the 
case that by using the ‗+‘ function one means to perform an addition, such that the 
correct response to the question ‘68 + 57 =?‘ is the value ‗125‘ (Kripke, 1982, p.8)? 
Presuming that one has never performed that particular calculation in the past, how 
can one tell that what one is doing now (using the ‗+‘ function) accords with what one 
was doing in the past?  
 
Wittgenstein points out that trying to determine how a rule exerts a constraint on one‘s 
behaviour is a matter of logical as opposed to causal determination: “How am I able to 
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obey a rule?”- if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for 
my following the rule in the way I do” (§217). Any account of one‘s behaviour that cites 
one‘s dispositions, perhaps inculcated through education, cannot account for why a 
certain response is correct and others are incorrect (Kripke, ibid. p.24). Appealing to 
the fact that one intends to go on in the same way as one has been disposed to in the 
past also begs the question against what ‗same‘ means in this context, given that it is a 
novel calculation96.  
 
The sceptical conclusion Kripke derives from this argument is pitched at both 
epistemological and metaphysical levels97. The epistemological issue concerns how 
one can be certain or confident about the answers one gives when one is purporting to 
use the addition function (ibid. p.8; Kusch, 2006, p.14). Kripke argues that there are no 
facts about one‘s previous actions, intentions or utterances that one can appeal to in 
order to justify the claim that one is following a particular rule: “…it seems that no 
matter what is in my mind at a given time, I am free in the future to interpret it in 
different ways” (Kripke, ibid. p.107). No matter how consistent one‘s use of the ‗+‘ 
function has been in the past, there is no epistemic guarantee that one is following the 
rule of addition as opposed to some deviant function. Crucially however, there is a 
metaphysical consequence to this sceptical argument: any cited fact cannot possibly 
constitute my meaning something by the function ‗+‘ such that it could guide or dictate 
my future use of the term. No fact constitutes my having attached one meaning to this 
term ‗+‘ rather than another (McDowell, 1984b, p.329) and if there is no fact of the 
matter at stake the sentence does not express a proposition: it is not truth conditional98. 
                                               
96
 Kripke presses this point by suggesting that one may actually be following a different function 
of ‗quus‘, which deviates from the plus function for (arbitrarily) numbers greater than 57, thus 
issuing the challenge to explain in virtue of what one can claim to be using ‗plus‘ rather than 
‗quus‘ or any other deviant function in performing the calculation. 
97
 Kripke argues for scepticism about meaning based on epistemological grounds, somewhat 
like Quine‘s argument for the indeterminacy of meaning (Miller, 1998, p.154). 
98
 Commentators such as Dummett have argued that Wittgenstein does indeed reject a truth-
conditional conception of meaning in the Investigations, marking a significant shift away from his 
previous views in the Tractatus (Dummett, 1959). 
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Therefore, the sceptical argument concludes “[t]here can be no such thing as meaning 
anything by any word” (Kripke, ibid. p.55). 
 
Although it is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine the implications of 
Kripke‘s sceptical conclusion, the form of his argument is relevant to our current 
concerns. In attempting to specify what a normative constraint on one‘s linguistic 
behaviour might look like, Kripke searches for a fact about a person that could 
constitute his obligation to go on in a certain way. Bearing in mind that what is at stake 
is the determination of the very meanings of words, a speaker cannot justify why he 
goes on in one way rather than another (using ‗plus‘ rather than ‗quus‘) by adverting to 
his intention to ‗add‘, or to say that he is performing a ‗counting‘ function, since both 
appeals are subject to the original sceptical attack. There is nothing to justify the claim 
that one is performing the functions of ‗adding‘ or ‗counting‘ rather than some other 
similar-looking function (ibid. p.21). Without a way to specify what the correct 
interpretation of these words is that is independent of a rule prescribing their 
application (and hence invulnerable to a sceptical challenge as to what they mean), 
one‘s search for justification falls prey to a vicious regress of interpretations. Whatever 
“mental furniture”, to use McDowell‘s phrase (1998, p.226), one cites to claim that one 
is using ‗+‘ correctly, the sceptic can point to other consistent interpretations of one‘s 
pattern of use, thereby requiring one to appeal to a further interpretation to fix what one 
understood the rule to entail. If a rule stands like a signpost (§85) indicating the 
direction in which one ought to go, understanding the direction itself requires an 
interpretation to explain how one ought to read it: “any interpretation hangs in the air 
along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support” (§198).  
 
If we are to follow the sceptical line of reasoning, the only way the regress could be 
halted would be by an interpretation that ensures the connection between the 
instruction given by a rule and its being successfully applied in practice. Wittgenstein 
refers to the kind of entity that could fulfil this role as a ―superlative fact‖ (§192), which 
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is a “self-standing source of significance” (Finkelstein, 2000, p.54), and he 
acknowledges that we have no model for what kind of thing this might be. McDowell 
considers that an account resting on the notion of a ―super-rigid‖ self-interpreting 
abstract entity makes our ability to adhere to rules look mysterious and supernatural. 
Succumbing to this ―rampant platonism‖ (1994, p.92), we cannot account for how the 
normative structure of meaning impacts on use and constrains our linguistic behaviour, 
since there is no way of specifying how such an entity, laying down rails in a Platonic 
heaven (McGinn, 1997, p.107), could engage with our finite minds. Furthermore, on a 
sceptical reading, the connection between a rule and its application cannot be 
grounded in the idea that some normative compulsion takes hold of us. Supplying 
conditions in virtue of which a term is correctly applied does not fulfil the role of 
showing us how we ought to use that term in practice: stating the rule does not itself do 
any normative work. Any attempts to locate this normativity through seeking to justify 
the connection between the rule and its correct use by appeal to a further interpretation 
lead to a regress that leaves our capacities to follow rules and conform to their 
normative prescriptions looking mysterious (Wright, 2002, p.151). Thus the 
epistemology of a Platonic conception of rule-following (and by implication, of meaning, 
logic and mathematics, which are prime candidates for being rule-governed) is circular 
(Bloor, 1973). 
 
Without a model for this kind of fact, on Kripke‘s account we are forced into scepticism 
about the notion of meaning something by a word. The implication for our present 
concerns is this: if a rule does not itself compel its correct conditions of application, 
then there appears to be nothing constraining our use of the rule at all: “if everything 
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. 
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here” (§201). For Kripke this entails 
that any normative standard that does guide or constrain the correct use of a term is 
not something that is intrinsic to using that word. Whilst there are myriad implications of 
the nuanced and complex view of meaning following from this claim, his resultant 
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account contains the central idea that the correct use of a term is determined only by a 
kind of communal agreement within a linguistic community99. The justification 
conditions for saying that someone has used a word correctly or uttered a meaningful 
sentence are a matter of the acceptance by and consensus with others, because such 
conditions cannot be intrinsic to an individual‘s grasp of the word‘s meaning.  
 
In one respect accounts of meaning derived from a sceptical standpoint do identify 
something intuitively correct about language use: that the meanings of words are 
flexible and subject to change over time depending on how they are used by members 
of a community. However, scepticism about meaning inevitably opens the door to the 
kind of relativist worry mentioned previously: if the rules determining the correct use of 
words have no objective justification, there is no obstacle to the idea that different 
communities might have no mutual ground or common co-ordinate system of reference 
from which to interpret the utterances of the speaker of an unfamiliar language. 
 
5.3. RULES AND RATIONALITY 
A Mistaken Dilemma 
Cast in this light, the dichotomy between the codification of rational standards of belief 
and the suggestion that they are relative to a community can be given philosophical 
substance by understanding it as an instance of the apparent dilemma about linguistic 
meaning raised by the rule-following considerations. Whilst Wittgenstein asks after 
what it is to grasp the meaning of a word and use it correctly, I am here interested in 
establishing what it is to possess a belief and know what follows from it. In seeking to 
ascertain what it is to use a word correctly according to its meaning, Wittgenstein 
invokes the notion that one follows a rule specifying its correct application. But in 
attempting to explain the connection between the rule and a prescription of these 
                                               
99
 There are numerous variations of this idea. Kripke retains scepticism about meaning while 
salvaging correctness conditions for a term‘s application from the idea of communal assent, 
while Wright (1984) attempts to recover the notion of meaning itself by arguing that it is 
constituted by shared agreement.  
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conditions, there is no foundational justification to be found and, on a Kripkean reading, 
an infinite regress of interpretations looms. This results in a forced dilemma between 
mysterious rampant platonism and a Kripkean scepticism that there is anything at all 
fixing the correct conditions of application for the rule. There are clear parallels here 
with the problem of characterising what rationality demands if it is construed in terms of 
subscription to rational principles. If we take it that to be rational is a matter of 
subscribing to principles of rationality, then the challenge lies in explaining how 
subscription connects the principle with moves made in accord with it, the moves that 
would enable the beliefs attributed to the agent to be deemed rational. Take, for 
instance, the claim that one subscribes to the principle of consistency. The principle 
can be described as a rule, prescribing conditions under which it would be correctly 
applied in a given situation. What connects the rule (consistency) with the conditions of 
its correct application? How would we know that a set of beliefs conform to this rule 
and how would we know it had been applied correctly100?  
 
Drawing on the analogy with Wittgenstein‘s insights into rules of linguistic meaning, any 
explanation of this connection seems to require a further interpretation to support it: if 
we appeal to the idea that by ‗consistency‘ we mean having beliefs that do not logically 
contradict, a sceptical argument would seize upon this interpretation and query what 
justifies our intended application of this concept of ‗contradiction‘, and so on. Unless we 
can posit some self-interpreting Platonic ―superlative fact‖ to explain the connection 
between the principles of rationality and how they are correctly applied, the normative 
obligations they place on our beliefs, behaviour and utterances seem mysterious and 
inexplicable101: “in rampant Platonism, the rational structure within which meaning 
                                               
100
 Wright develops a strong conventionalism in response to this question with respect to 
mathematical inferences, arguing that one‘s present judgements that one sincerely meant the 
same thing (‗plus‘) in the past determine that one did in fact mean the same thing: one‘s present 
judgements are stipulations, and these fill the role played by interpretations for Kripke (Wright, 
1980). As shall become clear, I consider this move to be a sceptical solution to a dilemma that 
need not arise in the first place 
101
 In commenting on McDowell‘s articulation of the Platonist supposition, Charles Taylor argues 
that such a view paves the way for much of our thinking about the mind even now, citing 
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comes into view is independent of anything merely human, so that the capacity of our 
minds to resonate to it looks occult or magical” (McDowell, 1994, p.92). 
 
If the sceptical reading of rule-following is right, attempts to understand rational 
interpretationism in terms of subscription to rational principles are doomed to failure, 
either leaving the normative constraints exerted by those principles unexplained, or 
conceding that there is nothing necessary about adherence to such principles. This 
brings us to the alternative conception of normative standards on the sceptical view. If 
the rule or principle itself cannot compel a particular (correct) application, our use of it 
appears unconstrained and there is no intrinsic normative prescription governing what 
it is to act in accordance with it. This implies that whatever standards are in play when 
we interpret an agent, they are not disciplined by any universally shared criteria. Just 
as communitarian responses to a Kripkean reading of Wittgenstein (e.g., Williams, 
1991; Wright, 1984) cite the consensus of a linguistic community as providing the 
standard of correctness by which word use should be judged, so too would standards 
of rationality be contingent on the shared agreement of a community.  
 
Recall that the relativist concern mooted the possibility of radically different standards 
of rationality: that what counts as a reason might be idiosyncratic to one individual or 
group and not intelligible to others as being a reason. There might be differences 
between the normative structure of intentional behaviour and language of an agent and 
an interpreter, in which case the interpreter would not be in a position to make 
normative judgements about the agent‘s behaviour. The motivation for adopting 
relativism about rational standards arises if one takes seriously the implications of the 
kind of scepticism developed by Kripke about meaning. Without any justification for the 
connection between holding a particular belief and the behaviour that ought to follow 
from this belief, it appears that whatever standard there might be is one imposed only 
                                                                                                                                         
cognitive psychology as resting on both ontological and methodological assumptions that the 
mind is a mechanical part of nature constituted by atomistic elements (Taylor, 2002, p.110). 
 183 
by a contingent consensus with others. If this is the correct way to understand 
interpretation, then it does indeed invite the question as to what guarantees that the 
norms of the interpreter match up with the constitutive norms governing the agent‘s 
own processes of belief formation and possession. There is thus a potential for radical 
divergence between interpreter and agent in standards that govern the application of 
intentional concepts. This entails that there may simply be different ways of going on in 
the world, which are not susceptible to normative judgement from outside that 
particular community. By this I mean that there may be such fundamentally different 
ways of going on, of individuating objects and events, using words and speaking a 
language, and of relating beliefs to actions, utterances and other intentional states, that 
there is no possibility that one set or group of people could form judgements about the 
intentional behaviour and utterances of agents outside of their own linguistic 
community. On this view, normativity is extrinsic to the concepts of meaning and belief, 
imposed only by the contingencies of shared agreement. Thus a community could be 
thought to possess language and exhibit intentional behaviour, but the standards 
governing the correct or appropriate moves are particular to that community. 
 
We therefore appear to be forced onto the second horn of the sceptical dilemma in 
attempting to explain how normative standards exert a constraint on intentional 
behaviour and interpretation. In denying that interpretation is underpinned by a 
necessary assumption of subscription to objective, codified principles or standards of 
rationality, we seem to have no choice but to accept that what normatively constrains 
the application of intentional concepts is contingent upon the agreed standards of a 
particular community. Furthermore, two potential intractable problems arise for 
interpretation, depending on the extent of the differences between communities. If, as 
is empirically plausible on this view, two communities differ radically in their systems of 
concepts and the kinds of connections that obtain between their utterances and 
actions, their ways of going on in the world will be incommensurable, and the behaviour 
and language used by members of one community would be unintelligible to the 
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other102. If, on the other hand, there is some overlap between the agreed judgements 
that constitute the communities‘ rational standards, the behaviour of each may be 
intelligible as being intentional, but nonetheless problematic for interpretation. 
Interpretation of individuals outside one‘s own community would necessarily involve 
imposing one‘s own standards onto behaviour that may in fact be normatively governed 
by very different constraints. Such an outcome clearly has implications for the 
possibilities of reliably and accurately attributing intentional states and interpreting 
utterances without cultural bias or rational prejudice about what it would be correct or 
appropriate to say, believe, intend or do. 
The Master Thesis 
We do not, however, need to embark upon the route of scepticism about meaning, and 
the diagnosis of misconception here bears relevance to the particular view of mentality 
and the constitution of mental states that I have been advocating. McDowell argues 
that the motivation behind thinking that we are forced onto the horns of the dilemma 
between Platonism and scepticism in the first place derives from a Cartesian dogma 
that the mind is populated with items that stand like sign-posts without need of 
interpretation (McDowell, 1998, p.264). If the identity of mental states does not depend 
on their normative relatedness to the world and to each other, it is mysterious how they 
could possess intentionality at all, and indeed it is this vulnerability that the sceptic 
exploits in formulating the regress of interpretations.  
 
Beliefs, desires and so forth impose a standard by which the world can be judged: a 
wish, for instance, is something that certain states of affairs in the world would satisfy, 
and its content can be identified by describing the conditions under which the wish 
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 A previously mentioned analogy in the philosophy of science helps clarify the more radical 
implications of this view. If there is no common, theory-neutral vocabulary and system of 
reference through which to co-ordinate the comparison of successive scientific theories then 
incommensurability between the theories results (Kuhn, 1970b, p.267). Without such a 
vocabulary we have no way of grounding or co-ordinating different schemes. This appears to 
lend support to the conclusion that there may be radically different and incommensurable ways 
of conceptualising and going on in the world, which cannot be normatively judged or even 
perceived as intelligible from outside. 
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would be fulfilled. McDowell argues that this intentionality of mental states cannot be 
explained or accounted for if there is nothing intrinsically world-involving about them, 
because if these states are only contingently related to the world this connection would 
need to be made via an interpretation, thus precipitating the sceptical regress. A 
conception of the mental realm as consisting in free-standing entities makes their 
intentionality mysterious, and requiring of a substantial philosophical theory to bridge 
the gap: “within the Cartesian picture there is a serious question about how it can be 
that experience…is not blank or blind” (McDowell, 1986, p.152). The close parallel with 
Wittgenstein‘s charting of the apparent tension between a rule and its conditions of 
application is clear: such mental entities are akin to sign-posts that stand in need of 
interpretation (Thornton, 2005, p.41). But this puzzlement is an artefact of a self-
inflicted philosophical anxiety (Horwich, 2005) through which we are tempted, 
illegitimately, to postulate some kind of inner mental mechanism to underpin our ability 
to practically grasp a rule (Lear & Stroud, 1984, p.226). McDowell attributes the 
temptation to conceive of mentality in this way to the success of explanation in the 
natural sciences and the superficially plausible attempt to incorporate our 
understanding of psychology within a naturalistic framework, using the vocabulary and 
concepts of the physical-causal sciences. He refers to this conception of the mind as 
the ―master thesis‖, and its rejection underpins his broader project of attempting to 
ease philosophical anxieties about the world-directedness of empirical content103 
(passim., but especially McDowell, 1994).  
 
Rejecting the master thesis points the way towards resolving the apparent tension 
between grasping a rule and correctly applying it, which finds its clearest expression in 
Wittgenstein‘s assertion that “there is a way of grasping a rule that is not an 
interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying the rule” and “going 
                                               
103
 This project forms the central aim of McDowell‘s Mind and World (1994), in which he argues 
for a ―partially re-enchanted‖ conception of nature that non-reductively incorporates normative 
relations. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this discussion to chart the complexities of this view, 
McDowell‘s point that despite the intelligibility of rational relations being sui generis they can 
nonetheless form part of a naturalistic framework is well taken. 
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against it” in actual cases” (§201, emphasis in original). The tension is generated by a 
philosophical anxiety about the justification we have for interpreting a rule in one 
‗correct‘ way rather than another, but in rejecting the idea that the rule can only exert a 
constraint on behaviour via an interpretation, we avoid being swayed by the sceptical 
concern. It is only if we think of intentional states as atomistic, free-standing entities 
that a puzzle arises as to how they could bear normative relations to one another and 
to the world. If, however, we recognise the essential normative relatedness of 
intentional states, this need for a bridge between the content-bearing entities and the 
normative standards to which they conform dissolves. 
 
What implication does this diagnosis of the error motivating the sceptical dilemma have 
for my primary concern with establishing how normative constraints may operate on 
our interpretive practices and intentional behaviour? The purpose of this foray into rule-
following has been to diagnose misconceptions about the demands of rationality, which 
create the anxiety that it is only through a set of principles that any objective normative 
constraint on interpretation and intentionality could be exerted. The negative lessons of 
the rule-following considerations support the claim that rationality is not a contingent 
feature of interpretation that can be laid like a grid over intentional behaviour as a 
heuristic to aid our understanding and explanations of an agent‘s actions and 
utterances, but is rather intrinsic to the concepts of intentionality. 
 
Before considering whether any positive account of rationality could be given once we 
are cured of the sceptical illusion, I wish to examine why a principled notion of 
rationality might be compelling in the first place. Certainly the appeal to principles has 
been central to the way rationality has often been articulated, as well as being a focus 
for attacks on the claim that rationality is necessary for interpretation. Given both the 
uncodifiability of rationality and the analogous arguments from rule-following I have 
outlined here, it is perhaps surprising that a principled conception of rationality has held 
sway as a model of human thought for so long. I now turn to examine the reasons for 
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this predominance and aim to undermine its tenability by dissolving a misunderstanding 
about the source of normative force upon which it is based. 
The Normative Force of Principles 
Conceptualising rationality in terms of principles to which agents subscribe is not 
entirely without merit. Indeed, powerful insights into human reasoning psychology have 
only been possible through experimental setups in which tests of conformity to or 
violation of a principle of rationality have framed the research methodology. I am not 
seeking to undermine the practical or theoretical utility of capturing generalisations 
about how we reason intentionally act. I am instead claiming that to take the view that 
agents are rational in virtue of their subscription to such principles is to misunderstand 
where the normative force of rationality arises. The principled conception of rationality 
as a necessary constraint on interpretation and interpretability implies that the 
principles themselves are supposed to provide justification for a determination of the 
intentional descriptions under which an agent‘s behaviour falls. But if the insights 
gleaned from Wittgenstein‘s examination of rule-following are correct, the principles do 
not themselves carry any normative force outside the context in which they are used. If 
construed as abstract force-makers, they cannot serve the explanatory role ascribed to 
them: either the obligation to conform to them is a mysterious Platonic fact about our 
psychology, or the standards are just contingent on their adoption by a particular 
community. 
 
Davidson recognises the challenge that arises from appealing to principles as 
normatively compelling, citing the fact that such an appeal begs the question against 
why we ought to conform to them (Davidson, 1985a). This is a question about the 
justification of the Rationality Requirement that one ought to be rational in one‘s beliefs, 
utterances and actions. Lewis Carroll‘s (1895) tale of Achilles and the tortoise provides 
a lesson about the appeal to principles of logic for both the justification and explanation 
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of the correct course of action issuing from the observance of a rule104. The example 
serves to demonstrate why this appeal is invalid and points the way towards an 
alternative way of conceiving of the demands of rationality that does not rest on the 
requirement of self-interpreting principles for justification. 
 
The scenario is set up thus: Achilles and the tortoise, characters reminiscent of one of 
Zeno‘s paradoxes, are discussing the relations between a set of propositions. 
Following Carroll, I call these ‗A‘ to denote a universal generalisation, equivalent to a 
principle; ‗B‘ to denote an antecedent premise; and ‗Z‘ to denote the consequent, which 
follows from the conjunction of A and B. The inference can be described thus: 
 A:  ‗if p  q‘ (the generalisation) 
 B:  ‗p‘  (the antecedent) 
 Z: ‗therefore q‘ (the consequent) 
The tortoise facetiously queries whether there might exist a person who accepts the 
truth of A and B but denies Z. Having acknowledged that such a person might exist, the 
challenge set for Achilles by the tortoise is to “force [him] logically, to accept Z as true” 
(ibid. p.278). Why must it be the case that the consequent is true? Achilles‘ strategy is 
to introduce a conditional ‗C‘ specifying the relation between A, B and Z, namely that if 
A and B are true then Z is true. Having written this down in addition to the other 
premises, Achilles falls prey to an infinite regress as a further conditional is then 
needed to ascertain the relation between A, B, C and Z. He attempts to stop this 
regress by claiming that “logic would take you by the throat and force you to do it!” 
(ibid. p.279) but the tortoise insists that another conditional is always needed to force 
him to accept the truth of Z. From this we are led to draw our own conclusions about 
the impossibility of meeting the tortoise‘s challenge. 
 
The tortoise is demanding some justification of how Z follows from A and B, in much 
the same way that the sceptic demands a justification for how a rule connects with its 
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 Lear‘s (1982) critique of Dummett‘s attack on the validity of the law of the excluded middle 
follows the same general structure as the argument put forth here. 
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conditions of application. The most usual strategy posited by in answer to Carroll‘s 
challenge is to deny that the conditional C should be added as a premise to the 
argument in order to strengthen it (Thomson, 1960, cited by Stroud, 1979). The parable 
of Achilles demonstrates not only the futility of appealing to a further conditional 
connecting the rule to its usage (leading to a regress of interpretations), but also the 
fact that no additional hypothetical is actually needed in order to augment the argument 
that Z follows from the conjunction of A and B. Rather, inferring the consequent is just 
what we should do, without the need for additional inferential apparatus. In a powerful 
critique of the picture of rationality that appears to drive Achilles‘ problem, Searle 
(2001) argues that the very sophistication of our formal syntactic models of reasoning, 
epitomised by proof-theoretic and computational models, creates an illusion that the 
logical principles of reasoning are justificatory. He attacks the notion that rationality is a 
matter of obeying the rules of logic, arguing that the tortoise‘s challenge serves to 
demonstrate that logic itself cannot serve a role in justifying our practice. Searle‘s 
strategy for fending off the threat of regress is to deny that the universal generalisation 
(A) plays any role in establishing the validity of the inference from B to Z. Rather, “the 
inference is perfectly valid as it stands without any outside help” (ibid. p.19). Thus if the 
generalisation connecting ‗p‘ to ‗q‟ holds, it is not in virtue of one‘s acceptance of the 
rule that if one believes ‗p‘ that one ought to believe ‗q‘: the rule does not in any way 
sanction the inference or guarantee its validity. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from these remarks is a Kantian one, that the connection 
between a rule and its application is not one that can take the form of an empirical 
explanation105 (Lear & Stroud, 1984, p.227).  We can better understand the connection 
by gaining insight into what we do, not through explanation. This is not a point about 
the stringency of a principled conception of rationality, but rather an insight into the 
―grammar‖ of the concept of a principle (McGinn, 1997, p.105), when considered as 
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 This stands opposed to a sceptical conclusion that the relationship is an inexplicable fiction, 
analogous to a Humean view of causation. 
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being akin to a rule in the way it is supposed to provide normative constraints on 
rational agency. At this stage, our explanations as to why we feel compelled to go on in 
a certain way come to an end: “If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do”” 
(§217). All we can do is point to our behaviour and acknowledge that the search for 
further justifications is fruitless106 (Wittgenstein, 1969, On Certainty, §130; §189; §192, 
hereafter OC). Thus in claiming that someone has grasped and successfully applied a 
rule, “the rule he has grasped does not explain his activity; his activity gives substance 
to the claim he has grasped the rule” (Lear, 1986, p.274). The point is not that we have 
failed to provide an account of the logical compulsion pressing us towards making 
certain moves that we consider to be correct or appropriate. Rather, Wittgenstein‘s 
insight is that there is no justification to be had in the first place from outside the 
practice in which those moves are made. Seeking interpretations to explain and justify 
the connection between a rule and its correct applications is futile because to think that 
we need to provide such justifications is to take a mis-step in determining how 
normative obligations operate and in understanding why we go on as we do. Thus even 
in the paradigmatic instance of logical reasoning, the assertion that Z ‗must‘ follow is 
not grounded in a superlative fact that grabs us by the throat, and to think that it must is 
to fall prey to a fundamental misunderstanding about the way in which normative 
constraints on behaviour operate. 
 
This is a crucial point: far from presenting a kind of semantic nihilism, Wittgenstein 
aimed to uncover and dismantle a misunderstanding about the way we use words that 
comes to prominence when we attempt to seek justification for our linguistic practices 
(see esp. McDowell, 1994). He demonstrates that being led down the path of regress 
indicates we have gone wrong in our analysis of what the norms governing the correct 
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 Wittgenstein‘s remarks here refer to the grounds we have for taking certain beliefs to be true 
about the world and thus address the traditional sceptical problem of justifying one‘s claims to 
knowledge about the external world. Nonetheless, the metaphor of hitting bedrock in one‘s 
explanations applies equally to the notion of rational standards I am charting here. 
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use of words must look like. The idea that we are compelled by the force of abstract 
logical principles to go on in a certain way is a chimera generated from a philosophical 
misunderstanding of what governs our linguistic interpretive practices (McGinn, 1997, 
p.105). From this picture emerges the idea that going on correctly is not a matter of 
conforming or aiming to conform to normative principles or rules. 
 
This critique of the normative force of logical principles extends to the supposed 
principles of rationality. Whilst there may be rules and maxims that aid decision-making 
and interpretation, “rationality is not constituted as a set of rules…the structure of 
intentional states and the constitutive rules of speech acts already contain constraints 
of rationality” (Searle, 2001, p.22). The consequence of adopting the mistaken 
principled view of rationality is an overly prescriptive, implausibly stringent conception 
of the necessary conditions on intentionality: the idea that one can be deemed a 
rational agent only to the extent that one‘s beliefs and intentional behaviour are what 
they rationally ought to be. This is the position Bortolotti (2004a; 2004b) attacks, and 
rightly so. However, once we take seriously the idea that principles are explanatorily 
impotent this objection can be seen as misplaced. Principles cannot themselves serve 
a role in justifying why certain moves are correct or appropriate and others incorrect or 
inappropriate in their given context. 
 
5.4. THE NOTION OF PRACTICE 
A Therapeutic Resolution 
Once we are disabused of the assumptions of the master thesis, conceptual space is 
made for a constructive answer to the question of how rationality exerts a normative 
constraint on intentional behaviour and interpretation, which doesn‘t rest on the 
requirement of justification via an interpretation. McDowell (1984b) takes Wittgenstein‘s 
remark that “‟obeying a rule‟ is a practice” (§202) to constitute the seed of an answer to 
this question: following a rule is a matter of acting as one has been trained to do 
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(McDowell, ibid. p.339). Appealing to such training does not provide a brute causal 
explanation for one‘s behaviour, but rather provides the requisite normative context in 
which it makes sense to judge the behaviour as correct or incorrect in light of one‘s 
“initiation into a custom” (ibid). A word‘s meaning what is does depends on there being 
a “use and custom among us” (Wittgenstein, RFM, I §63), hence it is an error to strip 
away this context in search of the foundations of rule-following. This is an important 
point as it demonstrates Wittgenstein‘s rejection of the idea that fundamentally 
normative behaviour could be characterised in non-normative terms. Even at the 
―bedrock‖ of explanation, the point at which justifications run out, normative notions 
such as correctness, accord and rule-following have application, and these notions are 
essential to language (McDowell, ibid. p.341). The norms that permeate language use 
cannot be derived from a physical-causal disposition to act in a certain way in response 
to a rule (§§193-195). Thus, according to McDowell at least, Wittgenstein‘s mention of 
customs (§198) practice (§202) and institutions (RFM, VI §31) is an attempt to retain 
the fundamental normativity of meaning and interpretation. 
 
The idea of social practice occupies a central role in Wittgenstein‘s account of rule-
following and reflects, in Lear‘s phrase, Wittgenstein‘s “anthropological stance” (1986): 
his concern with understanding language within the context of its use within a 
community. The very notion of meaning something by a word is only intelligible if it is 
used within a community sharing certain practices in the way they go on. These 
practices form “an indeterminate and unspoken horizon” (McGinn, 1997, p.96), 
inculcation into which allows an agent to master the appropriate use of words as he is 
educated. Furthermore, in answer to the epistemological question of how we can know 
that going on in a certain way is correct or appropriate, our linguistic usage is 
legitimated by our shared mindedness with others107. 
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 Lear and Stroud (1984) refer to this as the synthetic unity of representations, analogous to 
the Kantian notion of the analytic unity of apperception. 
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The concept of a rule is intelligible only within the embedded context of the practice of 
using it, not as some Platonic ideal telling one how to apply it correctly independently of 
this surrounding (Finkelstein, 2000). The crucial steps in this characterisation therefore 
appear to be sociological: we mean certain things by a certain word because this is 
“the way we are taught to use it” (RFM, I §2), which suggests that following a rule 
correctly is the culmination of a social process of learning (Bloor, 1973, p.184). I have 
used the term ‗practice‘ previously in describing rational relativism, motivating the 
concern that if the demands of rationality are framed only by social customs, 
techniques, institutions and so forth, there are no universal standards underpinning 
linguistic usage or intentionality. In this respect, appealing to social practices appears 
at first glance to be an admission that standards of rationality are relative to a 
community. If the correctness of, for example, particular intentional attributions is fixed 
only by the contingencies of consensus within a community, there is space for the 
possibility of there being different ways of going on. 
 
Several passages in the Investigations can be read as concessions towards the 
possibility of relativism about practices. As a simple example, the idea of going on in a 
different way by reacting to one‘s training in a manner that is not in accord with one‘s 
peers, strikes us as empirically plausible (§185). Given that justifications for saying 
what constitutes the correct moves have run out, viewed as an empirical claim about 
how we go on in the world there is nothing to rule out the possibility of being other-
minded. This view is perpetuated by Wittgenstein‘s positing of a hypothetical tribe who 
appear to behave and speak in ways radically different to our own (§§205-207) but to 
whom we wish to attribute language and intentional states. 
 
There is nonetheless an essential difference between the kind of relativism that results 
from communitarian readings of Wittgenstein, developed in response to the sceptical 
dilemma, and what is suggested by grounding the correct application of a rule in the 
practices and customs into which one is initiated. The sceptic finds no epistemic 
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foundation for using a rule in a certain way and therefore goes about reconstructing an 
ersatz notion of meaning by referring to the negative role of the community in ruling out 
incorrect applications of a rule (Kripke, 1982), or by characterising standards of 
correctness in terms of patterns constituted by ongoing communal judgement (Wright, 
1984). As McDowell argues, these accounts only generate the illusion of being guided 
by norms and rules (Thornton, 2005, p.38). By contrast, freed from the grip of the 
demand for justification via an interpretation, the notion of practice accommodates the 
constraints operating on behaviour and utterances without attempting to eschew their 
intrinsic normativity. Grasping a rule is a matter of ““obeying [it]” and “going against it” 
in actual cases” (§201), and what it is to comply with or violate a rule can only be 
identified against a background of the practice of using the rule. The invocation of the 
community therefore serves a different role from that required by the sceptic. 
The Transcendental Argument 
To construe the notion of practice as a contingent sociological construct would be to 
overlook the transcendental thread that permeates Wittgenstein‘s discussion and the 
lessons about the relations between language, thought and the world that emerge from 
the rule-following considerations. Despite the anthropological orientation towards 
understanding what it is to use words according to their meaning implied by 
Wittgenstein‘s reference to training, practices and customs, there is a non-empirical, 
non-explanatory insight at work about how we go on in the world108 (Lear, 1986). 
 
Wittgenstein considers the circumstances under which we would deem an alien tribe to 
be performing intentional actions, speaking a language, obeying orders and so forth 
(§206). This thought experiment is akin to Davidson‘s use of the notion of a Radical 
Interpreter, but the aim of this exploration is different. Whereas Davidson is concerned 
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 Lear argues that this kind of inquiry deserves to be called ―transcendental‖, as the concern 
with establishing how rules relate to their instances of application parallels Kant‘s a priori 
investigation into how concepts apply to objects. The Kantian argument that concepts have no 
meaning beyond the contexts of the judgements in which they are applied reflects 
Wittgenstein‘s own conception of the intelligibility of rules as manifested in their use within a 
practice (Lear, 1986, p.269). 
 195 
with uncovering the conditions of possibility for languagehood, Wittgenstein is seeking 
to make a grammatical observation about our concept of a language; namely that it 
describes characteristic regularities in the use of signs, such as words, and performing 
of actions (McGinn, 1997, p.110). Within the activity and practice of using words and 
attributing intentional states, certain patterns emerge that fix the correct applications of 
those words, and this is fundamental to the idea of a “form of life” (e.g., §241). 
Wittgenstein thus resists the temptation to mythologize meaning by showing that the 
distinction between correct and incorrect responses is grounded in the context of the 
practice in which the response occurs (McGinn, 1997, p.102). The “feelings of 
naturalness” (Lear & Stroud, 1984; Lear, 1982) that accompany our progression in 
continuing a series in a certain way, or in applying a particular term, reflect the effects 
of our being trained and initiated into a custom. There is a multiplicity of language-
games that make up these patterns and the breadth, complexity and richness of these 
serve to emphasise that language can only be identified as part of an activity or form of 
life (Finkelstein, 2000). Furthermore, we are brought into awareness of these 
connections and the correct ways of going on through our development and education:  
“the demands of reason are essentially such that a human upbringing can open a 
human being‟s eyes to them” (McDowell, 1994, p.92).  
 
Wittgenstein‘s employment of the notion of a ―form of life‖ signifies the way we are 
minded to go on in the world, reflecting our perceptions of salience, feelings of 
naturalness, shared epistemic interests and so forth (Lear, 1982, p.385). Any moves to 
understand what this form of life is and how it is constituted will necessarily be made 
from within, as we cannot step outside of our experience and concepts to evaluate our 
mindedness from outside, from a Nagelian ―view from nowhere‖ or a position of 
Quinean ―cosmic exile‖. We cannot consider our mindedness to be one possibility 
amongst others as we would not be able to make sense of a form of life that was not in 
large part similar to our own. The examples of differing tribal practices should therefore 
not be taken as describing instances of genuine other-mindedness (ibid. p.389). They 
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are a device to reflectively probe our understanding of our mindedness, to enable us to 
see both how our own ways of going on are constituted by our interests and practices 
(Lear, 1986, p.276) and that the possibility of being other-minded lapses into 
incoherence. Beings that do not exhibit patterns in their vocal articulations and actions 
that we take to be characteristic of using a language would not be intelligible as 
intentional agents109. Lear suggests that in considering what the notion of ―agreement‖ 
consists in and querying the possibility of being other-minded we are confronted with a 
modal duck-rabbit. The way we happen to use words is not guaranteed (by some 
superlative fact) and seems only to be contingent on a shared form of life with our 
fellow man: a grasp on the world that is precarious at best. At the same time, however, 
there is no genuine empirical possibility of going on in a different way, as beyond the 
boundaries of our mindedness we can say nothing at all:  “however tenuous a fact our 
being minded as we are may at times appear, it is not a fact that could genuinely have 
been otherwise” (Lear, 1982, p.387). 
 
When observing an agent‘s behaviour and listening to his utterances, we cannot help 
but see intention and hear meaning. No matter how alien the language or unfamiliar the 
tribe, we see characteristically human patterns and regularities in the relations between 
verbal behaviour and action (Hopkins, 2004, p.10) that provide us with a frame of 
reference through which we can perceive what going on in the right way is, in practice. 
Furthermore, intentional explanation relies on being able to identify and co-ordinate 
speech behaviour with an agents‘ actions (ibid. p.4). Speaking a language involves a 
kind of order that is essentially found in human behaviour: “the common behaviour of 
mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language” (§206). Consider our ordinary practices of interpretation, in which we take 
linguistic utterances to express intentional states, and make sense of an agent‘s 
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 This assertion is not meant as a rejection of the idea that we can explain and perhaps predict 
the behaviour of non-linguistic creatures. The point is rather that the concept of language, as a 
communicative tool, describes a form of life that exhibits the characteristic patterns of activity 
that constitute the following of rules (McGinn, 1997, p.110). 
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actions on the basis of such attributions. What allows us to take this interpretive step 
with any degree of confidence is that this attribution allows us to co-ordinate 
interpretation of the agent‘s other actions and utterances that are related to the 
attributed belief or desire: we have a common system of reference. 
 
Without such regularities, the gestures and vocalisations of a group of speakers would 
be unintelligible as intentional action and language. Their behaviour would seem  
confusing and illogical. If their way of going on is so radically different from our own that 
we cannot observe any patterns of regularity in the connections between utterances 
and movements, then we cannot apply the concepts of belief and action to them. To 
use Wittgenstein‘s own example from early in the Investigations, if there was not a 
regular connection between a tribesperson‘s utterance of the term ‗slab‘ and his 
gesturing towards a building-stone of a particular shape (§2), not only would our ability 
to grasp the meaning of the term falter but we would question whether the sounds 
being made constitute an (albeit primitive) language (§207). Hence it is only through 
identifying connections between utterances and actions within the context of an agent‘s 
behaviour, and his location within a community, that interpretation is possible at all. 
 
An important aspect of this transcendental insight is borne out in the idea of shared 
agreement. If part of what it is to use a language is to exhibit patterns and regularities 
in one‘s utterances and actions, and for these to be understood as such by others, then 
there must be a degree of agreement between members of the community as to what 
constitutes the right way to go on: 
―It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the 
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life‖ (§241, 
emphasis in original).  
―If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements‖ (§242).  
Agreement about judgements form part of the framework through which language can 
function: if we are to succeed in communicating at all we must agree on certain 
judgements about the world and the way our words and concepts relate to the world 
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and to our actions. For instance, agreement about whether or not a rule or order has 
been correctly followed (§458) in using a term or deploying a concept appropriately is 
necessary if we are to communicate and understand one another‘s use of that term or 
concept. In perceiving movements and noises made as manifestations of intentionally 
directed behaviour and speech we find regularities and patterns of activity, which 
emerge when we examine a whole range of behaviour, utterances, actions and 
interactions between members of the community going about their activities in the 
world. Naturally there is much potential for variation in practices within different cultural 
and linguistic communities; indeed we may find the customs and ways of using 
language exhibited by an unfamiliar tribe difficult to comprehend. Such practices are 
nonetheless intelligible as intentional and linguistic behaviour, and it is only because 
we can understand them as such that the difference in details and emphasis of their 
practices come to light: “we could not chart these differences, not justify a claim to have 
done so correctly, unless we could rely on Other Minds to be basically like us; so the 
key is to make these similarities our bridgehead” (Hollis, 1994, p.247). 
 
There are strong parallels between this Wittgensteinian insight into language use and 
the thesis of rational interpretationism, derived from Davidson‘s argument that the 
methodology of interpretation, constrained by the demands of Charity, reflects the 
relational structure of intentionality. We must generally agree on judgements about 
what is true if we are to use language to communicate, co-ordinating our beliefs about 
the world with those of others110. In particular, there must be agreement among those 
who use a language as to the circumstances under which a proposition would be held 
true111, thus emphasising the situatedness of language not only within a community but 
also within the world. This is not an authoritarian or charitable empirical assumption 
                                               
110
 Davidson (1974b) considers intertranslatability to be a criterion of languagehood. He seeks 
to undermine the possibility of there being radically different ways of going on in the world by 
denying that it is possible for languages to fail this intertranslatability criterion, arguing that any 
vocal articulations that cannot be translatable in principles should not count as instances of 
language-use at all  (p.186), and hence do not represent intentional behaviour. 
111
 Kripke (1982) famously rejects a truth-conditional theory of meaning in favour of constructing 
an ersatz notion of meaning based on the conditions under which one would assert a 
proposition. The connection of language to the world is thus lost on this view. 
 199 
about the possibilities of two agents happening to converge in their judgements and 
attitudes towards events and objects in a shared environment (Joseph, 2004, p.67). 
The only way we can initiate interpretation of another language is to start with general 
agreements about what is true: we assign truth-conditions to sentences held true by 
another, based on what we ourselves consider to be true in our language: if we want to 
understand others, we must count them right [by our own lights] in most matters”112 
(Davidson, 1974b, p.197).  
 
The requirement of agreement in judgements also suggests that we must largely agree 
on such things as the appropriate or correct moves that ought to be made in light of 
using a word, possessing a belief or forming an intention. An intention to use the word 
‗red‘ carries with it a normative commitment towards using it in the right way, applying 
to the correct objects and not to others. It thus constrains the pattern of one‘s actions 
and further utterances in a certain characteristic way. From the perspective of an 
interpreter attempting to understand an agent‘s linguistic utterances, he can attribute to 
the agent a grasp of the meaning of a word insofar as the agent uses the word 
correctly in the appropriate circumstances. By the same token, a belief is attributable to 
an agent insofar as he behaves in ways that follow from that belief. Thus, possessing a 
belief entails a commitment towards patterns of action and utterances that would be in 
accord with that belief, the absence or obvious violation of which would undermine the 
identity of that particular belief. 
 
It is of course quite possible for me to use words incorrectly, to assert open 
contradictions and perform actions that thwart my own avowed intentions: if we are 
unable to make mistakes or violate constraints on language use, belief and action there 
is no sense in which intentional behaviour could be said to be normative. Whilst the 
logic of belief precludes the possibility of sincerely holding a belief with the content ‗p 
                                               
112
 Luntley casts a similar argument in providing a transcendental account of selfhood, citing the 
self as the ground for the possibility of keeping track of things: an epistemic requirement of 
contact and interaction with the world (Luntley, 2006). 
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and not-p‘, the idea that the normative constraints on intentionality and interpretation 
are necessary does not rule out the empirical possibility of going against them on 
occasion. Just as I am free (in the sense of being physically able) to intentionally move 
my rook diagonally across the chess board, so I can also intentionally utter the term 
‗red‘ to apply to square things. Such gestures take on an air of stubborn defiance of the 
constraints of our ordinary practices, and may identify the behaviour as, for instance, 
humorous or deceptive. But in order for an interpreter to recognise such linguistic 
behaviour as intentional it must first be clear that the agent has, in the instance of 
language use, gained mastery of the words he is using. Otherwise, his mis-use will look 
like error or ignorance113. Similarly, I may not act on the basis of a belief I assert: there 
may be numerous reasons for this but the possibility of, for example, intentionally going 
against my belief (again, humour and deception are good examples) only arises if 
sufficient of my behaviour enables that belief to be attributed to me in the first place. 
Otherwise, it‘s questionable whether I do possess that belief: I am perhaps deluding 
myself. The point to be drawn out here is that it is only if one has established a path of 
the right way to go on that one can potentially stray from it. Thus the empirical 
possibility of not using words correctly or not respecting the normative commitments 
entailed by one‘s beliefs does not undermine the existence of general, holistic 
constraints on one‘s intentional behaviour but rather emphasises that our language-
games and customary practices are normative in nature. 
 
There is no cut-off point beyond which a specific belief could be said to violate a norm 
of reasoning, precisely because a specific belief cannot be considered in isolation from 
a whole set of other intentional states. Yet there is nonetheless a limit to the level of 
internal inconsistency that can be tolerated before abandoning the project of attributing 
meaning and propositional thought altogether: at this point a creature could not be said 
                                               
113
 There may of course be myriad interpretive explanations to accommodate this kind of 
deviant language use and render it perfectly intelligible. The point here is rather that whilst one 
can violate the rules, doing so threatens to push one outside the boundaries of interpretability in 
that specific instance. 
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to be participating in our shared form of life and his behaviour would thus be beyond 
the boundaries of intelligibility altogether. The normative standards constituting the 
shared background of agreement therefore set the limits to sense, as one could not fail 
largely to conform to them whilst still being intelligible as an intentional, linguistic agent. 
These standards are not, however, observer-independent. The point is a familiar one, 
echoing the Background Argument that it is only against a background of largely 
correct, intelligible behaviour that certain moves can be identified as being in error: “In 
order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind” (OC, 
§156). Construed as a general, contextualised description of the assumptions that 
comprise a shared agreement in forms of life, this requirement of ‗conformity with 
mankind‘ reflects a feature of shared agreement (Davidson, 1970a, p.222). 
 
Wittgenstein‘s remarks on agreement in forms of life therefore bear a resemblance to 
Davidson‘s conception of the background of rationality, pointing towards similar general 
conclusions about the conceptual limits on interpretation and intentionality. If we are 
able to attribute beliefs, desires, linguistic utterances and intentional actions to an 
agent, we are necessarily doing so within a broad context of shared agreement: 
“finding the common ground is not subsequent to understanding, but a condition of 
it…If we understand [an agent‟s] words, a common ground exists, a shared „way of 
life‟” (Davidson, 1995b, p.51). Wedgwood (2007, p.277) draws on a metaphor from 
Plato‘s Republic to characterise this type of position: the Form of the Good is to the 
understanding what the sun is to vision. Just as we count as being sighted creatures 
because we are appropriately sensitive to light the source of which is the sun, so too 
we count as rational, intentional agents because we are appropriately sensitive to the 
normative requirements of reason, the source of which is our form of life, systems of 
communication and practice, and ability to get on in the world. 
 
This reading of Wittgenstein‘s rule-following remarks demonstrates that despite the fact 
our linguistic and interpretive practices cannot be explained or justified in a way that 
 202 
guarantees their correctness, this does not diminish their normative force as standards 
that guide our behaviour and constrain intentional attributions. The assertion ―this is 
simply what I do‖ is a recognition of the fact that at bedrock, we are minded in a 
particular way that is exhibited in characteristic patterns of activity that constitute what 
we can call ‗following a rule‘ and using a language. This idea of mindedness is not 
something that we can grasp and evaluate from the outside since it is not a genuine 
possibility that we could be radically other-minded. It is just a feature of language that 
there exist these patterns of use, and these are common to any community to whom 
we‘d attribute the speaking of a language. Thus we gain an important insight from a 
transcendental consideration of how we go on in the world: using language, 
intentionally acting and interpreting the behaviour of others all rely on a common 
system of reference, manifested in the rich and complex context of our activities and 
practices. This system is not law-like as it is essentially heavily contextual, capable of 
being characterised only in terms of regularities and patterns in the relations between 
utterances and action. Indeed, the transcendental understanding of rules and rule-
following reveals that even basic laws of logic and arithmetic cannot be understood as 
platonic entities (Lear, 1986), independent of the human activity in which they are used:  
“The criteria of logic are not a direct gift from God but arise out of and are only 
intelligible in the context of ways of living and modes of social life” (Winch (1958) cited 
by Hollis, 1994, p.239). Yet from an empirical perspective the requirements of 
agreement are genuinely objective and necessary (Lear, 1986, p.271). In the final 
section of this chapter I will turn to address how these insights from Wittgenstein 
impact on the relativist concern previously raised, and the question of whether we can 
go some way towards describing the norms of rationality, which, I argue, are 
constitutive of our being minded as we are. 
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5.5. SHARED AGREEMENT 
The Unintelligibility of Radical Difference 
In chapter two I raised a potential worry that the standards of rationality by which one 
judges the decision-making process of another might admit of differences between 
individuals or communities, thus rendering invalid any attempt to evaluate normatively 
another person‘s reasons and decisions. This view is supported by sceptical readings 
of Wittgenstein‘s remarks on rule-following that suggest the correctness of attributions 
of meaning and intentionality are only fixed by the contingencies of the community‘s 
agreement: a move that opens up the possibility of alternative ways of going on if 
different communities reach different kinds of consensus.  
 
This concern can now be dissolved. On the rational interpretationist view I have 
developed, the conjunction of two claims serves to undermine the possibility of 
relativism about rational standards underpinning interpretation and intentionality. 
Firstly, the intentional realm is essentially intersubjective, and thereby constitutively 
bound up with the structure and constraints of interpretation by a third-person. This 
conception of intentionality as beholden to the possibilities of third-person interpretation 
finds echoes in Wittgenstein‘s notion of shared practice and is consistent with a 
rejection of the ―master thesis‖: a Cartesian view of mentality as a private and inner 
realm accessed with privileged authority in the first-person. Thus, a person‘s intentional 
states are constituted in part by third-person attributions: “we can see from a person‟s 
actions that they believe certain things definitely whether they express this belief or not” 
(OC, §284).  
 
Drawing out the parallel with using words is informative in grasping how this 
constitutive claim works. To reiterate, knowing the meaning of a word is a matter of 
being able to use it correctly. The pattern that is manifest by this usage can, if we wish 
to reflect philosophically on it, be construed as being in accord with a rule. But 
conceptualising the correct use of a word in terms of following a rule leads us into a 
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seductive misconception about the nature of meaning and the grounds for saying we 
have gone on in the right way when using a word correctly. The meaning of a word is 
not some platonic, atomistic entity that can be identified independently of its context of 
use. Nor does the rule specifying the correct application of a word constitute what it is 
to mean something by that word. To think that an explanation is needed here of the 
way the meaning of a word connects to its conditions of correct use is to fall foul of a 
platonistic reification of meaning that leaves language (and intentional behaviour) 
unconnected to anything and in need of justification (Finkelstein, 2000, p.67).  
 
If we are led to conceive of meanings as atomistic entities constitutively devoid of any 
intrinsic normativity, as the sceptical dilemma suggests, we are attempting to adopt a 
perspective on meaning that is external to the practices and customs in which 
language is used. Taking this position as a genuine point of view entails that the 
puzzlement about how standards of correctness for linguistic meaning impose 
normative constraints on our utterances is inevitable and intractable. If we succumb to 
this misconception then it appears as though all that is holding our standards of 
correctness in place are the agreements of the community one happens to be a 
member of. If this is indeed the case, there is scope for consensus to differ within 
different communities, and the possibility of relativism about meaning arises. A 
therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein shows us why this is a flawed view, as it represents 
a misguided attempt to step outside of our own linguistic and social practices to get a 
better grasp of their structure: 
―[Wittgenstein] hopes to get us to see that when we envision ourselves 
occupying an external point of view on language we don‘t succeed in 
articulating any thoughts - and that he sees our difficulty as one of coming to 
recognize that the idea of such a point of view creates the illusion of 
understanding‖ (Crary, 2000, p.6, emphasis in original). 
What this view shows is that it is an error to seek to grasp meaning from outside the 
perspective of our social and linguistic practices. The positive aspect to this therapeutic 
view is that meaning is in fact constituted by using words in the right way within the 
context of our linguistic practices, which I shall come to presently. 
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The analogy with belief is clear. Having a belief (or other intentional state) is a matter of 
speaking and acting in a way that is appropriate or reasonable in light of this content, 
such that that belief is attributable by an interpreter observing one‘s behaviour. 
Possessing a belief or forming an intention is much like following a rule: certain 
normative commitments are entailed by, for example, the sincere assertion that I 
believe it is raining, such as not simultaneously asserting that it is not raining, or when 
coupled with a desire to remain dry, acting in such a way as to avoid getting wet when 
going outside. It is an error to conceptualise beliefs as standalone psychological 
objects that can be identified independently of the normative relations they bear to 
other intentional states, utterances and the actions that are intended or performed in 
light of them. If we think of beliefs in this reified way, from outside the practices in which 
they occur, then all that fixes judgements about beliefs are reconstructed ersatz notions 
of correctness constructed by one‘s community. Without anything intrinsically 
normative to belief, the possibility of alternative notions of rationality and practices of 
reasoning look entirely plausible. However, to continue the analogy with meaning, it is 
an error to mythologize the nature of belief in this way, abstracting it away from its 
context and seeking an external perspective on the way beliefs are structured. The 
normativity of belief is intrinsic and constitutive, but it emerges only within the context of 
a form of life and cannot be grasped from outside. We are embedded within our form of 
life, which entails that all intentional behaviour is understood from within this 
framework. The conceptual possibility that gives rise to the relativist concern is 
therefore an illusion, because there is no conceptual space open for behaviour to be 
perceived as intentional and yet not to operate within the bounds of intelligibility 
shaping our form of life. The very idea of alternative ways of going on and radically 
different structures to the relationship between reasons, thoughts, actions and linguistic 
utterances is therefore devoid of content.  
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This brings us to the second claim: that the boundaries of intentionality are set by the 
standards of rationality shared by all intentional agents. This is what the constitutive 
rationality of the intentional domain I have described as the Rationality Assumption 
amounts to. Because what constitutes belief and meaning is partially determined by 
these standards, the very fact of being able to apply these concepts to the movements 
and utterances of a creature ensures he is participating in a shared form of life and is 
thus subject to these very standards. The norms governing the process of intentional 
attribution (encapsulated by the Rationality Constraint) converge in all creatures that 
can be interpreted as intentional beings, and are thus universal in virtue of our nature 
as social, action-guided and linguistic creatures114.  
The Rational Norms of Practice 
With this notion of non-principled normativity in place, the thesis of rational 
interpretationism becomes more cogent and less indicative of an empirically 
questionable thesis that renders most human behaviour irrational. The principled 
conception of rationality is a misguided attempt to decontextualise and codify the 
patterns, connections and ways of going on that emerge from our ordinary intentional 
and linguistic practice: “To say that there exists rationality is to say that perspectives 
blend…there is behind it no unknown quantity which has to be determined by 
deduction, or…demonstrated inductively” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.xi). This does not, 
however, mean that rationality is a mysterious and coincidental norm that ranges over 
our intentional behaviour: 
                                               
114
 I am not committing to giving an account of rationality independently of the requirements of 
intelligibility. Epistemologically, we seamlessly perceive intentionality in movements and 
utterances but this understanding cannot be explained by an ontological account of the bounds 
of intentionality from the outside, in terms that reduce the constitutive norms of rationality to 
something else, such as a set of procedural criteria. To think that a reductive account of the 
normative constraints on interpretation is necessary is to fall prey to the philosophical 
temptation to step outside of one‘s mindedness in order to grasp its structure. This is a line of 
thought akin to McDowell‘s critique of a sideways-on view of meaning and the description of 
intentional terms (e.g., 1994, Lecture II). The relation between the claim that there are epistemic 
normative constraints on interpretation and the ontological thesis that the intentional realm is 
rationally structured is therefore not an explanatory or reductive one, but rather one of 
interdependence. There is content to the idea that rational constraints operate on interpretation, 
since there the relations between beliefs are matters of what one ought to believe, but these 
cannot be captured in terms that are reduced beneath the bedrock level of norms. 
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―our responsiveness to reasons is not supernatural, we should dwell on the 
thought that it is our lives that are shaped by spontaneity, patterned in ways 
that come into view only within an enquiry framed by what Davidson calls ―the 
constitutive ideal of rationality‖‖ (McDowell, 1994, p.78). 
Contrary to the implicit assumptions of the predominant view of rationality, an agent is 
not rational in virtue of his subscription to rational principles. But it is difficult to grasp 
how interpretation and intentionality could be thought to be normative if it is not 
possible to provide clear rules for the general application of normative standards in 
judging behaviour and attributing intentional states. This inability to prescribe at the 
abstract, generalised level does not, however, entail that in individual circumstances it 
is not possible to provide a judgement as to what one ought to believe or do. 
 
Dodd (1999) provides a minimalist account of truth to demonstrate that the 
accumulation of instances in which we can make normative prescriptions about what 
one ought to assert, all of which prescribe that one ought to make assertions that are 
true, does not add up to prescribing a norm of truth. The analogy with the norms of 
belief is as follows. In particular circumstances, it might be the case that one ought to 
hold a belief that is true. For instance, if I am sitting in a pub with a pint of bitter on the 
table in front of me, I ought to believe that there is a pint of bitter on the table in front of 
me. Similarly, if last orders at the pub are called at 11pm, I ought to believe that last 
orders will be called at 11pm. Both of these facts are empirical truths, but enumerating 
all the instances of what I ought to believe in these particular situations ought not to 
result in their common denominator of truth being abstracted away from the distinct 
circumstances, aims, interests and specific contents of each of these situations to 
provide a context-free, generalised normative obligation. What makes it the case that I 
ought to hold a particular belief is not adherence to a norm of truth; truth is not an 
abstract force-maker in prescribing what I ought to believe, but rather in that particular 
context, I ought to hold a belief to which the truth predicate applies.  
 
Principles of rationality are derived from the complex and varied relations that exist 
between our utterances, actions and interactions with the world and other people, but 
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have no life or platonic existence outside the context in which they are characteristically 
used. On the view I have described rationality is manifested in our ordinary practice 
and any attempt we make to codify its normative demands as universal generalisations 
or principles is necessarily an abstraction away from this practice. Descriptions of the 
kinds of relations that obtain between behaviours, codified as principles, arise from the 
patterns of use and action that make up the broad scope of our ordinary activities and 
practices but do not themselves carry any normative weight. They are abstractions that 
emerge when we philosophically reflect on the form of life and human activities in 
which language and intention find their meaning. This does not mean, however, that 
rationality exists entirely in the eye of the beholder: “It exists in the ability of the agent 
to govern her behavior using those norms in context” (Gerrans, 2004, p.44). The 
source of normativity is thus located within the scope of human life and behaviour, on 
account of our ability to reflect on our reasons (Korsgaard, 1996, p.xii).  
 
The implications of this view for our conception of rationality are striking. Much of the 
empirical and philosophical literature on human reasoning and rationality has focused 
on the question of whether or not we conform to principles derived from logical laws, on 
the assumption that in order to be rational, one‘s beliefs and reasoning processes 
ought to display conformity with these principles. Abstracted from specific contexts, 
logical principles have been taken to constitute a normative ideal to which we should 
aspire, whilst the processes of reasoning, choice preferences and decision-making 
have been evaluated in isolation from the context in which they occur, in terms of 
whether or not they conform to the schematised structure of a logical inference. In light 
of the rule-following considerations, we can see that this view is mistaken and 
understand why this is so. The very idea that principles provide a specification of ideal 
rationality reflects the misconception that normative standards somehow exist 
independently of us, laying rails to infinity that prescribe the correct action for every 
instance of intentional behaviour. As is clear from the threat of the regress of 
interpretations that follows from this view of rules, it is a mistake to consider that such 
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principles themselves play the role of “normative force-maker” (Schroeder, 2003) here, 
compelling us to believe or intend one thing or another in a given situation.  
 
The interpretive process applies to individual speakers and our endeavours naturally 
concern the attribution of intentional states to that individual at any one time. Put this 
way, the constraints operating on interpretation may be thought to be individualistic and 
situation specific, to the exclusion of the fact that the individual is integrated into a 
wider linguistic, social, cultural community. On the account of rationality I have sought 
to defend, the individual cannot be understood in isolation from his relation to the world 
and to the community of which he is a part. I am therefore largely in agreement with 
Bortolotti‘s (2004) sentiment that interpretation depends on acquiring knowledge of the 
person‘s environment, his actions in relation to it and his linguistic interactions with 
others: in short, the rich and varied context in which behaviour ordinarily occurs.  
 
Take the example of a person who deliberately asserts a contradiction or paradox for 
comic effect. Within the context in which the remarks are made, and knowing the 
speaker‘s humorous intention, his utterances are perfectly intelligible. It is only if, in an 
attempt to identify whether the assertion itself (perhaps given schematically in terms of 
propositions held true) conforms to principles of rationality that we uncover a problem 
for interpretation, since considering the assertion in isolation entails that we lack the 
essential background resources to make sense of the contradiction. This is what I 
mean by the claim that it is not principles doing the work in constraining our 
interpretations: the intelligibility of behaviour arises from its being embedded in a rich 
context from which we identify normative constraints on how we ought to use words 
and how we ought to act if we are to be understood. This view has parallels with much 
thinking in the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions (particularly in the work 
of Gadamer and Husserl respectively), and has gained increasing currency in Anglo-
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American philosophy115: “We can no longer regard the social and physical environment 
as simply surrounding the psychological subject…contextual factors inextricably 
permeate the field of psychological investigation” (Pettit & McDowell, 1986, p.14). 
 
Given that I have argued that efforts to abstract general normative principles of 
rationality from the context of the activities in which they are collectively manifest are 
fundamentally flawed, there is an obvious bar to making any broad but informative 
generalisations about the standards of rationality that do constrain our linguistic and 
interpretive practices. If we are looking to ascertain how our interpretive practices are 
constrained in specific, individual instances of interpretation we lose sight of the 
broader patterns of practice that enable the behaviour to be intelligible as intentional 
action. Whatever standards are in play, they are always necessarily heavily contextual 
and subject to wide variation depending on the circumstances of the particular 
interpretive situation at hand: they are not absolute and indefeasible. 
 
Reflecting back on the principles that emerged from Davidson‘s account of Radical 
Interpretation, we can construe the demands of Charity as informative but not strictly 
prescriptive abstractions of the boundaries of intentionality and interpretability. The 
principles of truth and coherence provide a description of what these constraints look 
like at an abstracted and generalised level ranging over the entire intentional domain: 
one must get the world mostly right, and one‘s beliefs, desires and other intentional 
states must generally hang together as a coherent whole, in order for one to be 
interpretable and to count as an intentional agent. However, Charity does not provide 
us with the resources to make specific a priori prescriptions about what one rationally 
ought to intend or believe in particular situation116 (Cherniak, 1981, p.165). “Charity can 
offer no precise interpretive prescriptions” (Malpas, 1992, p.152) if it is assumed to 
                                               
115
 A precedent for this view within the philosophy of psychology was set by Dreyfus and 
Dreyfus (1986), who considered the view of the mind as a formal, symbolic information-
processing system to be a fundamental misconception driving artificial intelligence research. 
116 
Heil refers to Charity as “parsimony applied in the mental realm” (1989, p.574), implying it is 
not an ideal or strict constraint but is rather about the optimisation of standards of rationality in 
particular instances. 
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consist in a web of context-free principles that can be filled out with the contents and 
antecedent beliefs relevant to the circumstances of interpretation. At its root the 
process of intentional attribution is a matter of degree and intrinsically contextual 
judgement by an interpreter, and this reflects the nature of the subject matter at hand: 
the richly contextual practices and customs that constitute our form of life. 
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6. IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPACITY? 
6.1. FROM RULE-FOLLOWING TO DECISION-MAKING 
In this final chapter I attempt to draw out the main themes and arguments that have 
been presented, to consider their implications for clinical judgements about capacity. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of the discussion to propose any direct applications of 
these ideas to clinical policy, training and practice, I argue that such insights may 
provide a useful first step in framing practical questions about the concept of capacity 
and how it ought to be assessed. 
 
I showed in the first chapter that the cognitive conception of capacity underpinning the 
test of capacity set out in the MCA implies the process of a person‘s decision-making 
can be judged independently of the decision outcome. What matters for capacity, on 
this view, is that the person is able to use or weigh information in coming to a decision, 
irrespective of the perceived wisdom of the decision itself. Nonetheless, I suggested 
that procedural standards alone do not map on to what clinicians would consider to be 
indicative of capacity and incapacity. If values that seem distorted or patently false 
beliefs influence the decision-making process, capacity may be lacking even if there is 
a recognisable and logical connection between the input factors and the decision 
outcome. This indicates there is some kind of epistemic standard operating on capacity 
judgements disciplining what legitimately counts as a recognisable reason for a 
decision, and the question was raised as to whether such standards could vary 
between groups. The discussion here was premised on the idea that whilst epistemic 
standards potentially looked relative, the norms governing the process of decision-
making itself were fixed and objective. In other words, whatever the content of the 
particular beliefs and values entering into decision-making, the process from inputs to 
outputs was presumed to be governed by the abstract norms characterised by 
procedural rationality. The rule-following considerations have, however, both given us 
reason to question this assumption and provided us with the resources to explain why 
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and how epistemic considerations enter into judgements about a person‘s decision-
making process. I will take these points in turn, dealing first with the negative 
implications of the rule-following analogy and then considering how capacity 
judgements can proceed reliably and accurately in spite of the problems for 
assessment I have raised.  
Decision-Making Isn‟t a Psychological Process 
What does it mean to say that a person is (or is not) using or weighing information in 
coming to a decision? The capacity criteria require more than an understanding of the 
information given about a potential treatment or course of action; they require an 
indication that this information has been used appropriately in some unspecified way to 
influence the decision outcome. The metaphor that springs to mind in attempting to 
describe how this process might be envisaged is that of an information processing 
black box: a visual metaphor common to cognitive psychology, which is concerned with 
explaining mental functioning primarily through sophisticated flow diagrams of cognitive 
mechanisms. On this model, various factors serve as inputs to decision-making, 
including the information given along with a person‘s known beliefs, values, desires, 
fears and so forth. These feed into a process, whereby various cognitive mechanisms 
operate upon the information received, and subsequently an output emerges in the 
form of a decision about what the person wishes to do. A person thus uses or weighs 
information to the extent that these psychological mechanisms operate on the 
information, beliefs and desires relevant to the decision being made, acting like a 
computational information-processing function to produce an appropriate output. How, 
though, could the operation of such a psychological mechanism be judged? It is 
plausible that one could take on board the information, deliberate with it, weigh it up 
against one‘s beliefs, values and so forth and make a decision on the basis of that 
information, but equally plausible that one could take on board (and thus use an 
identical input to the former case) but discard the information and make a decision in 
spite of it. 
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It is essential to the test of capacity that examining the process of decision-making can 
enable an observer to distinguish between these two possibilities, since they differ in 
ways that are significant for an assessment of capacity: the former indicates fulfilment 
of the using or weighing information criterion, whereas the latter might not. Yet all that a 
clinician has to go on in judging whether a person is using or weighing information is 
the outcome of the decision, and some awareness of the input factors (many of which 
will be unknown to the clinician). Judgements about the decision-making process are 
therefore based upon the perceived connection between the input factors and the 
output: on whether or not the decision is one that ought to have been made in light of 
the information given. This is what gives rise to the thought that a person must have 
recognisable reasons for his decision. The decision ought to be one that in some 
respect follows from the person‘s beliefs, including the relevant information that has 
been conveyed. There ought therefore to be a reasonable connection between the 
inputs and the decision outcome if the person is to be judged to have used or weighed 
the information in coming to that decision. 
 
Now the relevance of the insights from rule-following emerges, if we think of the 
process of decision-making as akin to the application of a rule operating like a function 
on a given set of inputs to produce an outcome. The question arises: what connects 
successful using or weighing of information with the decision outcomes that ought to 
follow from it? We saw previously that it is misleading to seek an explanation of the 
relationship between a rule and the conditions under which it correctly applies by 
appealing to a platonic mechanism, because positing such a mechanism cannot justify 
the claim that the process followed is the right one (such as ‗plus‘ in the case of the rule 
of addition), as opposed to some deviant function (such as ‗quus‘). Similarly, is it a 
mistake to seek the connection between sets of inputs and the right kind of output that 
follows from them by appealing to a psychological mechanism of using or weighing 
information, because such a mechanism is of no help in differentiating between going 
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on in the right way (successfully using or weighing information) and the wrong way 
(following a deviant function that is indistinguishable in most cases). Positing a 
mysterious psychological mechanism does not enable one to distinguish capacity from 
incapacity solely in terms of the process of decision-making. Rather, what it is to 
successfully use or weigh information, and thus fulfil the essential criterion for capacity, 
is just that one reliably gets the right kind of output, that is, the right kind of decision 
outcomes that reasonably follow from the information one is given117. 
 
A necessary caveat must be added here, in extrapolating lessons from Wittgenstein on 
rule-following in language use and applying them to judgements about decision-making 
processes. Despite the fact that the correct meaning of a word is something that 
emerges from its use and is not a platonic, atomistic entity, it is nonetheless natural to 
think that there are prescriptions on what counts as the correct or incorrect use of a 
word. It is not so clear that using or weighing information and having a recognisable 
reason for one‘s decision admits of such tightly bounded prescriptions. We might say 
that a particular decision reasonably follows from the information given to a decision-
maker, and either condone or criticise it, but we would not necessarily consider the 
decision to be correct or incorrect. This is in part because of the vast number of factors 
that could potentially enter into and influence the decision-making process: a point to 
which I shall return below, but it is mentioned here in order to justify the vague terms 
with which I am describing the normative appropriateness of decision-outcomes, in 
sharp contrast with the definitive terminology of ‗correctness‘ and ‗incorrectness‘ 
employed in describing linguistic usage. 
 
The analogy with Wittgensteinian insights into rule-following points to a conclusion that 
has two significant negative implications for the conception of capacity upon which 
capacity legislation is based and its assessment by clinicians. The conclusion is that 
                                               
117
 To use terms originating with Reichenbach, the argument here is analogous to Kuhn‘s 
argument in the philosophy of science that the context of justification is not distinct from the 
context of discovery (Kuhn, 1970a). 
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any attempt to appeal to a psychological mechanism or process rests upon a 
misconception about the nature of the intentional realm, which is what McDowell calls 
the ―master thesis‖. This misconception fuels the perceived need to seek an 
explanation of the way in which norms and rules constrain intentional behaviour 
through a psychological mechanism or process. But if we are freed from this illusion 
and understand the intentional realm correctly, we see that no such explanation could 
succeed. Identifying the process that links a set of inputs with the outcome that ought 
to follow from them via the application of a psychological mechanism is explanatorily 
redundant. 
 
This conclusion supports the claim that it is futile to attempt to define what it is to 
possess capacity according to purely procedural criteria. Rather, a person‘s ability to 
use or weigh information emerges through his general reliability in making decisions 
that reasonably follow from the information given. It is a mistake to consider that a 
specification of mechanisms or processes abstracted away from all of the everyday 
instances of decision-making and interpersonal communication that comprise our 
ordinary practice provides an essentialist prescription for what constitutes reasonable 
decision-making: a prescription that is subsequently applicable in a particular instance 
to determine whether a decision is made on the basis of recognisable reasons. To be 
judged as having reasons for one‘s decisions, whether these are good or bad reasons, 
entails that one is participating in a shared normative practice. It is this practice that 
supplies the norms by which one‘s intentional behaviour is judged and constrains the 
kinds of outcomes that would be deemed to follow reasonably from the information one 
is given on a particular occasion of decision-making.  
Decision-Specificity 
The first implication of this conclusion is that it raises a question about just how 
decision-specific an assessment of capacity can be. Whilst there are good reasons to 
avoid taking a status approach to the possession or lack of capacity, the conclusion 
 217 
that one‘s ability to use or weigh information arises from a general ability to act for 
reasons and be interpreted as behaving intentionally potentially undermines the idea 
that a capacity judgement ought to be specific to an individual instance of decision-
making. The issue here turns on how we are to understand the term ―decision-specific‖. 
If what is meant is that the information and input factors (such as known beliefs and 
values) a clinician considers to be relevant to the decision at hand are isolated from 
any contextual factors that are not obviously related to the process of making that 
decision, then I do not think a capacity judgement can be decision-specific. This is 
because the very identity of beliefs can only be established in light of their relatedness 
to innumerable other beliefs, actions, interactions and utterances all of which form a 
rich and complex pattern of practice. Conceptually isolating beliefs, values, intentions 
and so forth from their constitutive relations and construing them as atomistic, 
determinate mental entities entails that we lose sight of the normative structure of 
reasons that forms the very basis of judgements about whether or not a decision 
outcome reasonably follows from its inputs.  
 
To clarify this point, consider the problems faced by a purely procedural conception of 
capacity identified in the first chapter. Based on procedural criteria alone, the anorexic 
who can set out his reasons for refusing to eat, premised on his high valuation of 
thinness, or the schizophrenic who refuses a blood transfusion on the grounds that he 
believes the blood will be poisoned by MI5, look as though they possess decision-
making capacity. This is because the values and beliefs attributed to them have been 
taken out of the context in which they occur and used as starting premises in an 
inferential reasoning process, and logically the process from premises to conclusion is 
intact118. Shorn of the epistemic and rational relations they bear to other beliefs, 
utterances and actions, the potentially capacity-undermining nature of these intentional 
states cannot be identified. If, on the other hand, we take specificity to pertain to a 
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 It might be protested that such beliefs are patently false, but content alone does not enable 
capacity to be distinguished from incapacity here: we all hold false beliefs, some of them 
stubbornly. 
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particular decision whilst fully acknowledging the contextual embeddedness of the 
factors entering into that decision within the person‘s own life, presupposing his status 
as an intentional agent who is responsive to reasons, then we are in a far better 
position to assess whether the decision outcome is one that the person ought to make. 
This assessment necessarily includes a judgement about the reasonableness of the 
input factors, construed not as starting premises for an inference but rather as features 
of the person‘s intentional and motivational structure that are subject to a range of 
epistemic normative constraints themselves. I will expand upon this point when 
considering the role of context in more depth below, but for now I suggest that we can 
reject the idea that decision-specificity means isolating the process leading to a 
particular decision from the rich context that gives the relationship between its inputs 
and output a normative structure. 
Substantive Epistemic Standards 
The second negative implication of the conclusion that decision-making is not 
underpinned by a psychological mechanism is that capacity judgements cannot be 
content-neutral. The decision outcome will in fact impact upon the judgement as to 
whether or not the patient has successfully used or weighed information in coming to a 
decision. This is because assessing whether or not a person has used or weighed 
information just is a matter of determining whether the decision outcome is one that 
reasonably follows in light of (among other things) the information given: there is, as we 
have seen, nothing intrinsic to the process itself that distinguishes success from failure 
on this criterion of capacity. In spite of the wording of capacity legislation and its 
insistence that unwise decisions do not undermine capacity, it appears that evaluating 
the outcome of a decision-making process is inevitable if the process itself is going to 
be assessed. This is a problematic conclusion as it potentially undercuts the main 
motivation for seeking a process-based conception of capacity, which was the 
avoidance of undue medical paternalism. Paternalism could result from capacity being 
denied on the basis of patients making choices that are considered unwise or against 
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medical advice, hence the understandable attempt to ensure that no substantive 
criteria formed part of the test for capacity. The suggestion I am making is that there 
are indeed substantive standards underpinning capacity judgements, but that this lack 
of content-neutrality need not be considered to lead to judgements about capacity 
being based on the perceived wisdom of decisions.  
 
This claim requires unpacking if it is to avoid the risk of promoting paternalism, and the 
important distinction here turns on a subtle point about the nature of the normative 
commitments entailed by possessing beliefs and having reasons for one‘s decisions. 
Suggesting that there are indeed substantive standards underpinning judgements of 
capacity implies that in order to be deemed to possess capacity with respect to a 
decision, there are certain things one ought to believe or do (and want or value, 
although I am focusing here on epistemic commitments specifically). Failure to hold 
beliefs that accord with the requisite epistemic standards or holding beliefs that violate 
such standards would entail that such a person would be deemed to lack capacity. The 
question of whether or not the inclusion of substantive criteria would accord with clinical 
intuitions about capacity would depend on how these standards are defined. If they are 
construed as requiring agreement with what a clinician takes to be reasonable, or at 
least not significantly deviating from prevailing medical opinion, then the risk of 
paternalism arises. Decisions risk being undermined by paternalistic intentions if they 
are made in part on the basis of beliefs that do not accord with these epistemic 
standards. This is clearly an undesirable consequence. So how ought substantive 
epistemic standards to be characterised? 
 
In earlier chapters I used the theoretical apparatus of Davidson‘s project of Radical 
Interpretation to examine where the limits of interpretability and possibilities for 
intentional attribution lay. His Principle of Charity revealed two interdependent 
constraints of Correspondence and Coherence which were, he argued, necessary 
normative presuppositions for an interpreter seeking to attribute intentional states and 
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linguistic meaning to a people without any prior knowledge of their beliefs or language. 
From this theoretical reconstruction of the boundaries of interpretation emerged the 
epistemic standards of truth and coherence, taken broadly to be descriptive criteria of 
intentionality. At first glance, it therefore looks plausible to suggest that truth and 
coherence could be taken to form the epistemic standards underpinning judgements 
about a person‘s reasons. Indeed, these criteria are elevated to the status of normative 
prescriptions by the assumption of the Rationality Requirement that one ought to be 
rational. However, I diagnosed this assumption as resting upon a misconception. It 
would be a mistake to translate the normative constraints exposed by Radical 
Interpretation into an argument that truth and coherence supply normative epistemic 
standards circumscribing judgements about people‘s decision-making processes. This 
is because, as I argued previously, abstract generalised principles do not themselves 
normatively constrain our shared practice: the normativity of such principles emerges 
only within the context of the innumerable examples of practice from which they were 
derived. Seeking principled epistemic standards stripped of their context throws the 
baby, the source of normativity, out with the bathwater. 
 
The epistemic criteria of truth and coherence do not, therefore, normatively constrain 
intentional behaviour, although they may be useful descriptive generalisations about 
what beliefs look like. It thus appears that we have made no progress in identifying any 
criteria to fill out the claim that there are substantive epistemic standards constraining 
interpretation and judgements of decision-making, and there are good reasons for 
resisting any attempt to abstract and codify these standards. But some positive 
argument is surely needed to carry the weight of the claim that the epistemic standards 
intrinsic to capacity judgements exist and do not admit of radical variation between 
communities, or between individuals. I therefore turn now to consider the positive 
implications of the view of capacity I have argued for.  
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We can say only the following about the norms shaping our practice: that in individual 
instances of intentional behaviour it is possible to identify whether a particular belief or 
action is one that reasonably follows from a given belief, or in the case of decision-
making, whether a decision-outcome is one that reasonably follows from the 
information relevant to the decision at hand. In the first instance, this is not because the 
belief is subject to particular normative obligations of truth or coherence, but rather 
because what it is to have a belief is just that one reliably acts in a normatively 
appropriate way in light of it. By the same token, the input information is not 
constrained by specific epistemic standards in the process of being used or weighed, 
but rather what it is to use or weigh information is just that the resultant outcome is one 
that ought to have been reached. This normative obligation ought not to be construed 
in terms of adherence to principles but rather as a broad and general responsiveness 
to reasons that is manifest in our shared form of life. 
 
It is possible to reconcile the claim that capacity judgements cannot proceed through 
using content-neutral procedural criteria alone but involve substantive epistemic 
standards, with the need to avoid paternalistic denials of capacity based on the 
perceived lack of wisdom of decision outcomes. The key to understanding how this 
reconciliation can proceed lies in how we are to construe the content-ladenness of 
decision outcomes and the standards by which these are judged. I have argued that 
isolating the process involved in making a specific decision from the context in which it 
occurs leads us down the wrong path and breeds misconceptions about what it means 
to use or weigh information. The same is true of attempting to judge the determinate 
content of a decision as an outcome that one ought or ought not to have reached on 
the basis of the information available to the decision-maker. The fact that the decision 
outcome is evaluated in a capacity assessment does not mean that its content, in 
isolation, ought to be considered wise or good in order to indicate the presence of 
capacity. On its own, the decision outcome can neither be good nor bad, wise nor 
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unwise, appropriate nor inappropriate119. What makes the decision indicative of 
capacity is that it reasonably follows from the information given, the person‘s beliefs 
and so forth, all of which is normatively disciplined by the form of life we collectively 
inhabit as intentional agents. The decision content and the process by which it is 
formed are not conceptually separable elements of decision-making.  
 
On the rational interpretationist conception of intentionality I have adopted, what makes 
the decision an instance of intentional, reason-guided behaviour is just that it does bear 
normative epistemic and rational relations to the world and to the person‘s beliefs and 
other intentional states. Thus an evaluation of the decision outcome is not independent 
of its preceding process or the normative appropriateness of that decision within the 
context of the person‘s life and values. In light of this, the epistemic standards 
underpinning capacity judgements do not prescribe what one ought to do or believe 
and thereby constrain what decision outcomes one ought to reach, which would give 
rise to paternalistic judgements where the decision is considered to be unwise, but 
instead circumscribe the general normative structure of decisions made on the basis of 
reasons. 
6.2. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF CAPACITY JUDGEMENTS 
Holism and Context 
The view of capacity judgements I am defending suffers from the disadvantage that it is 
largely defined negatively by reference to what it rejects, rather than permitting a 
constructive positive argument to be developed about what capacity is and how it ought 
to be judged. Whilst a Wittgensteinian form of philosophical therapy is supposed to free 
us from the need to seek such positive explanations and justifications of our practice in 
the first place, I consider that adopting a form of quietism about capacity judgements is 
not a plausible option for a philosophical endeavour aiming to gain traction on the 
conceptual problems of assessing capacity in clinical practice. Hence although what 
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 Unless of course that decision leads to an action that breaches some legal or moral 
standard, for example, by causing harm to others. 
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follows gestures towards a constructive account of the framework in which capacity 
judgements take place, I recognise the inherent limitations of attempting to construct 
positive philosophical theses from insights largely derived from Wittgenstein‘s remarks 
on rules and Davidson‘s explicitly theoretical reconstruction of the grounds of 
interpretive judgement. 
 
An ability to be responsive to and act for reasons is a constitutive hallmark of 
intentional agency. The thesis of rational interpretationism advocated here claims that 
reasons, and the beliefs and desires that comprise them, ought not to be construed as 
private mental entities bearing contingent relationships to utterances and actions but 
instead as features of intentionality that are by their very nature interpretable by 
observers and disciplined both by the world and the norms of social practice. Having 
reasons for ones actions and decisions is therefore a matter of being able to respond to 
information gleaned from the world and from others in a way that is normatively 
appropriate and is interpreted as such by others. Different cultures and communities 
will undoubtedly diverge in many aspects of social practice, for example by placing high 
value on individual or community welfare, holding medical opinion or religious doctrine 
in high regard, considering scientific evidence or spiritual guidance to weigh in the 
balance of decision-making, and so forth. However, all such divergences in practice fall 
under the rubric of intentional behaviour and as such possess the intrinsic similarities 
captured by what I have called the normative structure of reasons. There is no abstract 
form to the structuring of reasons but we can still go some way towards charting their 
boundaries, or what Malpas (1992) refers to as the horizon of rationality, through cases 
where this structure breaks down. 
 
I suggest that to understand how this holistic normative account of the structure of 
reasons impacts upon individual judgements about a person‘s reasons, the insights of 
the Background Argument for rationality can be pressed into service. The norms of 
rationality are broad and messy, but they provide a framework within which intentional 
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behaviour, whether it is normatively appropriate or not, can be interpreted and 
understood. It is only in virtue of the implicit background structure of interconnected 
reasons, actions, intentional states and utterances that individual cases are able to be 
picked out as appearing irrational: a note of discord in an otherwise fairly coherent and 
harmonious symphony of intentional behaviour. 
 
Consider how acknowledging the essential role of this background affects judgements 
about mental capacity. Capacity is potentially undermined if a person makes a decision 
which does not reasonably follow from the information he has been given about the 
choice to be made. His behaviour can be understood as intentional if there is a clear 
reason explanation available for his decision, but if there are grounds to suspect the 
reason is caused by a mental impairment it will not count as being recognisable in the 
sense required for capacity. The difficult question facing a clinician is how to determine 
whether beliefs and other intentional states or values that appear out of the ordinary 
are impairing the decision-making process. It might be the case that there are elements 
of the person‘s belief and value system or motivational structure of which the clinician 
is unaware but in light of which the decision would reasonably follow, or it might be the 
case that it is indeed a mental impairment influencing the decision and thus the 
decision ought not to be respected as the expression of an autonomous choice. 
 
Presume for a moment that we can understand the person‘s assertions about his 
beliefs and decision in isolation, without questioning the meaning of these utterances. If 
there is any logically coherent reason connection between his asserted beliefs and the 
decision outcome no resources are available for the interpreter to distinguish between 
decisions that are the result of a pathology of belief from those that are legitimately 
made. As I have argued, examining the procedural criteria alone is of no justificatory 
help, and if the content of the beliefs entering into the process are judged on the basis 
of their truth or internal coherence with other beliefs, then many of our ordinarily held 
beliefs would fail to lead to reasonable decision outcomes. However, if the rich 
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framework of rationality within which reasons operate is taken seriously, then the 
conceptual resources are available to recognise blips in this rational landscape in a far 
more refined manner than simply identifying bizarre content and attempting to grasp 
whether or not it is indicative of pathology. For instance, in the case of the anorexic 
patient his overvaluation of thinness will likely be intrinsically bound up with numerous 
beliefs about how he appears, issues of self-esteem and self-worth, positive aspects of 
self-control, perceptions of aesthetic ideals, and so on. All of these factors and many 
more will modulate this valuation of thinness and each subtly influence what that 
valuation means and how it impacts upon his decision-making. Far from being so broad 
and general as to paralyse normative judgements about individual instances of 
decision-making, the global, holistic structure of reasons provides the backdrop of 
understanding against which potentially capacity-undermining divergences can be 
identified.  
 
In chapter two (section 2.4) I challenged the view that capacity could be determined 
either by appealing to the procedural logical coherence of the process of decision-
making or by evaluating the truth of or shared agreement about the particular beliefs 
that influence the decision outcome. Such standards fail to provide a criterion to 
distinguish between two cases in which different judgements of capacity would 
intuitively be made. A Jehovah‘s Witness has reasons for his decision to refuse a blood 
transfusion that legally ought to be respected, whereas an individual with the 
schizophrenic delusion that the blood for transfusion is poisoned does not have valid 
reasons. I used the disjunction between these two examples to motivate the concern 
that there could be different but valid epistemic standards governing the decision-
making process. Having now closed off this conceptual possibility, how is the difference 
between these cases to be understood? I suggest that the following conclusions can 
now be drawn. Seeking a criterion to distinguish capacity from incapacity in these 
cases is a futile exercise. If we examine the process stripped of all content and context, 
there is nothing to differentiate them. If we look to the epistemic status of the beliefs 
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influencing decision-making, neither truth, nor plausibility, nor level of communal 
agreement can support a distinction between the cases. We cannot generate a 
context-independent checklist for determining capacity, but this does not imply that the 
judgement is arbitrary: there is content to the idea that there is rational shape to the 
appreciation of a person‘s reasons. Although there is an inherent impediment to using 
examples as they cannot provide all the facts that might be relevant to an assessment 
of capacity, I suggest that we can gesture towards the kinds of questions a clinician 
conducting an assessment ought to bear in mind in the two cases mentioned. For 
example, one might query the consistency of the patient‘s decision-influencing beliefs 
with his broader worldview, the empirical sensibility such beliefs have and whether they 
are amenable to revision or argument, and the cultural acceptability and rationality of 
the values impinging upon decision-making, to name but a few possible considerations. 
It is only if we acknowledge the historical, social, physical and environmental context 
surrounding each decision and the relational nature of the intentional states entering 
into the decision-making process that we are in a position to identify where anomalies 
occur that might indicate impairment to decision-making capacity. Whilst we cannot 
provide a clear-cut prescriptive specification of how capacity judgements ought to work, 
there is nonetheless a rational structure to the determination of capacity. 
 
If an asserted belief is sustained in spite of being patently false or failing to be at all 
coherent with other beliefs an individual expresses or those of his community, there are 
grounds for suspecting the belief to be an irrational one, possibly caused by a 
psychopathological impairment. It is the failure of the rational and epistemic relations 
that ought to obtain that picks the belief out as being irrational, not the attributed 
content of the belief itself. This rational background accommodates potential 
divergences in epistemic norms of reasoning and evidence-weighing, as the 
individual‘s own belief and value system forms part of the rational structure within 
which irrationality is identified: the context of understanding the individual‘s other 
beliefs and the background of his social and historical environment provides this 
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framework. This point does not advert to the internal coherence of the individual‘s 
thoughts and actions conceived of as meaningful entities in isolation from the world. On 
the account I have developed, the identities of his thoughts, utterances and actions are 
partially constituted by the relations they bear to the world beyond his own brain, and 
by their interpretability by third-person observers. Essentially then, the holism and 
context-ladenness of the intentional realm provide a richer framework for identifying 
instances of irrationality that may undermine capacity than any attempt to grasp the 
singular process of a particular instance of decision-making can achieve. 
Philosophical Insights in Practice 
To gain an understanding of how the insights into the holistic and context-laden norms 
of rationality and reasons I have sought to clarify can be brought to bear on practical 
issues in clinical judgement, I will briefly consider a recent tragic case brought to the 
public‘s attention amidst significant debate among clinicians and law-makers about the 
ethical implications of implementing the Mental Capacity Act in practice. Kerrie 
Wooltorton was a 26 year old woman who had been diagnosed with an emotionally 
unstable personality disorder and depression for a number of years120. She had 
attempted suicide on nine previous occasions by drinking anti-freeze, but had 
subsequently accepted life-saving dialysis each time. In September 2007, she made a 
further suicide attempt and called an ambulance. A few days previously she had 
drafted an advance statement dictating that in the event of a suicide attempt she did 
not want to receive life-saving treatment. The statement asserted that if she called an 
ambulance, this did not indicate she had changed her mind and wished to be treated, 
but rather that she did not wish to die alone and in pain. On admission to hospital she 
presented this statement and directed doctors to read it when they asked her if she 
wanted treatment. The consultant renal physician assessed that Ms. Wooltorton 
possessed the capacity to refuse treatment and as a result she died four days later, 
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 Many details from the coroner‘s report are not in the public domain, and so all information 
regarding the circumstances of her admission to hospital and subsequent death has been 
gleaned from subsequently cited journal articles and responses. 
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having accepted only palliative care. As she was deemed to possess capacity, to 
disregard her decision or treat her on the basis of a best interests‘ judgement would 
have been unlawful. In September 2009, the Norfolk coroner upheld the decision of the 
treating doctors (Brannan et al., 2010). Whilst this case is undoubtedly complex and 
prompts many ethical, legal and clinical questions regarding the applicability of 
advance directives (MacLean, 2009) and the relation between different parts of the 
legislature (for example, the interface between the Mental Health Act (2007), the 
Mental Capacity Act (2005) and the Suicide Act (1961)), I wish to focus here on the 
determination of Ms. Wooltorton‘s capacity to refuse treatment that would likely have 
prevented her death.  
 
Given the clear precedent at common law (Re C) that the presence of a mental 
disorder is not a bar to the presence of capacity, Ms. Wooltorton‘s capacity would have 
been assessed according to the criteria laid out in the MCA: understanding, retaining, 
using or weighing information, and communicating a decision121. From the detail of the 
advance statement, demonstrating awareness of how her actions might be interpreted 
and the consequences that would follow, it is evident that Ms. Wooltorton was aware of 
the implications of her actions and cognizant of the fact that without medical 
intervention, her suicide attempt would likely succeed. In recording a narrative verdict, 
the coroner agreed that her treatment refusal was made in full knowledge of the likely 
consequences (Dyer, 2009). There is thus little question that strictly speaking the 
patient could be thought to fulfil all the criteria, entailing that legally, her decision must 
be respected. 
 
Much debate arose in light of this verdict, particularly among clinicians who were 
concerned that Ms. Wooltorton‘s mental capacity to refuse treatment might have been 
impaired. On the face of it, she had a recognisable reason for her decision: if we 
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 Although the MCA did not come into full legal force until 1
st
 October 2007, clinicians ought to 
have undergone training about its provisions and put them into practice by the time of Ms. 
Wooltorton‘s admission in September of that year. 
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consider that a factor in the decision-making process was a desire to die (this was 
thought to be in part because she was unable to bear children due to a medical 
condition), her action of drinking anti-freeze and refusing treatment reasonably follows, 
even if we would not condone that desire. Abstracted away from its context, there is 
nothing about this decision-making process that undermines capacity. But ought the 
desire to die be taken to be a simple premise in an inferential process? I suggest not. 
The point I wish to draw out here is that her treatment refusal ought to be understood in 
light of the complex context in which it was made, before a judgement as to whether or 
not she possessed the requisite capacity could be determined. It is only then that the 
potentially distorting effects of beliefs and values caused by a mental impairment would 
come to light.  
 
I am not suggesting that suicide may never be a choice made by a person with 
capacity, but rather that in order to frame a judgement about whether a person has 
capacity with regard to this decision, an understanding of the contextual and historical 
background of that decision needs to be in place. In the case of Ms. Wooltorton, whilst 
she clearly understood and accepted the consequences of treatment refusal, her 
history of failed suicide attempts by the same method, her depressive state, refusal to 
engage with the treating clinicians to discuss her options or her reasons for her 
decision, the clinical relevance of her unstable personality disorder, and the fact that 
she was a well known and frequent user of mental health services all contribute to a 
broad picture that could provide an enriched understanding of her mental capacity at 
the time of admission and treatment refusal.  
 
Treating judgements of capacity as a reductive exercise in ticking off criteria of mental 
functioning leads to an impoverished understanding of what it is to possess the 
capacity to make a particular decision and undermines the subtleties and complexities 
of clinical judgement. Whilst judgements of capacity are and will remain difficult, 
particularly in cases where the effects of psychiatric conditions are implicated in a 
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person‘s decision-making, I suggest that taking the contextual and holistic nature of 
reasons seriously does not diminish the objectivity and reliability of such judgements 
but in fact enhances it. If we seek to understand reasons holistically and not in 
empirical isolation from their relations and implications beyond the specific decision at 
hand, then we have the resources available to distinguish odd and perhaps 
idiosyncratic beliefs from those that may undermine capacity. Taking a narrow criterial 
approach to capacity assessment risks overlooking the very features of intentionality 
and decision-making that would enable these kinds of distinctions to be recognised. 
Clinical Judgements and Expertise 
The gesture towards a constructive account of the justifications for capacity 
judgements has thus far indicated that determining whether or not an individual has 
recognisable reasons for a decision is a matter of seeking to understand that decision 
in light of the normative structure of shared practice. I do not, however, wish to imply 
that capacity judgements are unskilled observations, the ability for which is simply a 
facet of one‘s natural ability to interpret intentional behaviour. The capacity for making 
such judgements is indeed intrinsic to participating in a shared form of life, but the 
ability to make good, reliable and accurate assessments of capacity is a skill that 
requires training, experience and the development of considerable expertise. This 
subtle but essential aspect of clinical training and practice is easily overlooked if one is 
focused solely on checking off the capacity criteria in assessing a person‘s decision-
making as though they were indices of cognitive functioning (Silberfeld & Checkland, 
1999).  
 
Expertise is a matter of practical wisdom that ought not to be construed as inferior to 
rule-based judgements or arbitrary because its standards cannot be abstracted from 
the practice in which the pronouncements of expertise are made. This is not a new 
problem: Dreyfus cites the examples of Socrates being frustrated by the failure of 
Euthyphro, an expert on piety, to articulate the piety-recognition rule by which Socrates 
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presumed he must make his judgements. Instead Euthyphro could only provide 
perspicuous examples of applications of his expertise (Dreyfus, 1992, p.67). But rather 
than taking this feature of expert judgement to be a limitation, or inferior to the objective 
rigour of a checklist of criteria, the arguments I have presented here and in the 
previous chapter point to the conclusion that such judgement is in fact crucial to a good 
assessment, as it is flexible and broad in scope, able to take into account subtle, 
complex contextual factors, a rich and possibly inconsistent history, the mitigating 
effects of particular beliefs, values, compulsions or fixations and innumerable other 
factors that influence a person‘s decision-making process.  
 
To give due consideration of how expertise ought to be defined or what the particular 
skills necessary to expert judgement would be would require significant further 
empirical and conceptual research, but the claim that capacity judgements do rely on 
what are fundamentally uncodified norms of judgement indicates that attempting to 
increase objectivity and reliability through a criteriological approach alone is a 
misguided strategy. This is not to suggest that codified criteria are dispensable in 
making assessments of capacity, but only that a simple reading of such criteria ought 
not to exhaust the normative standards implicated in what is intrinsically a complex 
judgement:  
―Providing they are interpreted intelligently, diagrammatic codifications can be 
helpful guides to practice. What they cannot do, however, is capture good 
clinical judgement independently of the tacit background. In themselves they 
remain merely partial and schematic codifications of practice‖ (Thornton, 
2006). 
Again there are close parallels with this view in debates within the philosophy of 
science: for Kuhn, the judgements of a trained expert scientific community constitute 
the best criterion of objectivity and rationality we have for scientific theories (Kuhn, 
1977). Although experts may not always achieve consensus in judgements, if capacity 
assessments are to be more robust and capable of reliably distinguishing capacity from 
incapacity, developing the skills necessary for complex, context-laden judgements 
would equip clinicians with the best possible tools for the difficult task at hand. 
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Future Directions for Research 
The purpose of capacity legislation is to ensure respect for individual autonomy as far 
as possible, whilst protecting the interests of those whose autonomy is impaired in 
relation to a particular decision. Autonomy is generally taken to refer to a person‘s 
ability to self-govern; to act and make choices freely, without interference or external 
influence (Christman, 2009). In bioethics the clearest use of the notion of autonomy is 
the requirement that informed consent is obtained prior to any medical intervention, 
which suggests that autonomy is the entitlement to self-determination with respect to 
the treatment one is subject to (Manson & O'Neill, 2007). Dworkin also predicates 
much of his influential ethical theory of autonomy on the ability to make decisions in a 
specific context (e.g., Dworkin, 1986) and other authors in bioethics suggest that 
“competency be regarded solely as a function of the capacity for autonomous action” 
(Silver, 2002, p.465). The concepts of capacity and autonomy are thus closely 
connected, although it is not clear to what extent they co-refer. Given the increasing 
prominence of capacity as a medico-legal concept and the broadly liberal political 
agenda in the UK, further research exploring the conceptual relationship between 
capacity and autonomy would be fruitful. It would be particularly interesting to consider 
the connection between capacity and autonomy in relation to the disparity between 
increasingly paternalistic mental health law that revokes the right to autonomy and the 
promotion of respect for choices that are made by individuals with capacity.  
 
These questions are also significant for broader fields of study in which the concept of 
autonomy is variously employed. There is a wealth of literature in the field of ethics, 
particularly derived from attempts to naturalise a Kantian conception of autonomy, that 
focuses on the evaluative elements of autonomy, and the conceptual exploration of the 
epistemic standards of capacity conducted here could potentially intersect with these 
discussions. I have argued that a test of capacity is not a purely procedural but 
depends on substantive criteria, and so if the concepts of capacity and autonomy 
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overlap there may be implications for the extensive debates in ethics and political 
philosophy about whether autonomy is a value-laden or content-neutral concept.  
 
In rejecting the reduction of capacity tests to sets of codified principles and checklist 
criteria I have emphasised the role of clinical expertise in assessing capacity, arguing 
that such expertise supplies the best kind of practical judgement possible for 
distinguishing capacity from incapacity. I have given a broad defence here of the 
importance of expertise in the face of a competing demand to secure the objectivity of 
assessments through the use of reductive criteria, but there is significant scope for 
research on the nature, bounds and justifications of expertise in clinical decision-
making, particularly when such judgements are as ethically and politically loaded as 
they are in mental health care. One potential area of contact lies in discussions about 
the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge, and the role that the latter, as a 
form of uncodifiable good judgement, plays in evidence based medicine (e.g., 
Thornton, 2006). Furthermore, the argument that clinical judgement does not derive its 
normative justifications from principles but rather from the uncodified rationality of 
practice may carry over into the field of medical ethics, in which judgements are 
typically based on the four cardinal principles set out in Beauchamp and Childress‘s 
influential textbook (2001, pt.II). 
 
The introduction of capacity legislation has placed the individual‘s ability to make 
particular decisions centre stage in conceptual and practical issues about the legitimate 
reach of healthcare and medical paternalism. Hingeing upon the determinations of a 
capacity assessment is the potential to deny an individual a fundamental human right, 
freedom of choice, and the potential to permit life-threatening decisions to be carried 
out by individuals whose health and welfare it is incumbent upon society to protect, 
even from themselves. Questions about how we ought to treat patients lacking capacity 
are ethically, politically and emotively loaded, and it is likely that the ethical debate will 
intensify as capacity legislation is tested in the courts and the rights of the individual in 
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medical decision-making are further championed. It is therefore imperative that 
decisions made paternalistically on behalf of patients are only taken when necessary, 
that is, when they lack the capacity to make particular decisions for themselves. In 
spite of sophisticated attempts to codify the criteria of capacity judgements to ensure 
objectivity and reliability across clinicians, in this thesis I have demonstrated the 
limitations of a narrow cognitive approach to decision-making and argued that 
objectivity is not sacrificed if the rich personal and interpersonal context in which 
decisions are made is acknowledged. 
 235 
References 
Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 4 All E.R. 649. 
B v Croydon Health Authority [1994a] 2 W.L.R. 294. 
Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 290. 
South West Hertfordshire Health Authority v KB [1994b] 2 F.C.R. 1051. 
Norfolk & Norwich Healthcare (NHS) Trust v W [1996] 2 F.L.R. 613. 
Re MB (Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 F.L.R. 426. 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 c. 9. [online] 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/pdf/ukpga_20050009_en.pdf. 
Trust A and Trust B v H (An Adult Patient) [2006] 2 FLR 958. 
Mental Health Act 2007 c. 12. [online] 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2007/pdf/ukpga_20070012_en.pdf. 
American Psychiatric Association (1980) Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 3rd Ed., Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
American Psychiatric Association (2000) Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 4th Ed., Text Revision, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric 
Association. 
Appelbaum, P. S. & Grisso, T. (1995) 'The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I: 
Mental illness and competence to consent to treatment.' Law & Human Behavior, 
19:2, 105-126. 
Appelbaum, P. S. & Roth, L. H. (1982) 'Competency to consent to research. A 
psychiatric overview.' Archives of General Psychiatry, 39:8, 951-958. 
Aronson, E. (1969) 'The theory of cognitive dissonance: a current perspective.' In 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology: Volume 4, L. Berkowitz (Ed.), New 
York: Academic Press, pp. 1-34. 
Ashton, G., Letts, P., Oates, L. & Terrell, M. (2006) Mental Capacity: The New Law, 
Jordan Publishing. 
Audi, R. (2004) 'Theoretical rationality: its sources, structure and scope.' In The Oxford 
Handbook of Rationality, A. R. Mele and P. Rawlings (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 17-44. 
Banner, N. F. & Thornton, T. (2007) 'The new philosophy of psychiatry: its (recent) 
past, present and future: a review of the Oxford University Press series International 
Perspectives in Philosophy and Psychiatry.' Philosophy, Ethics & Humanities in 
Medicine, 2:9. 
Bayne, T. & Pacherie, E. (2004) 'Experience, belief and the interpretive fold.' 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11:1, 81-86. 
 236 
Bean, G., Nishisato, S., Rector, N. A. & Glancy, G. (1994) 'The psychometric properties 
of the Competency Interview Schedule.' Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 39:8, 368-
376. 
Beauchamp, T. L. & Childress, J. F. (2001) Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bentall, R. P., Corcoran, R., Howard, R., Blackwood, N. & Kinderman, P. (2001) 
'Persecutory delusions: A review and theoretical integration.' Clinical Psychology 
Review, 21:8, 1143-1192. 
Bermúdez, J. L. (2001) 'Normativity and Rationality in Delusional Psychiatric 
Disorders.' Mind & Language, 16:5, 457-493. 
Bermúdez, J. L. (2005) Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, 
Routledge. 
Bermúdez, J. L. (2009) Decision Theory and Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Berrios, G. (1991) 'Delusions as "wrong beliefs": a conceptual history.' British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 159: 6-13. 
Bielby, P. (2005) 'The conflation of competence and capacity in English medical law: A 
philosophical critique.' Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy, 8:3, 357-369. 
Block, N. (1987) 'Functional role and truth conditions.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, LXI: 157-181. 
Bloor, D. (1973) 'Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics.' 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 4:2, 173-191. 
Bloor, D. (1983) Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, London. 
Bolton, D. & Hill, J. (2004) Mind, Meaning and Mental Disorder, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bortolotti, L. (2003) 'Inconsistency and interpretation.' Philosophical Explorations, 6:2, 
109-123. 
Bortolotti, L. (2004a) 'Can we interpret irrational behaviour?' Behavior & Philosophy, 
32: 359-375. 
Bortolotti, L. (2004b) 'Intentionality without rationality.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, CV:3, 385-392. 
Bortolotti, L. (2005) 'Delusions and the background of rationality.' Mind & Language, 
20:2, 189-208. 
Bortolotti, L. & Broome, M. R. (2008) 'Delusional beliefs and reason giving.' 
Philosophical Psychology, 21:6, 821-841. 
Braine, M. D. S., Reiser, B. J., & Rumain, B. (1984) 'Some empirical justification for a 
theory of natural propositional logic.' In The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 
G. H. Bower (Ed.), New York: Academic Press. 
Brannan, S., Davies, M., English, V., Mussell, R., Sheather, J., Chrispin, E. & 
Sommerville, A. (2010) 'Ethics briefings.' Journal of Medical Ethics, 36: 63-64. 
 237 
Breden, T. M. & Vollmann, J. (2004) 'The Cognitive Based Approach of Capacity 
Assessment in Psychiatry: A Philosophical Critique of the MacCAT-T.' Health Care 
Analysis, 12:4, 273-283. 
British Medical Association & The Law Society (2004) Assessment of Mental Capacity: 
Guidance for Doctors and Lawyers, British Medical Association. 
Broome, J. (1997) 'Reason and motivation.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Suppl. Vol. 71: 131-146. 
Buchanan, A. & Brock, D. W. (1986) 'Deciding for others.' Millbank Quarterly, 64:2, 17-
94. 
Cairns, R., Maddock, C., Buchanan, A., David, A. S., Hayward, P., Richardson, G., 
Szmukler, G. & Hotopf, M. (2005a) 'Prevalence and predictors of mental incapacity 
in psychiatric in-patients.' British Journal of Psychiatry, 187: 379-385. 
Cairns, R., Maddock, C., Buchanan, A., David, A. S., Hayward, P., Richardson, G., 
Szmukler, G. & Hotopf, M. (2005b) 'Reliability of mental capacity assessments in 
psychiatric in-patients.' British Journal of Psychiatry, 187:4, 372-378. 
Campbell, J. (2001) 'Rationality, meaning, and the analysis of delusion.' Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, and Psychology, 8:2, 89-100. 
Campbell, J. (2007) 'An interventionist approach to causation in psychology.' In Causal 
Learning: Psychology, Philosophy, & Computation, A. Gopnik and L. Schulz (Eds.), 
New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 58-66. 
Campbell, J. (2009) 'What does rationality have to do with psychological causation? 
Propositional attitudes as mechanisms and as control variables.' In Psychiatry As 
Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives, M. R. Broome and L. Bortolotti 
(Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137-149. 
Carpenter, W. T., Gold, J. M., Lahti, A. C., Queern, C. A., Conley, R. R., Barkto, J. J., 
Kovnick, J. & Appelbaum, P. S. (2000) 'Decisional capacity for informed consent in 
schizophrenia research.' Archives of General Psychiatry, 57: 533-538. 
Carroll, L. (1895) 'What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.' Mind, IV:14, 278-280. 
Charland, L. C. (2006) 'Anorexia and the MacCAT-T test for mental competence: 
validity, value, and emotion.' Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 13:4, 283-287. 
Charland, L. C. "Decision-making capacity" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) [online] 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/decision-capacity/. 
Charland, L. C. (2001) 'Mental competence and value: The problem of normativity in 
the assessment of decision-making capacity.' Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 8:2, 
135-145. 
Cherniak, C. (1981) 'Minimal Rationality.' Mind, XC: 161-183. 
Child, W. (1993) 'Anomalism, uncodifiability and psychophysical relations.' The 
Philosophical Review, 102:2, 215-245. 
Child, W. (1996a) 'Anomalism, rationality, and psychophysical relations.' In Causality, 
Interpretation & the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 56-90. 
 238 
Child, W. (1996b) Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Chomsky, N. (1986) Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use, NY: Praeger. 
Christman, J. "Autonomy in moral and political philosophy" The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) [online] 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/autonomy-moral. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1998 Protocol No. 11. 
Crary, A. (2000) 'Introduction.' In The New Wittgenstein, A. Crary and R. Read (Eds.), 
London: Routledge, pp. 1-18. 
Culver, C. M. & Gert, B. (2004) 'Competence.' In The Philosophy of Psychiatry: A 
Companion, Jennifer Radden (Ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 258-271. 
Danielson, P. (2004) 'Rationality & Evolution.' In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, 
A. R. Mele and P. Rawlings (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 417-439. 
Davidson, D. (1967) 'Truth and Meaning.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 17-42. 
Davidson, D. (1968) 'On saying that.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 93-108. 
Davidson, D. (1969) 'True to the facts.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 43-54. 
Davidson, D. (1970a) 'Mental events.' In Essays, (2001a) pp. 207-224. 
Davidson, D. (1970b) 'Semantics for natural languages.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 55-
64. 
Davidson, D. (1973a) 'Psychology as Philosophy.' In Essays, (2001a) pp. 229-245. 
Davidson, D. (1973b) 'Radical Interpretation.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 125-140. 
Davidson, D. (1974a) 'Belief and the basis of meaning.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 141-
154. 
Davidson, D. (1974b) 'On the very idea of a conceptual scheme.' In Inquiries, (2001b) 
pp. 183-198. 
Davidson, D. (1974c) 'Replies to David Lewis & W.V. Quine.' Synthese, 27: 345-349. 
Davidson, D. (1975) 'Thought and talk.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 155-170. 
Davidson, D. (1977) 'Reality without reference.' In Inquiries, (2001b) pp. 215-226. 
Davidson, D. (1978) 'Intending.' In Essays, (2001a) pp. 83-102. 
Davidson, D. (1982) 'Paradoxes of irrationality.' In Problems of Rationality, (2004) pp. 
169-188. 
Davidson, D. (1983) 'A Coherence theory of truth and knowledge.' In Subjective, 
Intersubjective, Objective, (2001) pp. 137-153. 
Davidson, D. (1985a) 'Incoherence and irrationality.' In Problems of Rationality, (2004) 
pp. 189-198. 
 239 
Davidson, D. (1985b) 'Replies to Essays X-XII.' In Essays on Davidson: Actions and 
Events, B. Vermazen and M. Hintikka (Eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 242-252. 
Davidson, D. (1986a) 'A nice derangement of epitaphs.' In Truth and Interpretation: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, 1989 E. LePore (Ed.), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, pp. 433-446. 
Davidson, D. (1986b) 'Deception and division.' In Problems of Rationality, (2004) pp. 
199-212. 
Davidson, D. (1990) 'The structure and content of truth.' The Journal of Philosophy, 
87:6, 279-328. 
Davidson, D. (1991) 'Three varieties of knowledge.' In Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective, (2001) pp. 205-220. 
Davidson, D. (1994) 'Radical Interpretation interpreted.' Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 
Logic and Language: 121-128. 
Davidson, D. (1995a) 'Could there be a science of rationality?' In Problems of 
Rationality, (2004) pp. 117-134. 
Davidson, D. (1995b) 'The objectivity of values.' In Problems of Rationality, (2004) pp. 
39-52. 
Davidson, D. (1997) 'The emergence of thought.' In Subjective, Intersubjective, 
Objective, (2001) pp. 123-134. 
Davidson, D. (2001a) Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davidson, D. (2001b) Inquiries Into Truth & Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Davidson, D. (2001) Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Davidson, D. (2003) 'Responses to Barry Stroud, John McDowell, and Tyler Burge.' 
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 67:3, 691-699. 
Davidson, D. (2004) Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Davies, M., Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. & Breen, N. (2001) 'Monothematic delusions: 
towards a two-factor account.' Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8:2-3, 133-158. 
Dawson, J. & Szmukler, G. (2006) 'Fusion of mental health and incapacity legislation.' 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 188: 504-509. 
Dennett, D. C. (1987) The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. 
Department of Constitutional Affairs (2007) Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of 
Practice, London: TSO. 
Dodd, J. (1999) 'There is no norm of truth: a minimalist reply to Wright.' Analysis, 
59:264, 291-299. 
Dreyfus, H. L. (1992) What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artifical Reason, 
MIT Press. 
 240 
Dreyfus, H. L. & Dreyfus, S. E. (1986) Mind Over Machine: the Power of Human 
Intuition & Expertise in the Era of the Computer, Mew York: MacMillan. 
Dummett, M. (1959) 'Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics.' Philosophical Review, 
68: 324-348. 
Dummett, M. (1993) 'What is a theory of meaning?' In The Seas of Language, Oxford: 
Oxford Universoty Press, pp. 1-33. 
Dworkin, R. (1986) 'Autonomy and the demented self.' The Millbank Quarterly, 
64:Suppl. 2, 4-16. 
Dyer, C. (2009) 'Coroner rules that treating 26 year old woman who wanted to die 
would have been unlawful.' British Medical Journal, 339: b4070. 
Elliot, A. J. & Devine, P. G. (1994) 'On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance: 
dissonance as a psychological discomfort.' Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology, 67: 382-394. 
Elster, J. (1984) 'The nature and scope of rational-choice explanation.' In Actions & 
Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, E. LePore and B. P. 
McLaughlin (Eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 60-72. 
Evans, J. & Over, D. E. (1996) Rationality & Reasoning, Psychology Press. 
Evnine, S. (1991) Donald Davidson, Stanford University Press. 
Eysenck, M. W. & Keane, M. T. (2005) 'Reasoning and deduction.' In Cognitive 
Psychology: A Student's Handbook, 5th Edition, Psychology Press, pp. 506-532. 
Fennell, P. (2007) Mental Health: The New Law, Bristol: Jordan Publishing. 
Finkelstein, D. H. (2000) 'Wittgenstein on rules and platonism.' In The New 
Wittgenstein, A. Crary and R. Read (Eds.), London: Routledge, pp. 53-73. 
Flanagan, O. (1984) The Science of the Mind, MIT Press. 
Fodor, J. & Lepore, E. (1992) Holism: A Shopper's Guide, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Foley, R. (1993) Working Without a Net, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Føllesdal, D. (1984) 'Causation and explanation: A problem in Davidson's view on 
action and mind.' In Actions & Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald 
Davidson, E. LePore and B. P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 311-323. 
Frankfurt, H. (1977) 'Freedom of the will and the concept of the person.' Journal of 
Philosophy, 68:1, 5-20. 
Freedman, B. (1981) 'Competence, marginal and otherwise: concepts and ethics.' 
Int.J.Law Psychiatry, 4:1-2, 53-72. 
Garety, P., Hemsley, D. & Wessely, S. (1991) 'Reasoning in deluded schizophrenic and 
paranoid patients: biases in performance on a probablistic inference task.' Journal of 
Nervous & Mental Disorder, 179: 194-201. 
Gerrans, P. (2004) 'Cognitive architecture and the limits of Interpretationism.' 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 11:1, 43-48. 
 241 
Gigerenzer, G. (2006) 'Bounded and rational.' In Contemporary Debates in Cognitive 
Science, R. J. Stainton (Ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 115-133. 
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M. & ABC Research Group (1999) Simple Heuristics That 
Make Us Smart, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gigerenzer, G. & Selten, R. (2001) 'Rethinking rationality.' In Bounded Rationality: The 
Adaptive Toolbox, Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (Eds.), MIT Press, pp. 1-
12. 
Glock, H.-J. (2003) Quine & Davidson on Language, Thought & Reality, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gold, I. & Howhy, J. (2000) 'Rationality and Schizophrenic Delusion.' In Pathologies of 
Belief, M. Coltheart and M. Davies (Eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 145-166. 
Goldman, A. I. (1989) 'Interpretation psychologized.' Mind & Language, 4: 161-185. 
Grandy, R. (1973) 'Reference, meaning and belief.' Journal of Philosophy, 70: 439-452. 
Grice, P. (1957) 'Meaning.' The Philosophical Review, 66: 377-388. 
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1995a) 'Comparison of standards for assessing 
patients' capacities to make treatment decisions.' American Journal of Psychiatry, 
152:7, 1033-1037. 
Grisso, T. & Appelbaum, P. S. (1995b) 'The MacArthur treatment competence study. 
III: Abilities of patients to consent to psychiatric and medical treatments.' Law & 
Human Behavior, 19:2, 149-174. 
Grisso, T., Appelbaum, P. S. & Hill-Fotouhi, C. (1997) 'The MacCAT-T: A clinical tool to 
assess patients' capacities to make treatment decisions.' Psychiatric Services, 
48:11, 1415-1419. 
Grisso, T., Appelbaum, P. S., Mulvey, E. P. & Fletcher, K. (1995) 'The MacArthur 
treatment competence study. II: Measures of abilities related to competence to 
consent to treatment.' Law & Human Behavior, 19:2, 127-148. 
Grubb, A. (2004) 'Consent ot Treatment: Competent Patient.' In Principles of Medical 
Law, A. Grubb and J. Laing (Eds.), Oxford University Press. 
Grubb, A. & Laing, J. (2004) Principles of Medical Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gunn, M. (1994) 'The meaning of incapacity.' Medical Law Review, 2: 8-29. 
Gunn, M. J., Wong, J. G., Clare, I. C. H. & Holland, A. J. (1999) 'Decision-Making 
Capacity.' Medical Law Review, 7: 269-306. 
Harman, G. (1999) 'Rationality.' In Reasoning, Meaning & Mind, G. Harman (Ed.), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 10-45. 
Harman, G. (2004) 'Practical aspects of theoretical reasoning.' In The Oxford 
Handbook of Rationality, A. R. Mele and P. Rawlings (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 45-56. 
Hattiangadi, A. (2006) 'Is Meaning Normative?' Mind & Language, 21:2, 220-240. 
 242 
Heal, J. (1998) 'Understanding Other Minds from the Inside.' In Current Issues in 
Philosophy of Mind, A. O'Hear (Ed.), Cambridge University Press, pp. 83-100. 
Heal, J. (2008) ''Back To The Rough Ground!' Wittgensteinian Reflections on 
Rationality and Reason.' In Wittgenstein and Reason, J. Preston (Ed.), Oxford: 
Blackwell, pp. 47-64. 
Heil, J. (1989) 'Minds divided.' Mind, XCVIII:392, 571-583. 
Henderson, D. K. (1987) 'A solution to Davidson's paradox of irrationality.' Erkenntnis, 
27:3, 359-369. 
Henderson, D. K. (1991) 'Rationalizing explanation, normative principles, and 
descriptive generalizations.' Behavior & Philosophy, 19:1, 1-20. 
Higgs, R. (2004) 'The contribution of narrative ethics to issues of capacity in 
psychiatry.' Health Care Analysis, 12:4, 307-316. 
Hollis, M. (1994) 'Rationality and relativism.' In The Philosophy of Social Science: An 
Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 224-247. 
Holroyd, J. (2010) 'Clarifying capacity: values and reasons'. Unpublished draft. 
Hopkins, J. (2004) 'Wittgenstein, Davidson, and the methodology of interpretation'. 
Unpublished draft. 
Horwich, P. (2005) Reflections on Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hotopf, M. (2005) 'The assessment of mental capacity.' Clinical Medicine, 5:6, 580-584. 
Hunt, G. (1990) 'Schizophrenia and indeterminacy: the problem of validity.' Theoretical 
Medicine, 11: 61-78. 
Hurley, S. & Nudds, M. (2006) Rational Animals?, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Jackman, H. (2003) 'Charity, self interpretation and belief.' Journal of Philosophical 
Research, 28: 145-170. 
Janofsky, J. S., McCarthy, R. J. & Folstein, M. F. (1992) 'The Hopkins Competency 
Assessment Test: A brief method for evaluating patients' capacity to give informed 
consent.' Hospital & Community Psychiatry, 43:2, 132-136. 
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Legrenzi, P. & Legrenzi, M. S. (1972) 'Reasoning and a sense of 
reality.' The British Journal of Psychology, 63: 395-400. 
Jones, R. (2005a) Mental Capacity Act Manual, Andover: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Jones, R. (2005b) 'Review of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.' Psychiatric Bulletin, 29: 
423-427. 
Joseph, M. (2004) Donald Davidson, Acumen. 
Kacelnik, A. (2006) 'Meanings of Rationality.' In Rational Animals?, S. Hurley and M. 
Nudds (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kahnemann, D. & Tversky, A. (1972) 'Subjective probability: a judgment of 
representativeness.' Cognitive Psychology, 3: 430-454. 
 243 
Kemp, R., Chua, S., McKenna, P. & David, A. S. (1997) 'Reasoning and delusions.' 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 170: 398-405. 
Kennedy, I. (1997) 'Commentary on Re MB (Medical Treatment).' Medical Law Review, 
5: 317-353. 
Kim, S. Y. H. (2006) 'When does decisional impairment become decisional 
incompetence? Ethical and methodological issues in capacity research in 
schizophrenia.' Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32:1, 92-97. 
Kim, S. Y. H., Caine, E. D., Currier, G. W., Leibovici, A. & Ryan, J. M. (2001) 
'Assessing the competence of persons with Alzheimer's disease in providing 
informed consent for participation in research.' American Journal of Psychiatry, 
158:5, 712-717. 
Kim, S. Y. H., Karlawish, J. H. T. & Caine, E. D. (2002) 'Current state of research on 
decision-making competence of cognitively impaired elderly persons.' American 
Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 10:2, 151-165. 
Kitamura, F., Tomoda, A., Tsukada, K., Tanaka, M., Kawakami, I., Mishima, S. & 
Kitamura, T. (1998) 'Method for assessment of competency to consent in the 
mentally ill: Rationale, development, and comparison with the medically ill.' 
International Journal of Law & Psychiatry, 21:3, 223-244. 
Korsgaard, C. M. (1996) The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Kuhn, T. (1970a) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd Ed., Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970b) 'Reflections on my critics.' In Criticism & the Growth of Knowledge, 
I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (Eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
231-278. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1977) 'Objectivity, value judgment and theory choice.' In The Essential 
Tension, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 320-339. 
Kupfer, D. J., First, M. B. & Reggier, D. A. (2002) A Research Agenda for DSM-V, 
American Psychiatric Association. 
Kusch, M. (2006) A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules: Defending Kripke's 
Wittgenstein, Chesham, Acumen. 
Laing, R. D. (1967) Politics of Experience, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Langdon, R. & Coltheart, M. (2000) 'The cognitive neuropsychology of delusions.' In 
Pathologies of Belief, M. Davies and M. Coltheart (Eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 183-
215. 
Law Commission (1991) No. 119. Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: 
An Overview, London: HMSO. 
Law Commission (1993) No. 128. Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: 
A New Jurisdiction, London: HMSO. 
 244 
Law Commission (1993) No. 129. Mentally Incapacitated Adults and Decision-Making: 
Medical Treatment and Research, London: HMSO. 
Law Commission (1995) Report No. 231. Mental Incapacity, London: HMSO. 
Lear, J. (1982) 'Leaving the world alone.' The Journal of Philosophy, 79:7, 382-403. 
Lear, J. (1986) 'Transcendental Anthropology.' In Subject, Thought & Context, J. 
McDowell and P. Pettit (Eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 267-298. 
Lear, J. & Stroud, B. (1984) 'The Disappearing 'We'.' Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volumes, 58: 219-258. 
Leeser, J. & O'Donohue, W. (1999) 'What is a delusion? Epistemological dimensions.' 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108:4, 687-694. 
Lepore, E. & Ludwig, K. (2005) Donald Davidson: Meaning, Truth, Language & Reality, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
LePore, E. & Ludwig, K. (2006) 'Introduction.' In The Essential Davidson, E. LePore 
and K. Ludwig (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-22. 
Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1923) Primitive Mentality (Trans. L.A. Clare of La Mentalité Primitive 
(Paris, 1922), London: Allen & Unwin. 
Lloyd, G. E. R. (2007) Cognitive Variations: Reflections on the Unity and Diversity of 
the Human Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ludwig, K. (2004) 'Rationality, Language and the Principle of Charity.' In The Oxford 
Handbook of Rationality, A. R. Mele and P. Rawlings (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 343-362. 
Luntley, M. (2003) 'Rules and other people.' In Wittgenstein: Meaning & Judgement, 
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 93-123. 
Luntley, M. (2006) 'Keeping track, autobiography, and the conditions for self-erosion.' 
In Dementia: Mind, Meaning, and the Person, J. C. Hughes, S. J. Louw, and S. R. 
Sabat (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 105-122. 
MacLean, S. (2009) 'Live and let die.' British Medical Journal, 339: b4112. 
Maher, B. A. (1999) 'Anomalous experience in everyday life: its significance for 
psychopathology.' The Monist, 82: 547-570. 
Malpas, J. E. (1992) Donald Davidson & the Mirror of Meaning: Holism, Truth, 
Interpretation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Manson, N. C. & O'Neill, O. (2007) Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Martin, A. M. (2007) 'Tales Publicly Allowed: Competence, Capacity and Religious 
Beliefs.' Hastings Center Report, 37:1, 33-40. 
McDowell, J. (1979) 'Virtue and Reason.' The Monist, 62: 331-350. 
McDowell, J. (1984a) 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism.' In Actions and Events: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, E. LePore and B. P. 
McLaughlin (Eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 387-398. 
 245 
McDowell, J. (1984b) 'Wittgenstein on Following a Rule.' Synthese, 58: 325-363. 
McDowell, J. (1986) 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space.' In Subject, 
Thought and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 137-168. 
McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World, Harvard University Press. 
McDowell, J. (1998) Mind, Value, and Reality, President and Fellows of Harvard 
College. 
McGinn, M. (1997) Wittgenstein & the Philosophical Investigations, London: Routledge. 
McLaughlin, B. P. (1985) 'Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental.' In 
Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, E. LePore 
and B. P. McLaughlin (Eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 331-368. 
McLeod, P., Plunkett, K., & Rolls, E. T. (2006) 'The attraction of Parallel Distributed 
Processing for modelling cognition.' In Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary 
Readings, J. L. Bermúdez (Ed.), Routledge, pp. 182-202. 
Mele, A. R. & Rawling, P. (2004) The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Alfred R. Mele 
and Piers Rawling (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) The Phenomenology of Perception, Trans. Colin Smith, 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Millar, A. (2004) Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Miller, A. (1998) Philosophy of Language, Routledge. 
Mišcevic N. (2000) Rationality & Cognition: Against Relativism-Pragmatism, University 
of Toronto Press. 
Moran, R. (2001) Authority & Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton 
University Press. 
Mukherjee, S. & Shah, A. (2001) 'The prevalence and correlates of capacity to consent 
to a geriatric psychiatry admission.' Aging and Mental Health, 5:4, 335-339. 
Mulhall, S. (1987) 'Davidson on interpretation and understanding.' The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 37:148, 319-322. 
Nozick, R. (1993) The Nature of Rationality, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Nygaard, H. A., Naik, M. & Ruths, S. (2000) 'Mental impairment in nursing home 
residents.' Tidsskr.Nor Laegeforen., 120:26, 3113-3116. 
Nys, H., Welie, S., Garanis-Papadatos, T. & Ploumpidis, D. (2004) 'Patient capacity in 
mental health care: Legal overview.' Health Care Analysis, 12:4, 329-337. 
Oaksford, M. & Chater, N. (2001) 'The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.' 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5:8, 349-357. 
Okai, D., Owen, G., McGuire, H., Singh, S., Churchill, R. & Hotopf, M. (2007) 'Mental 
capacity in psychiatric patients: systematic review.' British Journal of Psychiatry, 
191: 291-297. 
 246 
Owen, G. S., Cutting, J. & David, A. S. (2007) 'Are people with schizophrenia more 
logical than healthy volunteers?' British Journal of Psychiatry, 191: 453-454. 
Owen, G. S., David, A. S., Richardson, G., Szmukler, G., Hayward, P. & Hotopf, M. 
(2009a) 'Mental capacity, diagnosis and insight in psychiatric in-patients: a cross-
sectional study.' Psychological Medicine, 39: 1389-1398. 
Owen, G. S., Freyenhagen, F., Richardson, G. & Hotopf, M. (2009b) 'Mental capacity 
and decisional autonomy: an interdisciplinary challenge.' Inquiry, 52:1, 79-107. 
Pettit, P. (1990) 'The Reality of Rule-Following.' Mind, 99: 1-21. 
Pettit, P. & McDowell, J. (1986) 'Introduction.' In Subject, Thought and Context, P. 
Pettit and J. McDowell (Eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Pettit, P. & Smith, M. (1990) 'Backgrounding Desire.' The Philosophical Review, 99:4, 
565-592. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press. 
Radden, J. (1985) Madness and Reason, London: Allen and Unwin. 
Ramberg, B. T. (1989) Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language: An Introduction, 
Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Raymont, V. (2002) ''Not in perfect mind' - the complexity of clinical capacity 
assessment.' Psychiatric Bulletin, 26: 201-204. 
Raymont, V., Bingley, W., Buchanan, A., David, A. S., Hayward, P., Wessely, S. & 
Hotopf, M. (2004) 'Prevalence of mental incapacity in medical inpatients and 
associated risk factors: cross-sectional study.' Lancet, 364:9443, 1421-1427. 
Raz, J. (1999) 'Explaining normativity: on rationality and the justification of reason.' 
Ratio (new series), 12: 354-379. 
Rhodes, J. & Gipps, R. G. T. (2008) 'Delusions, certainty, and the Background.' 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 15:4, 295-310. 
Richards, S. & Mughal, A. F. (2006) Working With the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 
Hampshire: Matrix Training Associates. 
Rosenberg, J. "Wilfrid Sellars" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) [online] 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/sellars/. 
Rudnick, A. (2002) 'Depression and competence to refuse psychiatric treatment.' 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 28: 151-155. 
Sackett, D. L., Haynes, R. B., Guyatt, G. H. & Tugwell, P. (1991) Clinical Epidemiology: 
A Basic Science for Clinical Medicine, Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co. 
Sass, L. A. (1994) The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber and the 
Schizophrenic Mind, Cornell University Press. 
Schulte, J. (2008) 'Rules and Reason.' In Wittgenstein and Reason, J. Preston (Ed.), 
Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 107-122. 
 247 
Searle, J. R. (2001) 'The Classical Model of Rationality and its weaknesses.' In 
Rationality In Action, MIT Press, pp. 1-33. 
Sesardic, N. (1986) 'Psychology without Principle of Charity.' Dialectica, 40:3, 229-240. 
Silberfeld, M. (1994) 'Evaluating decisions in mental capacity assessments.' 
International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry, 9:5, 365-371. 
Silberfeld, M. & Checkland, D. (1999) 'Faulty judgment, expert opinion, and decision-
making capacity.' Theoretical Medicine & Bioethics, 20:4, 377-393. 
Silver, M. (2002) 'Reflections on determining competency.' Bioethics, 16:5, 455-468. 
Smith, M. (2004) 'Humean Rationality.' In The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, A. R. 
Mele and P. Rawlings (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75-92. 
Spitzer, M. (1990) 'On defining delusions.' Comprehensive Psychiatry, 31:5, 377-397. 
Stauch, M., Wheat, K. & Tingle, J. (2006) Text, Cases and Materials on Medical Law, 
New York: Routledge Cavendish. 
Stein, E. (1996) Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy & 
Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Stich, S. (1983) From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bradford Books, MIT Press. 
Stich, S. P. (1999) 'Dennett on Intentional Systems.' In Mind & Cognition: An 
Anthology, W. G. Lycan (Ed.), Blackwell, pp. 87-100. 
Stone, T. & Young, A. W. (1997) 'Delusions and brain injury: The philosophy and 
psychology of belief.' Mind & Language, 12:3-4, 327-364. 
Stroud, B. (1979) 'Inference, Belief, and Understanding.' Mind, LXXXVIII:1, 179-196. 
Tan, J. & Hope, T. (2008) 'Treatment refusal in anorexia: a challenge to current 
concepts of capacity.' In Empirical Ethics in Psychiatry, Widdershoven G., T. Hope, 
and J. McMillan (Eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 187-211. 
Tan, J., Hope, T. & Stewart, A. (2003) 'Competence to refuse treatment in anorexia 
nervosa.' International Journal of Law & Psychiatry, 26:6, 697-707. 
Tan, J. O. A., Stewart, A., Fitzpatrick, R. & Hope, T. (2006) 'Competence to make 
treatment decisions in anorexia nervosa: thinking processes and values.' 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 13:4, 267-282. 
Taylor, C. (2002) 'Foundationalism and the inner-outer distinction.' In Reading 
McDowell: On Mind & World, N. H. Smith (Ed.), New York: Routledge, pp. 106-119. 
Thornton, T. (1997) 'Reasons and Causes in Philosophy and Psychopathology.' 
Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 4:4, 307-317. 
Thornton, T. (2005) John McDowell, Acumen. 
Thornton, T. (2006) 'Tacit knowledge as the unifying factor in evidence based medicine 
and clinical judgement.' Philosophy, Ethics & Humanities in Medicine, 1:2. 
 248 
Tomoda, A., Yasumiya, R., Sumiyama, T., Tsukada, K., Hayakawa, T., Matsubara, K., 
Kitamura, F. & Kitamura, T. (1997) 'Validity and reliability of structured interview for 
competency incompetency assessment testing and ranking inventory.' Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 53:5, 443-450. 
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983) 'Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the 
conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.' Psychological Review, 91: 293-315. 
Tversky, A. & Kahnemann, D. (1974) 'Judgement under uncertainty: heuristics and 
biases.' Science, 185: 1124-1131. 
Van Staden, C. W. & Kruger, C. (2003) 'Incapacity to give informed consent owing to 
mental disorder.' Journal of Medical Ethics, 29:1, 41-43. 
Vellinga, A., Smit, J. H., van Leeuwen, E., van Tilburg, W. & Jonker, C. (2004) 
'Instruments to assess decision-making capacity: An overview.' International 
Psychogeriatrics, 16:4, 397-419. 
Viglione, V., Muratori, F., Maestro, S., Brunori, E. & Picchi, L. (2006) 'Denial of 
symptoms and psychopathology in adolescent anorexia nervosa.' Psychopathology, 
39:5, 255-260. 
Vollman, J., Bauer, A., Danker-Hopfe, H. & Helmchen, H. (2003) 'Competence of 
mentally ill patients: a comparative empirical study.' Psychological Medicine, 33: 
1463-1471. 
Waldfogel, S. & Meadows, S. (1996) 'Religious issues in the capacity evaluation.' 
General Hospital Psychiatry, 18:3, 173-182. 
Wallace, R. J. "Practical Reason" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) [online] 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/practical-reason/. 
Wason, P. C. (1983) 'Realism and rationality in the selection task.' In Thinking and 
Reasoning: Psychological Approaches, J. St Evans (Ed.), Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
pp. 44-75. 
Wedgwood, R. (2007) The Nature of Normativity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wiggins, D. (1975) 'Deliberation and Practical Reason.' In Needs, Values, Truth: 
Essays in the Philosophy of Value, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 215-237. 
Williams, M. (1991) 'Blind Obedience: Rules, Community and the Individual.' In 
Meaning Scepticism, K. Puhl (Ed.), Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., pp. 93-125. 
Wilson, N. L. (1959) 'Substances without substrata.' Review of Metaphysics, 12: 521-
539. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (Ed.), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1956) Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Eds.), 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 249 
Wong, J. G., Clare, I. C. H., Holland, A. J., Watson, P. C. & Gunn, M. (2000) 'The 
capacity of people with a 'mental disability' to make a health care decision.' 
Psychological Medicine, 30: 295-306. 
Wright, C. (1980) Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, London: 
Duckworth. 
Wright, C. (1984) 'Kripke's account of the argument against private language.' The 
Journal of Philosophy, 81:12, 759-778. 
Wright, C. (2002) 'Human Nature?' In Reading McDowell: On Mind & World, N. H. 
Smith (Ed.), New York: Routledge, pp. 140-159. 
Zahavi, D. (2005) Subjectivity & Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
 
